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Abstract
In an effort to separate the Islamic regulatory scheme with respect to the criminalization of
consensual sexual conduct from the caricature espoused by many Western thinkers, this Note pro-
vides a comparative analysis of the criminalization of private consensual sexual conduct in Islamic
law and U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on the right of privacy. Part I provides a brief background
of Islamic and U.S. criminal regulations on consensual sex and outlines the evolution of consti-
tutional privacy jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Part II first examines the evidentiary
and procedural requirements pertaining to the criminalization of consensual sexual intercourse in
Islamic law, explores the consequences of transgressing these evidentiary requirements, and ana-
lyzes the theological and privacy-related constraints on initiating suits for engaging in such private
conduct. Part II then applies these regulations to the recent case of Amina Lawal in northern
Nigeria, and analyzes Islamic regulations governing sexual activity not amounting to intercourse.
Finally, Part II examines an alternative reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s current analysis of
privacy as articulated in Lawrence v. Texas. Finally, Part III argues that Islamic evidence law and
consequences of evidentiary transgression act as a de jure restriction to prosecuting individuals
who engage in private consensual sex. Combined with theological and privacy-related regula-
tions, which act as deterrents to such prosecutions, these evidentiary requirements create a zone of
privacy that protects private consensual sex from State regulation. Part III then argues that the U.S.
Supreme Court has subtly shifted away from recognizing privacy-related rights towards asserting
a stance against all morals legislation, and concludes that it is the Court’s anti-morals legisla-
tion rhetoric, and not the constitutional right of privacy, that determines the holding in Lawrence.
Moreover, Part III draws a distinction between the Islamic and American approaches to privacy
jurisprudence by examining the significantly distinct consequences of the Islamic guarantee of
privacy and the American criticism of morals-based legislation. Exploring the ramifications of the
Court’s anti-morals legislation posture, Part III concludes that, despite the caricature embraced by
the Western world, the real right of privacy resides in Islamic jurisprudence.
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PENUMBRAS, PRIVACY, AND THE DEATH
OF MORALS-BASED LEGISLATION:
COMPARING U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WITH THE INHERENT RIGHT OF PRIVACY
IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
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INTRODUCTION
Islamic jurisprudence designates adultery and fornication as
crimes against God.1 Individuals who privately engage in such
activity (unless they freely confess) answer only to God and not
the State. 2 Although the international community customarily
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., Cornell Univer-
sity, 2001. I am indebted to many people for their guidance, assistance, patience, and
encouragement. I would like to thank Dr. Mohammad Fadel, Martin Flaherty, Asifa
Quraishi, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the editors of the ILJ, notably Neil Dennis, Margarita
Melikjanian, Michel Paradis, and Michele Totah, for allowing me to publish in this
unique book, and especially my family. wa usaddiru kitabi hadha musta 'inan billah
raghiban ilayh.
1. See MOHAMED S. EL-AwA, PUNISHMENTf IN ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1981) (observing that
in Islamic law, application of punishment for fornication and adultery is considered
right of God); Ahmad Abd al-Aziz al-Alfi, Punishment in Islamic Criminal Law, in THE
ISLAMIC CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 227 (listing certain offenses as crimes
against God); Ruud Peters, Zina, in 11 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 509 (P.J. Bearman
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that majority of Sunni schools of thought classify homo-
sexual sodomy as crime against God, with exception of Hanafis). Whether homosexual
anal intercourse constitutes adultery or fornication is a matter of controversy among
Muslim jurists. Id. The majority of Sunni schools treat such conduct in the same man-
ner as illicit heterosexual intercourse. Id. See 4 al-Dardir, AL-SHARH AL-SAGHIR 448
(Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif n.d.) (describing juristic views on heterosexual sodomy). The
majority of Sunni jurists regard heterosexual anal intercourse between a non-marital
couple as a crime against God. Id. Such activity within marriage, although considered
sinful by these jurists, is not a crime against God. Id. See 3 al-Mawwaq, AL-TAJ WA-L-IKLIL
405-06 (n.d.) (providing commentary on Mukhtasar of Khalil and noting that majority
of Sunni jurists regard anal intercourse between married couple as sinful). See generally
5 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 776-79 (C.E. Bosworth et al. eds., 1983) (discussing sod-
omy in Islam).
2. See Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan From
a Woman-Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 287, 313 (1997) (distinguishing be-
tween individual's obligations to God and State); Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Between the
Shari[']ah and "Barbarism," available at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/barticles/
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associates legal restrictions on consensual sexual behavior with
non-Western traditions, such constraints extend to Western re-
gions, including the United States.' Historically, numerous juris-
dictions in the United States have criminalized adultery, fornica-
tion, and sodomy between consenting adults acting in private.4
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's construal of a constitutional
right of privacy, many of these statutes have continued to sur-
vive. 5 These laws have endured precisely because, until a 2003
challenge to a State regulation criminalizing homosexual sod-
omy,6 the Supreme Court had failed to establish a right for con-
senting adults to engage in private sexual activity.7 This Note
seeks to demonstrate that it has taken over 200 years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence to establish a right of privacy that has sub-
sisted since the advent of Islamic law.8
betweentheshariahand.htm [hereinafter Sanusi, Between the Shari[']ah and "Barba-
rism"] (drawing distinction between private and public morals in Islamic law).
3. See Shari[']a[h] Law: What do you Think?, BBC NEws, Sept. 2, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talkingpoint/debates/africandebates/2203988.stm
(cataloging international criticisms and assumptions regarding Islamic regulation of
sexual conduct); Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social
Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REv. 643, 647 (2001) (noting that, as of mid-1999,
eighty-six countries criminalized same-sex intimate activity between consenting adults).
4. See, e.g., Melissa Ash Haggard, Note, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and
State Law and the Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal Justice System,
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 470-73 (1998) (discussing common law and contemporary
prohibitions on adultery); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on
Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1660, 1661-63 (1991) [hereinafter Note,
Constitutional Barriers] (describing historical proscription of fornication); Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (discussing statutory prohibitions of all sodomy in
general and same-sex sodomy in particular pre- and post-Bowers). See also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., FROM OUTLAWS TO CITIZENS: GAY AMERICANS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
Lawrence (forthcoming n.d.) (manuscript at 2-15, on file with author) (discussing histori-
cal ban on same-sex sodomy).
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 359, 360 (Mass. 1983) (de-
nying challenge to adultery statute as infringing constitutional right of privacy); Doe v.
Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200, 1201, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (rejecting chal-
lenge to sodomy legislation as violating constitutional privacy rights).
6. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475, 2484 (establishing fundamental right for con-
senting adults of same sex to engage in private acts of intimacy); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (repealed 2003) (criminalizing same-sex sodomy).
7. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (circumscribing right of privacy);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 n.5, 695 n.17 (1977) (noting that
Court had not yet established right for consenting adults to engage in private acts of
intimacy); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (rejecting argument that Court's privacy jurispru-
dence protects any private sexual activity between consenting adults from State regula-
tion).
8. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82, 2484 (protecting individual autonomy in mat-
ters of private intimacy); I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &JUsTICE 192 (Joshia Dressler ed.,
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In an effort to separate the Islamic regulatory scheme with
respect to the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct from
the caricature espoused by many Western thinkers, this Note
provides a comparative analysis of the criminalization of private
consensual sexual conduct in Islamic law and U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence on the right of privacy. Part I provides a brief
background of Islamic and U.S. criminal regulations on consen-
sual sex and outlines the evolution of constitutional privacy juris-
prudence in the U.S. Supreme Court. Part II first examines the
evidentiary and procedural requirements pertaining to the
criminalization of consensual sexual intercourse in Islamic law,
explores the consequences of transgressing these evidentiary re-
quirements, and analyzes the theological and privacy-related
constraints on initiating suits for engaging in such private con-
duct. Part II then applies these regulations to the recent case of
Amina Lawal in northern Nigeria, and analyzes Islamic regula-
tions governing sexual activity not amounting to intercourse. Fi-
nally, Part II examines an alternative reading of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's current analysis of privacy as articulated in Law-
rence v. Texas.
Finally, Part III argues that Islamic evidence law and conse-
quences of evidentiary transgression act as a de jure restriction
to prosecuting individuals who engage in private consensual sex.
Combined with theological and privacy-related regulations,
which act as deterrents to such prosecutions, these evidentiary
requirements create a zone of privacy that protects private con-
sensual sex from State regulation. Part III then argues that the
U.S. Supreme Court has subtly shifted away from recognizing
privacy-related rights towards asserting a stance against all
morals legislation, and concludes that it is the Court's anti-
morals legislation rhetoric, and not the constitutional right of
privacy, that determines the holding in Lawrence. Moreover, Part
III draws a distinction between the Islamic and American ap-
proaches to privacy jurisprudence by examining the significantly
distinct consequences of the Islamic guarantee of privacy and
the American criticism of morals-based legislation. Exploring
the ramifications of the Court's anti-morals legislation posture,
Part III concludes that, despite the caricature embraced by the
2d ed. 2002) (noting that Islamic law developed during first three and half centuries
after death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D.).
2003] PRIVACY IN ISLAMIC JURISPR UDENCE 373
Western world, the real right of privacy resides in Islamic juris-
prudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Islamic Law: The Regulation of Consensual Sex
Before defining the laws proscribing consensual sexual in-
tercourse in Islam, a comprehensive analysis of the criminaliza-
tion of such conduct requires familiarity with the sources of Is-
lamic law.
1. Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence
Classical Islamic jurisprudence, or Shari'ah,9 speaks of four
sources of law: the Qur'an,"° Sunnah,1 l qiyas 12 and ijma.1 3 Di-
9. See N. Calder, Shari'a[h], in 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 321 (C.E. Bosworth
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) (defining Shari'ah as rules, derived primarily from Qur'an and
hadith, which govern lives of Muslims); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at xiii (defining Shari'ah as Islamic law); Irshad
Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7J. ISLAMIC L. & CUL-
TURE 27, 33-34 (2002) (defining Shari'ah as pathway which God directs Muslims to fol-
low); QUR'AN 45:18 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 10th ed., amana Publ'ns 1999) (com-
manding Muslims to adhere to path of Shari'ah). The Qur'an states: "Then We put
thee on the (right) Way of Religion: so follow thou that (Way), and follow not the
desires of those who know not." Id. See also Bassiouni, supra, at xiii (describing Shari'ah
as containing rules organizing Muslim societies and providing means for resolving con-
flicts between individual and State and between private parties).
10. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 45 (noting that in Islam, Qur'an is word of
God);JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 2, 3 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that
Qur'an is revelation of God); Bassiouni, supra note 9, at xiii (noting that Qur'an con-
tains rules and regulations governing Muslim world and forms basis for relationship
between individual and God, between all persons, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and
between individual and all aspects of creation). The Qur'an also states that Islam is not
a new religion, but rather, a culmination of God's commands to mankind through the
prophets, including Moses, Jesus, and the final prophet, Muhammad. Id. Muslims,
therefore, believe that Islam is the final expression of Judeo-Christian revelations. Id.
See also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 41 (discussing origin of Islam as perceived by Mus-
lims and noting that Muslims believe God's message of Islam began with all prophets of
Bible and culminated through Prophet Muhammad).
11. See G.H.A. Juynboll, Sunna[h], in 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 878 (C.E. Bos-
worth et al. eds., 1997) (defining Sunnah as "the generally approved standard or prac-
tice introduced by the Prophet [Muhammad]"); ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 2, 5 (defin-
ing Sunnah as traditions and example of Prophet Muhammad); Abdal-Haqq, supra note
9, at 46 (defining Sunnah as practices or traditions of Prophet Muhammad); DR.
NAGATY SANAD, THE THEORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAMIC LAW:
SHARI'A[H] 38 (1991) (defining Sunnah as authentic tradition of Prophet Muhammad,
including his words and actions); EsPosITo, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that Qur'an was
revealed to Prophet Muhammad over period of time); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 45
(noting that Prophet Muhammad taught Qur'an through recitation). See also ESPOSITO,
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vine in nature, the Qur'an and Sunnah form the primary sources
of Islamic law. 14 If the Qur'an and Sunnah were silent on a mat-
ter, jurists engaged in independent interpretation, or ijtihad,"5
supra note 10, at 5 (noting that scholars have collected and compiled books of hadith
recording Prophetic Sunnah);J. Robson, Hadith, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 23
(B. Lewis et al. eds., 1965) (defining hadith as "account of what the Prophet [Muham-
mad] said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence");
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 46-47 (distinguishing between Sunnah and hadith). See
generally MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA AZAMI, STUDIES IN HADITH METHODOLOGY AND LITERA-
TURE (1992) (discussing hadith literature and science of hadith methodology).
12. See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 2 (defining qiyas as reasoning by analogy);
SANAD, supra note 11, at 39-40 (defining qiyas as judgment derived from legal analogy);
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 36, 56 (defining qiyas as analogical deduction).
13. See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 2, 7 (defining ijma as unanimous consensus of
jurists of particular era on specific issue); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 36 (defining ijma
as consensus of opinion among Prophet's companions or learned community); SANAD,
supra note 11, at 39 (asserting that ijma does not require agreement of all Muslims, but
rather, agreement of qualified and competent Muslim jurists).
14. See SANAD, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that Qur'an, Holy Book in Islam, is
primary source of Islamic law); Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law, and Custom: Redefining Mus-
lim Women's Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (1997) (stating that Qur'an is
foundation of Islamic law); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 46, 51 (asserting that Qur'an is
primary foundation for Islamic law); EsPosITo, supra note 10, at 1-2 (stating that Qur'an
is not book of law or collection of directives providing legal system). See also Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 9, at 46 (noting that Qur'an includes legal injunctions but is not code
of law). See ABDUR RAHMAN I. Doi, SHARI'AH: THE IsLAMIc LAw 45 (1984) (describing
Sunnah as one of primary sources of Shari'ah); MUHAMMAD SHARIF CHAUDHRY, CODE OF
ISLAMIC LAws 1, 8 (1997) (noting that Qur'an and Sunnah are primary sources of Is-
lamic law and describing Sunnah as most important source of Islamic law after Qur'an);
SANAD, supra note 11, at 39 (describing significant role of Sunnah in Islamic jurispru-
dence in complementing Qur'an or interpreting its texts); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at
33, 35 (2002) (noting that authority of Sunnah is revealed in Qur'anic command to
obey Prophet). See also EsPosITo, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that significance of Sun-
nah is rooted in Qur'anic command to obey and follow example of Prophet Muham-
mad); QUR'AN 4:59, 80 (directing Muslims to obey God and Prophet). The Qur'an
states: "0 ye who believe! Obey [God], and obey the [Prophet] .... He who obeys the
[Prophet], obeys [God] . I..." d. The Qur'an describes the Prophet as an exemplary
model for Muslims. See id. at 33:21. "Ye have indeed in the Messenger of [God] a
beautiful pattern (of conduct) ...." Id. The Qur'an also declares that the Prophet only
speaks from divine inspiration. See id. at 53:3, 4. "Your Companion is neither astray nor
misled, Nor does he say (aught) of (his own) Desire. It is no less than inspiration sent
down to him." Id. See also SANAD, supra note 11, at 38-39 (noting that Sunnah is divinely
inspired); Doi, supra, at 45 (describing divine nature of Prophet's behavior). "[The
Prophet Muhammad] never spoke from his own imagination but told only what [God]
had revealed unto him." Id.
15. See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 6 (defining ijtihad as personal reasoning or in-
terpretation); SANAD, supra note 11, at 39 (defining ijtihad as jurist's endeavor or self-
exertion in formulating rnle of law based on Qur'an and Sunnah); al-Hibri, supra note
14, at 6 (defining ijtihad as science of interpretation and rulemaking); Abdal-Haqq,
supra note 9, at 36 (citing hadith on and providing literal definition of ijtihad).
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based on these sources.16 One type ofjuristic interpretation was
reasoning by analogy, or qiyas, whereby a legal solution cited in
the Qur'an or Sunnah for a particular case was applied to a simi-
lar case. 7 The final source of law, one which derived its author-
ity from a statement of the Prophet Muhammad, is the doctrine
of ijma, or consensus of the scholars of a particular era on a spe-
cific issue.' 8 Matters unvoiced by the primary sources of
Shari'ah were thus resolved by resort to ijtihad, qiyas, and ijma."9
As scholars from different societies, and those within the same
society, engaged in independent reasoning, many disagreed in
their ijtihad.2" As a result, numerous schools of thought emerged
in the Islamic empire, five of which remain today: Hanafi,
Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Ja'fari. 21
16. See al-Hibri, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that Muslim scholars resort to ijtihad
when matter is unresolved by Qur'an and Sunnah); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 35
(discussing primacy of ijtihad in early Islamic jurisprudence as tool for applying Islamic
law to new situations); EsPosITo, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that if question arose re-
garding Qur'anic text, jurists applied personal reasoning to reach interpretation).
17. See Mohammad Fadel, Origins, History and Methodology of Islamic Law, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 359, 359 (2000-2001) (reviewing AHMAD HASAN, ANALOGICAL REASONING IN
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: A STUDY OF THEJURIDICIAL PRINCIPLE OF QIYAS (1992)) (discuss-
ing prohibition of wine as example of analogical deduction); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14,
at 21 (citing examples of Prophet's use of qiyas); EsPosITo, supra note 10, at 6-7 (dis-
cussing key principle of qiyas as determining illa [reason or cause] for rule).
18. See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that validity of ijma as source of law is
affirmed by hadith where Prophet Muhammad confirmed authority ofjuristic consen-
sus). The Prophet is reported to have said: "My community will never agree on an
error." Id. See also SANAD, supra note 11, at 39 (stating thatjudgments derived from ijma
and ijtihad must be in accordance with spirit of general rules set forth in Qur'an and
Sunnah); al-Hibri, supra note 14, at 6 (discussing permissibility of supplementing relig-
ious law with customary law where primary sources are silent on particular issue, as long
as local custom is consistent with Qur'an and Sunnah).
19. See ESPOSITO, supra note 10, at 6-8 (discussing qiyas, ijma, and itihad); al-Hibri,
supra note 14, at 6 (noting that when Qur'an and Sunnah are silent on matter, Muslim
scholars resort to Islamic science of interpretation); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 17-18
(discussing use of ijma).
20. See CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 17 (citing hadith praising difference of opinion
among learned scholars). The Prophet is reported to have said: "The difference of
opinion among the learned of my community is a sign of God's grace." Id. See also
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 59 (highlighting importance of conducting interpretation
with sincerity, and rewarding jurist, even if he errs, for exerting effort to reach correct
decision); al-Hibri, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that ijtihad must be founded on religious
and linguistic knowledge, and conducted piously). The Prophet is reported to have
stated that a mujtahid [one who engages in ijtihad] who erred in ijtihad would even
receive reward from God, presumably for exerting the effort to arrive at the correct
judgment. Id. Moreover, early jurists regarded their disagreements as a sign of God's
mercy. Id. at 6-7.
21. See al-Hibri, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that major schools of thought existing
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2. Zina
Consensual sexual intercourse between a man and woman
who are not married to one another [zina or "unlawful sexual
relations"] forms one of the several offenses of hudood, singular
hadd, a defined class of crimes whose punishments are fixed and
made mandatory by the Qur'an and Sunnah. 22 At least two cate-
gories of conduct are implicated in the crime of zina: (1) con-
today include Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, andJa'fari); EsPoSITO, supra note 10, at
2, 2 n.2 (noting that Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools are four schools of
thought in Sunni Islam (sect adhered to by approximately ninety percent of Muslims)
which are named after mujtahids who founded them, and explaining that while there
were originally many schools of law, only these four survived over time); Abdal-Haqq,
supra note 9, at 39 (noting thatJa'fari school is predominant school of thought among
Shi'i Muslims); al-Hibri, supra note 14, at 6-7 (noting that as result ofjuristic differences
in interpretation, hundreds of schools of ijtihad evolved but only few major schools
remain viable today). See also A.D. AlIloLA, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAw 30 (3d ed.
1989) (noting that as fundamental principles articulated by four Sunni schools are vir-
tually identical, schools differ only in minor details); Abdal-Haqq, supra note 9, at 65
(emphasizing significant uniformity in fundamental methodologies employed by all five
major schools and noting that while five schools reach different conclusions on variety
of matters, their judgments differ only slightly). See generally MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA,
THE FOUR IMAMS: THEIR LIVES, IWORKS, AND THEIR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT (2001) (pro-
viding detailed history of founders of four Sunni schools of thought).
22. See Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa, The Basis of Islamic Penal Legislation, in THE
ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 127 (noting that punishment in Is-
lamic law is classified into two categories: fixed [hudood and quesas] and discretionary
[1a'azir]); MUHAMMAD IQBAL SIDDIQI, THE PENAL LAw OF ISLAM 51-52 (1985) (noting
that punishment in Islamic law is divided into three categories (hadd, quesas, and
ta'azir), where both hadd and quesas are fixed by law); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 1-2
(describing hudood as punishments prescribed by Qur'an or Sunnah, and classifying
penalty for zina as hadd); SANAD, supra note 11, at 40-41 (describing hudood penalties as
those prescribed by Qur'an and Sunnah); QUR'AN 2:229 (affirming fixed nature of
hadd). "These are the limits ordained by [God]; so do not transgress them." Id. See also
B. Carra de Vaux & Joseph Schacht, Hadd, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra
note 11, at 20 (listing five offenses as crimes of hudood: unlawful intercourse, false accu-
sation of unlawful intercourse, drinking alcohol, theft, and highway robbery); EL-AWA,
supra note 1, at 1-2 (including apostasy as hadd crime and noting that majority of Is-
lamic jurists recognize six offenses of hudood). For an argument limiting the hudood to
four, see id. at 2-68 (arguing for exclusion of apostasy and alcohol drinking as crimes of
hudood); Aly Aly Mansour, Hud[oo]d Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
supra note 1, at 197 (including "transgression," or rising against legitimate leader by use
of force (which is equivalent to treason and armed rebellion), among offenses of
hudood); al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (noting that hudood crimes implicate fundamental
public interest); al-'Awwa, supra, at 127 (noting that hadd affords protection to public
interests). See also CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 81-82 (noting immutability of hadd pun-
ishment and demonstrating that once guilt of zina is established beyond reasonable
doubt, punishment can neither be pardoned nor negotiated); al-'Awwa, supra, at 128
(noting that hadd penalties cannot be mitigated, augmented, or suspended); RUUD PE-
TERS, A SURVEY OF ISLAMIC LAw: THE LAw OF PERSONS, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, THE LAw
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sensual sexual intercourse between a man and woman who (a)
are not married to each other and (b) are or have been lawfully
married to a third person where the marriage was consummated
("adultery"); 23 and (2) consensual sexual intercourse between
an unmarried man and unmarried woman ("fornication").24
The Qur'an first sets forth a general moral prohibition of zina 21
and, in a subsequent verse, enforces its moral proscription by
subjecting those who commit zina to criminal prosecution.26
OF SUCCESSION, CRIMINAL LAw 106 (2002) (noting hadith where Prophet disallowed sub-
stituting ransom in place of hadd penalty).
23. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (defining zina as unlawful sexual intercourse
between man and woman who are not married to one another); EL-AwA, supra note 1,
at 14 (noting that zina applies to both adultery and fornication); Peters, supra note 1, at
509 (noting that only muhsan can be guilty of adultery and defining muhsan as one who
is adult, free, Muslim (except in Shafi'i school of thought where dhimmi can also be
muhsan), and has previously engaged in legitimate sexual intercourse in marital rela-
tionship regardless of whether marriage still exists); Cl. Cahen, Dhimma, in 2 THE ENCV-
CLOPAEDIA OF IsLAM 227 (B. Lewis et al. eds., 1965) (defining dhimmi as non-Muslim
living under Islamic law); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 82 (noting that to constitute
adultery, offender must have been legally married and marriage must have been con-
summated); PETERS, supra note 22, at 127 (asserting that offence of zina requires vagi-
nal penetration). See also Syed Amin-U1-Hasan Rizvi, Adulteiy and Fornication in Islamic
Criminal Law: A Debate, in CRIMINAL LAW IN ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD, A COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIvE 225-26 (Tahir Mahmood et al. eds., 1996) (noting that consent is ele-
ment of zina); Quraishi, supra note 2, 314, 315-17 (discussing Islamic law on rape and
emphasizing that rape is not subset of zina); PETERS, supra note 22, at 92 (noting that
individuals engaging in hadd crimes are excused from hadd penalty if activity falls under
defense of mistake).
24. See HIDEAKI HOMMA, STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ISLAMIC PENAL LAw 30
(1986) (defining fornication as unlawful sexual intercourse between two unmarried
persons); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 14 (defining fornication as sexual relations between
unmarried man and unmarried woman); Rizvi, supra note 23, at 223 (defining fornica-
tion as sexual relationship between male and female who are neither married to one
another nor to third persons).
25. See QUR'AN 17:32 (denouncing zina as sinful act). The Qur'an states: "Nor
come nigh to unlawful sex for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to
other evils)." Id. See also Doi, supra note 14, at 236 (quoting hadith where Prophet
described zina as sin). The Prophet is reported to have said that "[t]here is no sin after
associationism greater in the eyes of [God] than a drop of semen which a man places in
the womb which is not lawful for him." Id. In another hadith, the Prophet described
zina as the third greatest sin, after associationism and killing one's child for fear of
poverty. See id. at 236-37 (quoting hadith on zina).
26. See QUR'AN 24:2 (criminalizing zina). This Qur'anic verse states the following:
The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication - flog each of them
with a hundred stripes: let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter
prescribed by [God], if ye believe in [God] and the Last Day: and let a party
of the Believers witness their punishment.
Id. See also Quraishi, supra note 2, at 293-94 (describing Qur'an 24:2 as specifically
setting forth legal prescriptions criminalizing unlawful sexual intercourse); EL-AWA,
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Classified as a hadd offense, zina is considered a crime against
God.27
a. Heterosexual and Homosexual Sodomy
The majority of Sunni jurists regard heterosexual anal inter-
course between a non-marital couple as zina.28 Such activity
within marriage, although considered sinful, is not a crime of
zina.29 Sunni schools of thought differ in their criminal classifi-
cation of homosexual sodomy.3" The Shafi'i, Hanbali, and
Maliki schools regard homosexual intercourse as zina and thus
liable to hadd punishment, while the Hanafis consider homosex-
ual sodomy a crime of ta'azir, or discretionary punishment.3"
B. Regulating Consensual Sex in the United States
To a large extent, laws regulating private sexual conduct be-
tween consenting adults have remained unenforced in the
United States. Criminalization of such intimate activity, there-
fore, has been more apparent than real, and overtime, even less
apparent.
supra note 1, at 14 (noting that Qur'an 24:2 concerns crime of zina). This Note will not
address the punishment for zina. It only proposes to analyze the criminalization of
consensual sex in Islamic jurisprudence.
27. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 1 (asserting that application of punishment for
zina is considered right of God); al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (listing certain offenses as
crimes against God).
28. See 4 al-Dardir, supra note 1, at 448 (describing position of Sunni schools on
criminalization of heterosexual sodomy). See generally 5 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM,
supra note 1, at 776-79 (discussing sodomy, or liwat).
29. See 3 al-Mawwaq, supra note 1, at 405-06 (noting that according to majority of
Sunni jurists, anal intercourse between married couple is sinful); 4 al-Dardir, supra note
1, at 448 (explaining that majority of Sunni schools do not classify marital anal inter-
course as zina).
30. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (discussing positions of Muslim schools of
thought on criminalization of homosexual sodomy). See generally 5 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF ISLAM, supra note 1, at 776-79 (discussing sodomy in Islam).
31. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that Hanafis do not consider homosex-
ual intercourse as zina). The Shi'i school classifies homosexual sodomy as a crime of
hadd. Id.; E-mail from Mohammad Fadel, Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to
Seema Saifee (Dec. 9, 2003, 22:23:59 EST) (on file with author) (noting that majority
position that homosexual sodomy is zina only applies to sodomy between two men); al-
Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (asserting that ta'azir includes all crimes whose penalties are
not fixed by Qur'an or Sunnah); SANAD, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that validity of
ta'azir category derived from ijma); al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (explaining that ruler or
judge has discretion to detennine, in accordance with public interest and changing
mores, whether certain acts are punishable under ta'azir); SANAD, supra note 11, at 41
(noting thatjudge must comply with general rules prescribed in Qur'an and Sunnah).
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1. Fornication
Twelve States continue to criminalize premarital sex, sanc-
tioning sexual activity solely within the marital relationship. 
3 2
Notwithstanding the proscription of fornication, selective en-
forcement remains the norm. 3  For example, fornication legisla-
tion is often employed to punish rape and prostitution.34 In or-
der to meet the statutory requirements for these latter crimes,
State legislation requires additional conduct, such as force or
commercial activity, to accompany sexual activity.35 As a result,
sexual conduct is a necessary, but not sufficient element for
prosecution.36 Selective enforcement of fornication legislation
therefore entails penalization of a restricted group of offenders,
32. See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1661 n.9 (citing fourteen stat-
utes prohibiting fornication as of 1991); Richard Green, Griswold's Legacy: Fornication
and Adultery as Crimes, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 545, 546 (1989) (noting that as of 1989,
thirteen States and District of Columbia penalized fornication); Maureen E. Markey,
The Price of Landlord's "Free Exercise" of Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free Hous-
ing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 752 (1995) (noting that fornication statutes
continue to exist in about one-fourth of States). See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1602
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1987); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (West 1990); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 18 (1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.34 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1986);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-2 (1978) (repealed
2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104
(1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1990).
33. See State v. Lutz, 57 N.J. 314, 315 (1971) (emphasizing uneven enforcement of
New Jersey's fornication statute); Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1661-62
(discussing selective enforcement of fornication laws); Hillary Greene, Note, Undead
Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 169, 172 n.20 (1997) (discussing selective enforcement of Vir-
ginia's fornication statutes).
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1206 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing selec-
tive application of Virginia's "fornication and cohabitation" statutes to prostitution and
public conduct); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 334, 335-36 (N.J. 1977) (noting that
jury in lower court found suspected rapist guilty of fornication). See Note, Constitutional
Barriers, supra note 4, at 1662 (noting that fornication laws are enforced primarily
against suspected prostitutes and rapists); Juhi Mehta, Note, Prosecuting Teenage Parents
Under Fornication Statutes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Social Problem of
Teen Pregnancy, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 130 n.63 (1998) (citing Saunders as exam-
ple of selective enforcement of fornication statutes against suspected rapists).
35. See, e.g., Duling, 782 F.2d at 1206 (demonstrating no record of arrest under
Virginia's "fornication and cohabitation" statutes for non-prostitutional fornication
conducted in private). See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1662 (demon-
strating that fornication statutes are typically enforced against persons charged with
engaging in commercial or non-consensual sexual conduct).
36. See, e.g., Summit Med. Assocs. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404, 1427 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (noting that arrests under Virginia's "fornication and cohabitation" statutes were
confined to prostitutional or non-private activity). See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra
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specifically rapists and prostitutes, and criminalization of con-
duct where fornication is simply an element of the crime and
not the crime itself 3 7 Fornication alone has largely evaded crim-
inal prosecution in the United States.38
2. Adultery
The common law considered extramarital sex a violation of
the marital contract. 9 Defining adultery in terms of the wo-
man's marital status, the common law focused on the risk that
adulterous conduct posed to male spousal property rights.4" In
this way, the common law examined adultery through a patriar-
chal lens.4" Although the common law regarded extramarital
sex as a civil wrong, it introduced a foundation for modern legis-
note 4, at 1662 (revealing that additional element of force or commercial activity is
required to enforce fornication laws against suspected rapists or prostitutes).
37. See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1662 (describing selective en-
forcement of State fornication statutes); Summit Med. Assocs., 984 F. Supp. at 1427 (dem-
onstrating that selective enforcement of fornication legislation entails presence of ele-
ments beyond mere sexual activity); Duling, 782 F.2d at 1206 (discussing selective en-
forcement of Virginia's "fornication and cohabitation" laws).
38. See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REv.
523, 526 n.8 (2000) (noting that fornication statutes are rarely enforced); Note, Consti-
tutionalBarriers, supra note 4, at 1661 n.l (noting that fornication statutes are typically
unenforced); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 187 (1988) [hereinafter Law, Homosexuality] (noting that criminal penalties for
fornication are seldom enforced); Murray R. Garnick, Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 469 n.20 (1983) (discussing non-enforcement of ex-
isting fornication statutes). See also Harry G. Prince, Note, Public Policy Limitations on
Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REv. 163, 192 (1985)
(noting that many States have repealed criminal fornication statutes).
39. See United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 146, 147 (C.M.A. 1986), overruled by,
United States v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (stating that common law did not
consider adultery as crime); Haggard, supra note 4, at 471 (asserting that common law
courts considered adultery breach of marital contract).
40. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147 (demonstrating that married woman and single man
who engaged in sexual intercourse were considered adulterers but single woman and
married man were considered fornicators); Haggard, supra note 4, at 471 (discussing
implications of wife's adulterous affair on husband's property rights); Hickson, 22 MJ.
at 147 (discussing common law concerns regarding illegitimate heirs to husband's
property); Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Ky. 1992) (describing common law
property-based arguments establishing husband's exclusive right to wife's services);
Haggard, supra note 4, at 470-71 (asserting that contemporary criminalization of adul-
tery originates from common law purposes to preserve inheritance and property rights
of men).
41. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147 (discussing effects of adultery on male inheritance
and property rights); Haggard, supra note 4, at 471 (describing common law regula-
tions on adultery as rooted in historical women-as-chattel ideology where husband held
exclusive right to wife's services).
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lation criminalizing adultery.42
Today, twenty-three States have enacted legislation penaliz-
ing adultery.4" With the introduction of the Married Women's
Property Acts, which granted wives independent ownership
rights to property, and changing social mores regarding the
rights of women, common law property-based rationales lost per-
suasive force.44 Adultery is now characterized as an act of deceit
and betrayal.45 In their efforts to penalize adultery, modern stat-
42. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 147 (discussing prohibition of adultery at common law);
Haggard, supra note 4, at 470-71 (discussing common law ban on adultery). See also
Prince, supra note 38, at 192 (noting that many States have repealed criminal adultery
statutes).
43. See Haggard, supra note 4, at 472 (emphasizing decriminalization of adultery
among States); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering
Difference, 26 VT. L. REv. 407, Winter 2002, at 412 n.23 (noting that, as of 1996, adultery
was crime in twenty-five States); Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REv. 1, 22
(1998) (noting that twenty-four States and District of Columbia continued to criminal-
ize adultery in 1998). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1994); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1408 (West 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
201 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. § 798.01 (Harrison 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19
(1996); IDAO0 CODE § 18-6601 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (1995); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 14 (Law. Co-op.
1992); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. 750.30 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 (West
1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (1996); N.Y. [law] § 255.17
(McKinney 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 872 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-6-2
(1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1997); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 1996).
44. See Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
Married Women's Property Acts, passed by most States in late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in attempt to equalize legal status of wives, afforded wives equal
property rights and right to sue in their individual names to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries); In re Bell-Breslin, 283 B.R. 834, 839 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002) (noting that
Maryland Married Women's Property Statute recognized married woman's right to own
property separate from husband); Haggard, supra note 4, at 471-72 (noting that Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts afforded women right to own property in their own name).
See Hoye, 824 S.W.2d at 423 (discussing evolving perception of wife's role in marriage
and referring to wife-as-chattel ideology as antiquated); Haggard, supra note 4, at 471
(discussing legal and social implications of abolishing societal notion of women as hus-
bands' chattel); Erin L. Arcesi, Note, Conservatorships and Marriage: For Love or Money?,
16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 298, 306 (2003) (describing Married Women's Property stat-
utes as attempt to reflect changing role of women in society and perception of marriage
as equal partnership). Cf. Zainab Chaudhry, Comment, The Myth of Misogyny: A Reanal-
ysis of Women's Inheritance in Islamic Law, 61 ALB. L. REV. 511, 513, 515 (1997) (discuss-
ing women's inheritance rights in Islam and noting that introduction of Islam gener-
ated radical elevation in status of women and allowed Muslim women to own and man-
age their own property).
45. See Haggard, supra note 4, at 472 (revealing that much like jurisdictional ratio-
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utes have adopted non-proprietary interests, including preserv-
ing marriage." In spite of statutory efforts to legitimize the pe-
nalization of adultery through the rationale of preserving
morals, enforcement of adultery legislation (much like fornica-
tion statutes) remains minimal.47 While less than half the States
continue to penalize adultery, most of these lingering statutes
are enforced only in theory.4"
3. Heterosexual and Same-Sex Sodomy
Since colonial times, States have enacted legislation outlaw-
ing sodomy irrespective of the gender of the partners.49 The
nales for criminalizing adultery, legal definitions vary from State to State). In a few
States, only married individuals can be found guilty of committing adultery. Id.; see, e.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie 1996). Other States require only one party to be married to
convict both parties of adultery. See Haggard, supra note 4, at 472 (noting that several
States find both parties guilty of adultery as long as one party is married). See, e.g., Aiuz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. § 798.01 (Harrison 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 1993);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (Michie 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 14 (Law. Co-
op. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645-3 (1996); N.Y. [law] § 255.17 (Consol. 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-6-2 (1994). See also Haggard, supra note 4, at 473 (revealing that few
statutes set forth requirements for proof of adultery or fornication); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
§ 798.01 (Harrison 1992) (making it crime to live in "open state of adultery"); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 1993) (criminalizing adultery if "open and notorious").
46. See People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (classifying
preservation of marriage as legitimate State interest for prohibiting adultery); Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (citing purpose of Illinois adultery and
fornication statutes as preserving institution of marriage); Oliverson v. West Valley City,
875 F. Supp. 1465, 1484 (D. Utah 1994) (discussing State's interest in avoiding "deficits
and damages" caused by adulterous relationship).
47. See Haggard, supra note 4, at 469-70, 473 (noting that statutes criminalizing
adultery are seldom enforced or prosecuted); Prince, supra note 38, at 192-93 (noting
that although several jurisdictions continue to proscribe adultery and fornication, such
statutes are rarely enforced).
48. Prince, supra note 38, at 192-93 (noting that while several States continue to
criminalize adultery, such statutes are seldom enforced); Haggard, supra note 4, at 469-
70, 473 (noting that laws criminalizing adultery are seldom enforced). See also Louis A.
Alexander, Note, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and
the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, Nov. 1984, 102, 137 (arguing that trend of non-en-
forcement, modification, or repeal of adultery and fornication statutes supports posi-
tion that courts will reject defense of illegality in tort suits for sexual transmission of
disease); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1866 n.87 (2000) (argu-
ing that regular non-enforcement or decrease in prosecution or conviction tends to
subvert norm prohibiting activity).
49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478-79 (2003) (noting that in colonial
times and nineteenth century, prohibitions against sodomy did not distinguish between
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term homosexuality was coined in the nineteenth century and
laws specifically directed at same-sex sodomy did not develop un-
til the late twentieth century.5"t As of June 2003, when the Su-
preme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas, thirteen States continue
to criminalize sodomy while only four direct their anti-sodomy
legislation solely to same-sex partners; even these States, how-
ever, have moved towards repealing such statutes.5 Much like
adultery and fornication statutes, legislation outlawing sodomy
(whether directed at all or only same-sex couples) remains
highly unenforced.52
heterosexuals and homosexuals). See also Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homo-
sexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden. Determinants of Bowers v. Harowick
[sic], 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1088 (1988) (discussing concept of homosexuality in nineteenth
century).
50. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479 (asserting that U.S. laws targeting homosexual
couples are not deeply rooted in history but developed in last third of twentieth cen-
tury). But see Kevin F. Ryan, A blawed Performance, 29 VT. B. J. 5, 9 (2003) (arguing that
Lawrence Court provides lengthy but not very convincing discussion that laws specifically
directed at same-sex sodomy are of relatively recent origin). See also Goldstein, supra
note 49, at 1087-88 (noting that while homosexual intimacy existed in earlier eras, as-
sumption that homosexual persons were fundamentally different from heterosexuals
only developed in late nineteenth century); ESKRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3)
(noting that first three-quarters of twentieth century marked period of increasing State
snooping, especially into lives of sexual minorities, while in nineteenth century, State
did not intrude into Nation's bedrooms).
51. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1974);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1982); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon
2003) (repealed 2003). See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480, 2481 (discussing decriminaliza-
tion of sodomy statutes); Yao, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MiAMi L. REV. 521, 524 (1986) (noting that few statutes ex-
pressly prohibit same-sex sodomy); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (discussing statutory
prohibitions of sodomy pre- and post-Bowers and noting that after Bowers, about one-
fourth of States continued to criminalize sodomy irrespective of partner's gender); Bow-
ers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (noting that twenty-four States and District of Columbia contin-
ued to criminalize private consensual sodomy at time case was decided). See also Inching
Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United
States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2004, 2014 (2003) (noting that when Bowers was
decided, twenty-four States and District of Columbia outlawed sodomy); Ryan, supra
note 50, at 9 (noting that Lawrence Court reveals that States have been slowly repealing
sodomy laws); Arthur S. Leonard, A Magna Carta for Gay Americans, GAY CITY NEWS,
available at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn226/amagnacarta.html (arguing that logi-
cal result of Lawrence is invalidation of remaining sodomy statutes).
52. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (observing pattern of non-enforcement of State
sodomy statutes where conduct occurs between consenting adults acting in private, and
asserting that Texas Attorney General stated that Texas had never prosecuted anyone
under same-sex sodomy statute). The Lawrence Court found that "[t]he reported deci-
sions concerning the prosecution of consensual, homosexual sodomy between adults
for the years 1880-1995 are not always clear in the details, but a significant number
involved conduct in a public place." Id. at 2479. See Ryan, supra note 50, at 9 (asserting
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In their efforts to criminalize certain consensual sexual ac-
tivity, States have adopted interests in preserving marriage,53
averting illegitimacy,54 preventing disease,55 and preserving
morals. 56 States have thus increasingly embraced morals-based
legislation in their attempts to criminalize adultery, fornication,
and sodomy.57 In spite of these morals-based laws, an inherent
pattern of decriminalization and non-enforcement challenges
that Lawrence Court demonstrates that sodomy statutes have rarely been enforced in
United States except to ensure that alleged rapists who could not be convicted for lack
of evidence could still be prosecuted for some offense); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2
(Powell, J., concurring) (discussing pattern of non-enforcement of Georgia sodomy
statute with respect to private consensual homosexual sodomy and noting that history
of non-enforcement suggests waning character of legislation criminalizing private con-
sensual homosexual sodomy). See also ESKRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3) (assert-
ing that, in nineteenth century, evidentiary requirements in sodomy cases immunized
consenting adults who engaged in private sexual acts from prosecution). Cf Ma'amoun
M. Salama, General Principles of Criminal Evidence in IslamicJurisprudence, in THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 115-22 (discussing evidentiary requirements
for proving zina in Islamic law).
53. See People v. Onofre, 72 A.D.2d 268, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (describing
preservation of marriage as legitimate State interest for proscribing adultery); Doe v.
Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 967 (E.D. Va. 1985) (rejecting promotion of marriage as
compelling State interest for banning fornication); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454,
457 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978) (citing purpose of Illinois adultery and fornication statutes as
protecting institution of marriage).
54. See State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341, 342, 346 (N.J. 1977) (examining State
interest in preventing upsurge in number of illegitimate children); State v. Barr, 110
N.J. Super. 365, 368 (1970) (discussing State interest in preventing birth of illegitimate
children); Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570, 585 (Md. 1981) (analyzing State's interest in
averting propagation of illegitimacy).
55. See Saunders, 381 A.2d at 336, 341 (analyzing State's interest in preventing vene-
real disease); Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1484 (D. Utah 1994)
(discussing State's interest in averting disease); Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla.
1979) (examining potential legislative concern with prevention of venereal disease);
Neville, 430 A.2d at 585 (discussing State interest in preventing spread of venereal dis-
ease).
56. See Jonathan Tatun, A Closer Look at Bowers v. Hardwick: State and Federal Deci-
sions Concerning Sexual Privacy and Equal Protection, 19 ToURo L. REV. 183, 191 (2002)
(noting that morality has often been central to State legislation); Ray Cliett, Comment,
How a Note or a Grope Can BeJustification For the Killing of a Homosexual. An Analysis of the
Effects of the Supreme Court's Views on Homosexuals, African-Americans and Women, 29 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 219, 247 (2003) (noting that Texas Court of
Appeals held that purpose of homosexual sodomy statute was to protect public morals).
But see Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353 (Ark. 2002) (holding that police power
cannot be used to enforce majoritarian morality on consenting same-sex partners
whose private intimate acts do not harm others).
57. See, e.g., Duling, 603 F. Supp. at 967 (characterizing State's interest in encour-
aging marriage as attempt to regulate public morals); Saunders, 381 A.2d at 341, 342,
346 (examining State interest in averting propagation of illegitimacy); Neville, 430 A.2d
at 585 (discussing State interest in preventing disease).
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the viability of current legislation criminalizing private intima-
cies between consenting adults.5 8 The privacy cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court also illustrate this deep-seated pattern.
4. Constitutional Privacy Jurisprudence
A survey of the U.S. Supreme Court's original privacy juris-
prudence, as expressed through the line of cases commencing
with Griswold v. Connecticut, and an examination of the Court's
current stance on privacy rights, as articulated by its recent deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas, illustrate the trajectory followed by the
Court with respect to the constitutional protection of private in-
timate acts between consenting adults.
a. Pre-Lawrence
The Supreme Court first articulated a constitutional right of
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.59 In Griswold, appellants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a State statute criminalizing the
use of any drug or article for the purpose of preventing concep-
58. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (describing pattern of non-
enforcement of State sodomy statutes where conduct occurs between consenting adults
acting in private, and noting that Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Bowers, argued
that history of non-enforcement of Georgia sodomy statute suggests waning character of
laws criminalizing private consensual homosexual sodomy); Haggard, supra note 4, at
469-70, 472, 473 (discussing decriminalization of adultery and noting that remaining
adultery statutes are seldom enforced); Prince, supra note 38, at 192 (noting that many
States have repealed criminal fornication and adultery statutes); Law, Homosexuality,
supra note 38, at 187 (noting that criminal penalties for fornication are rarely en-
forced).
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (enunciating constitutional right of privacy); Anne C.
Hydorn, Note, Does the Constitutional Right to Privacy Protect Forced Disclosure of Sexual Ori-
entation?, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 242 (2003) (discussing Court's privacy jurispru-
dence); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215,
216 (1987) (identifying Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where Court invalidated
statute limiting freedom to contract, as commencement of Court's first sustained use of
substantive due process); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other
Than Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 629, 630 (2003) (noting that scholars and judges widely criti-
cized Lochner and its progeny, and asserting that for critics who are skeptical of per-
ceived judicial activism, Lochner represents reminder of judicial overreaching); Conkle,
supra at 219 (asserting that Court abandoned Lochnering in 1930's and until Griswold,
this departure was widely understood as renouncing substantive due process in general,
and not merely application of doctrine to protection of economic rights); NORMAN RED-
LICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter RED-
LICH] (noting that many scholars understood Griswold as return to substantive due pro-
cess analysis renounced by Court in post-Lochner period); Conkle, supra, at 219 (assert-
ing that Griswold resurrected doctrine of substantive due process).
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tion.6 ° Finding that the Constitution creates "zones of privacy"
through various guarantees in the Bill of Rights,6 1 the Supreme
60. See Griswold, 381 U.S at 480 (stating that appellants, Executive Director of
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and licensed physician, who were con-
victed as accessories for distributing information and medical advice to married persons
on how to prevent conception and prescribing contraception for wife's use, argued that
State's accessory statute as so applied violated Fourteenth Amendment). Section 53-32
of the General Statutes of Connecticut provides as follows: "Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned." Id. The Griswold Court found that appellants
had standing to challenge the statute criminalizing the use of contraception. Id. at 481
(holding that accessory has standing to argue that offense which he is charged with
assisting cannot constitutionally be viewed as crime). See also Michelle L. Brenwald &
Kay Redeker, Note, A Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Repro-
duction, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 609 n.41 (1999) (noting that appellants' criminal con-
victions formed basis of their standing). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 (granting appel-
lants standing to assert constitutional rights of married persons with whom they had
professional relationship). See also David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contracep-
tion, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 341 (2000)
(noting that Court granted appellants standing to argue that State's prohibition on use
of contraceptives violated constitutional rights of married couples).
61. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (finding that although Constitution does not ex-
plicitly enumerate right of privacy, various amendments, including First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth, have "penumbras" creating zones of privacy). See also Julia K. Sullens,
Comment, Thus Far and No Further: The Supreme Court Draws the Outer Boundary of the
Right to Privacy, 61 TUL. L. REv. 907, 908 (1987) (discussing Court's finding that penum-
bral rights, although not expressly granted by Constitution, are necessary for full enjoy-
ment of rights protected by Bill of Rights). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84 (citing
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), which held that Constitution protects
freedom of association as peripheral First Amendment right, and demonstrating that
right of association creates zone of privacy for constitutionally valid associations by pro-
tecting disclosure of membership). See also Martin H. Belsky, Privacy, The Rehnquist
Court's Unmentionable "Right," 36 TULSA LJ. 43, Fall 2000, at 43 n.12 (noting that NAACP
was cited in Griswold to support holding that there is penumbra of privacy rights sur-
rounding rights protected by First Amendment). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83 (sup-
porting penumbra-based construal of constitutional right of privacy by reference to
prior decisions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and finding that although right to educate child in school
of parents' choice and right to study any particular subject are not mentioned in Consti-
tution, First Amendment has been construed to protect those rights). The Court noted
that without certain peripheral rights, the specific rights of the Constitution would be
less secure. Id. See also Conkle, supra note 59, at 220 (noting that Griswold explicitly
reconfirmed validity of Meyer and Pierce); Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy:
Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy
Reform, 66 Mo. L. REv. 527, 551 (2001) (noting that Court described Meyer and Pierce as
cases that recognized zones of privacy emanating from specific guarantees in Bill of
Rights); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The Power of
Parents to Control the Education of Their Own," 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB POL'Y 481, 484
(2002) (demonstrating that Meyer and Pierce provided foundation for modern substan-
tive due process jurisprudence). See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J. concur-
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Court declared the statute an unconstitutional6 2 intrusion upon
the right of marital privacy."' In subsequent years, the Court ex-
tended the right of privacy beyond the confines of the marital
ring) (noting that absence of specific constitutional provision expressly protecting mari-
tal privacy does not mean that government can disrupt traditional family relationship).
In this way, although an explicit right of privacy is not enumerated in the Constitution,
the right is nevertheless protected by implication. Id. But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that State has right to invade privacy unless prohibited
by specific constitutional provision); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(finding no general right of privacy in any constitutional provision or prior case de-
cided by U.S. Supreme Court). See also Bradley R. Haywood, Note, The Right to Shelter as
a Fundamental Interest Under the New York State Constitution, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
157, 182 (2002) (noting that Court provided content to right of privacy notwithstand-
ing absence of express reference to right in Constitution); Conkle, supra note 59, at 219
(noting that constitutional right of privacy recognized by Griswold finds no mention in
text of Constitution).
62. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that Court
found that State's contraception statute was unconstitutional). The Court's argument
for a constitutional right of privacy was based on penumbras emanating from specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. In finding the State statute unconstitutional,
the Griswold Court expressly relied on the "zones of privacy" created by various guaran-
tees in the Constitution, and not the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 927 (2d ed. 1991) (finding that decision in Griswold was not based on substantive
due process); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 216 (noting that in Griswold, Justice Douglas
refused to rely expressly on substantive due process, stating that Court does not sit as
"super-legislature" to review laws on social and economic affairs). But see STONE, supra,
at 918 (citing Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The "Griswold" Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 252-53 (1965)) (noting that Court,
"in extending the specifics to the periphery," essentially engaged in substantive due
process analysis, providing it with different title); STONE, supra, at 926 (noting that al-
though Griswold Court attempted to avoid relying on substantive due process as basis for
holding, Griswold was in fact decided under doctrine of substantive due process because
its decision can only be understood as holding that Connecticut statute substantively
invaded liberty protected by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Conkle,
supra note 59, at 219 (understanding decision in Griswold as application of substantive
due process); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2008, 2015-16 (2002) (noting that Griswold Court mischaracterized Meyer and Pierce as
First Amendment cases in attempt to reject substantive due process).
63. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that Court held
that State's contraception statute unconstitutionally invades right of marital privacy).
The Griswold Court limited the issue at hand to marital privacy and characterized the
invasion of marital bedrooms as abhorrent. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. The Court
reasoned as follows: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of mari-
tal bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marital relationship." Id. See also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (noting that Griswold invalidated Connecticut statute
as unconstitutional encroachment on right of marital privacy); Michael J. Sandel, Moral
Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527
(1989) (emphasizing Griswold's objective as safeguarding privacy of marital relation-
ship); Storrow, supra note 61, at 555 (arguing that Griswold asserts broad proposition
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird,65 the Court addressed the constitution-
ality of a Massachusetts statute placing disparate restrictions on
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried and married in-
dividuals.6 6 Declaring that the right of unmarried individuals to
access contraception must be the same as that of married per-
sons,6 7 the Court found the statute unconstitutional under the
that State cannot regulate intimate activity of married couples in their bedrooms, re-
gardless of whether activity is procreative).
64. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (extending right of privacy to unmarried persons
such that contraception rights must be same for married and unmarried alike); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending right of privacy to protect woman's decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy); Carey v. Population Sers. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687
(1977) (confirming that right of privacy in matters of childbearing is not limited to
married persons, and rejecting continued construal of Griswold as protecting only mar-
ried couple's use of contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (establishing that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects inti-
mate personal choices of individuals). See also Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52
Am. U. L. REv. 393, 425 n. 186 (2002) (stating that Eisenstadt extended right of privacy to
all individuals); Conkle, supra note 59, at 221 (arguing that Roe provided constitutional
protection to abortion decisions of both married and unmarried women); Rebecca L.
Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1503 (2002) (noting that Roe
extended right of privacy to abortion).
65. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
66. See id. at 440, 442, 443 (involving constitutional challenge by individual who
was convicted under State statute for displaying contraceptives during lecture to group
of students, and providing package of vaginal foam to young woman at end of lecture).
The statutory provisions were summarized as follows: (1) married couples may obtain
contraception to prevent pregnancy, but only from licensed physicians or licensed
pharmacists on prescription; (2) unmarried persons may not obtain contraception
from anyone to prevent pregnancy; and (3) married or unmarried persons may obtain
contraception from anyone to prevent propagation of disease. Id. at 442. See also M Ass.
GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (criminalizing distribution of contraception differently for
married and single persons). See alsoJohn Nivala, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Death
of Repose in Reproductive Decisionmaking, 4 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 64 (1983) (noting
that statute in Eisenstadt regulated distribution of contraception to unmarried persons).
See also Eisenstadt, 403 U.S. at 462 (White, J. concurring) (noting that defendant, who
was neither registered doctor nor registered pharmacist, was not charged for distribut-
ing contraception to unmarried person but rather for distributing contraception at all).
Quoting the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justice White noted that the
constitutionality of Baird's conviction rested on his lack of status as a distributor and
not the marital status of the foam recipient. Id.
67. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that right of privacy affords all individu-
als freedom from governmental intrusion into matters of childbearing). The Court
held that
... the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals .... If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6" Iden-
tifying the protected right as the individual's "decision whether
to bear or beget a child"6 rather than the privacy surrounding
the wedded relationship,"' the Eisenstadt Court extended the
right of privacy beyond the walls of the marital bedroom.7"
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. See also Storrow, supra note 61, at 551-52 (characterizing Eisenstadt as holding that
where married persons have right to procure contraception, unmarried persons must
also have that right); E. Lauren Arnault, Comment, Status, Conduct, and Forced Disclosure:
What Does Bowers v. Hardwick Really Say?, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 757, 764 n.54 (2003)
(observing that Eisenstadt Court invalidated statute for discriminating against unmar-
ried persons).
68. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443, 454-55 (holding Massachusetts statute unconsti-
tutional for providing dissimilar treatment to married and unmarried individuals who
are similarly situated). See also Storrow, supra note 61, at 551-52 (noting that decision in
Eisenstadt was matter of equal protection). But see REDLICH, supra note 59, at 218 n.17
(asserting that Eisenstadt Court used combination of equal protection and substantive
due process analysis and stating that although Court seemingly subjected State statute
to rational basis test, Court's standard actually approached strict scrutiny); STONE, supra
note 62, at 921 (asserting that Eisenstadt Court "purport[ed]" to apply rational basis
review to Massachusetts statute). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 922 (arguing that
both Eisenstadt and Griswold involved sex discrimination because bans on use of contra-
ception have disproportionate effects on women and, more importantly, such bans
could not have been codified if relevant burdens were imposed on men, and in absence
of stereotypes regarding maternal role of women). See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447-53
(finding no rational relationship between prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons, and Massachusetts' triple interests in deterring premarital sex, pro-
tecting health, and preserving morality). See also STONE, supra note 62, at 921 (stating
that Eisenstadt Court held that under rational basis review, none of State's three inter-
ests raised in defense of statute was sufficient to support challenged classification).
69. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 (noting that Eisenstadt Court described protected
fight as "decision whether to bear or beget a child"). See also Storrow, supra note 61, at
553 (arguing that Eisenstadt only protected right to decide whether to have children).
But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J. concurring) (noting that substantive due
process protects right of married and unmarried persons to engage in non-procreative
sex, including that which others may deem offensive or immoral); Conkle, supra note
59, at 232 (arguing that Eisenstadt and Roe necessarily protect right of unmarried heter-
osexual adults to engage in consensual non-reproductive sexual activity).
70. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (restricting issue to
marital privacy). See also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (noting that in Griswold, right of
privacy at issue inhered in matrimonial relationship); Sandel, supra note 63, at 527
(emphasizing Griswold's objective as protecting privacy of married relationship).
71. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (affording unmarried and married persons equal
rights to access contraception). See also Sandel, supra note 63, at 524, 527-28 (noting
that Eisenstadt effectuated shift in meaning of privacy from interest in preventing disclo-
sure of personal affairs to freedom to engage in certain behavior without governmental
restraint); Arnault, supra note 67, at 764 n.54 (asserting that Eisenstadt extended right of
privacy beyond marital couple to individual). But see Storrow, supra note 61, at 555-56
(arguing that Eisenstadt recognized different privacy rights for married and unmarried
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One year later, the Court construed the right of privacy to
protect a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy.72 In Roe v. Wade, an unmarried pregnant woman brought
a class action challenging the constitutionality of Texas legisla-
tion which made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion ex-
cept to save the life of the mother.73 Discussing the scope of the
liberty protected by modern substantive due process, the Court
relied on the Palko v. Connecticut74 framework of rights which are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 75
Noting that its prior decisions have extended the right of privacy
to certain spheres of personal "liberty, '76 the Court found that
the right of privacy encompassed the abortion decision,7 7 and
persons: right of sexual privacy for former and narrower right of procreative privacy,
insofar as acquiring contraception, for latter).
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that right of privacy is
broad enough to encompass woman's decision to procure abortion). See also Conkle,
supra note 59, at 221 (arguing that Roe provided constitutional protection to married
and single woman's decision to terminate pregnancy); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 219
(stating that, according to justice Blackmun, woman's right to terminate pregnancy was
based on constitutional right of privacy which derived from concept of personal liberty
in Due Process Clause).
73. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 117-18 (summarizing statute as criminalizing procur-
ing or attempting abortion except by medical advice for purpose of saving mother's
life). See also Sarah Weddington, The Wind Beneath My Wings: One Woman's Journey to
Effectuate Change as an Attorney, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 8 (2003) (noting that plaintiff
in Roe brought class action on behalf of all pregnant women or women who may be-
come pregnant in future and would like option of abortion); Jeffrey Rosen, A Viable
Solution: Why it Makes Sense to Permit Abortions and Punish Those Who Kill Fetuses, LEG. AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 2003, at 20, 22 (discussing academic criticism of Texas statute challenged in
Roe which punished physicians, but not pregnant women, for performing abortions).
74. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
75. REDLICH, supra note 59, at 219 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 324, and noting that
scope of rights fitting into Palko's formulation extended to marriage, procreation, con-
traception, familial relationships, childrearing, and education). See also PeterJ. Rubin,
Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 841-42 (2003) (providing several definitions of funda-
mental rights, beginning with formulation adopted in Palko).
76. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (noting that Court has recognized right of personal
privacy which extends to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, fa-
milial relationships, childrearing, and education). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at
219 (noting that scope of rights Court has deemed fundamental includes marriage,
procreation, contraception, familial relationships, childrearing, and education);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (confirming that substantive
liberty safeguarded by Fourteenth Amendment protects personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, familial relationships, childrearing, and educa-
tion).
77. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that right of privacy includes woman's deci-
sion whether to procure abortion). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 219 (stating that
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concluded that Texas' abortion laws violated the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
78
Shortly after its decision in Roe, the Court struck down an-
other State statute pursuant to the constitutional right of privacy.
In Carey v. Population Services International,79 the Court addressed
the constitutionality of New York legislation prohibiting the sale
or distribution of contraception to persons under the age of six-
teen, limiting the distribution of contraceptives to licensed phar-
macists, and banning all advertisement or display of contracep-
tion. o Recognizing that access to contraception is essential to
the exercise of the constitutionally protected freedom to decide
"whether to bear or beget a child,"" the Court invalidated the
Justice Blackmun premised right to terminate pregnancy on right of privacy which de-
rived from concept of individual liberty in Due Process Clause); Sandel, supra note 63,
at 528 (noting that, in context of contraception and abortion, right of privacy has
evolved into freedom to make certain individual decisions without State interference);
Conkle, supra note 59, at 221 (arguing that Roe provided constitutional protection to
abortion decisions of both married and unmarried women). But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 154
(concluding that woman's right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy is not abso-
lute, and emphasizing State's compelling interests in regulating abortion); Carey, 431
U.S. at 686 (highlighting Roe's discussion that certain State interests, including protect-
ing health, upholding medical standards, and safeguarding potential life, may at some
point become compelling enough to justify regulating abortion); David A. J. Richards,
Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 802 (1986)
(characterizing Roe as holding that government cannot criminally proscribe woman's
access to abortion services in certain stages of her pregnancy).
78. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding that Texas statute, which criminalizes abor-
tion except to save life of mother, without considering pregnancy stage or other inter-
ests involved, is unconstitutional under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amend-
ment). See also ChristopherJ. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determin-
ing Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REv. 169,
181 (2003) (noting that Roe protected woman's qualified right to terminate pregnancy
under Fourteenth Amendment's substantive concept of personal liberty); G. Edward
White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REv. 485, 550 n.160
(2002) (noting that Roe transformed right of privacy regarding intimate choices about
sexuality into due process liberty to decide whether to have abortion).
79. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
80. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681, 682 (1977) (noting that corporation involved in
selling contraception via mail challenged constitutionality of statute); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6811(8) (McKinney 1972) (limiting distribution and display of contraceptives). See
also Maggie Ilene Kaminer, How Broad is the Fundamental Right to Privacy and Personal
Autonomy? - On What Grounds Should the Ban on the Sale of Sexually Stimulating Devices Be
Considered Unconstitutional?, 9AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'v& L. 395, 405 (2001) (observ-
ing that Carey involved statute restricting access to contraceptive devices).
81. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88 (holding that because contraception constitutes
means of effectuating individual decisions in matters of childbearing, restricting access
to contraception burdens freedom to make such decisions). The Court noted that the
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statute pursuant to the First Amendment and the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. 2 Although the right of
privacy enunciated in Griswold inhered in the marital associa-
tion,83 Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey confirm that the constitutional
guarantee of individual privacy in matters of childbearing is not
limited to married couples.
84
Although the Griswold line of cases had not specifically an-
constitutionally protected freedom to make decisions in matters of childbearing formed
the basis of its prior holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe. Id. at 688-89. See also Cass
R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. Rrv.
1179, 1184 n.22 (1996) (asserting that in Carey, Court granted constitutional protection
to access contraception because such acquisition is essential to exercising fundamental
right to procreate); Storrow, supra note 61, at 555 (arguing that Carey Court re-con-
strued Griswold in order to emphasize basis of Griswold's holding as freedom to make
decisions in matters of childbearing and not "sexual freedom").
82. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681-82 (affirming decision of lower court which struck
down statute under First and Fourteenth Amendments insofar as it applied to nonpre-
scription contraception and enjoined its enforcement as so applied). The Court also
rejected the argument that banning contraception would deter sexual activity among
minors, and quoted Eisenstadt for the proposition that it is unreasonable to presume
that a State has prescribed pregnancy and birth of unwanted offspring, or dangers asso-
ciated with abortion, as a penalty for fornication. Id. at 694-96. See also REDLICH, supra
note 59, at 218-19 (noting that Court in Carey invalidated requirement that registered
pharmacist distribute contraception because it burdened individual's right to make de-
cisions in matters of childbearing without furthering compelling State interest). More-
over, the Court struck down the ban on advertisements as violating the First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech without advancing any legitimate purpose. Id. at
218. Furthermore, the plurality invalidated the ban on distributing contraception to
minors because this prohibition did not serve a significant State interest. Id. See Carel,
431 U.S. at 686-87 (criticizing appellants' argument that Court has not accorded "ac-
cess" to contraception fundamental rights status as overlooking premise of Griswold and
Eisenstadt, and emphasizing principle of Griswold as protecting personal decisions in
matters of childbearing).
83. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (protecting right of mari-
tal privacy). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (noting that privacy
right at issue in Griswold inhered in marital relationship); Sandel, supra note 63, at 527
(emphasizing Griswold's objective as protecting privacy of marital relationship).
84. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (noting that Eisenstadt, Carey,
and Roe all confirm that Griswold's reasoning was not limited to protecting rights of
married adults). See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (holding that right of privacy affords all
individuals freedom from State intrusion into matters of childbearing); Roe, 410 U.S. at
113 (affording right of privacy to unmarried pregnant woman); Carey, 431 U.S. at 687
(holding that Eisenstadt and subsequent cases clarified that constitutional protection of
decisional autonomy in matters of childbearing does not depend on marital relation-
ship); Storrow, supra note 61, at 551-52 (describing Eisenstadt as holding that where
married persons have right to acquire contraception, unmarried persons must also have
that right); Arnault, supra note 67, at 764 n.54 (declaring that Eisenstadt extended right
of privacy from married couple to individual). But see Storrow, supra note 61, at 555-56
(arguing that Eisenstadt recognized distinct privacy rights for married and single per-
sons).
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nounced a right for consenting adults to engage in private acts
of intimacy, legal scholars have argued that these cases create a
constitutional right to intimate association.85 As the use of con-
traception and abortion necessarily entail sexual intercourse,
academics have argued that the decisions in Eisenstadt and Roe
protect the unmarried person's right to engage in consensual
sexual activity. 6 As a result, if the government cannot intrude
into the personal decision to use contraception or procure an
abortion, it necessarily cannot intrude into the intimate decision
to engage in consensual sexual conduct.8 7  Even a Supreme
Court Justice, along with eminent academics, has argued that
the Court's privacy jurisprudence protects the married and un-
married person's right to engage in non-procreative consensual
85. See Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Reg-
ulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 1, 26 (2000) (asserting that scholars have persuasively articulated existence of
"freedom of intimate association"); Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1663-64,
1666 (arguing that Griswold line of cases affords constitutional protection for intimate
associations).
86. See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1664 (noting that right to use
contraception would be meaningless without corresponding right to engage in sexual
intercourse, and construing privacy right enunciated in Griswold and Eisenstadt more
expansively than mere right to use contraception); Conkle, supra note 59, at 221-22
(arguing that right of privacy, which includes right to access and use contraception and
right to procure abortion, at least incidentally protects underlying sexual conduct giv-
ing rise to protected activity). See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (providing married and
single persons equal rights to access to contraception); Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 (confirm-
ing that right of privacy in matters of childbearing is not limited to married couples);
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (noting that Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe confirm that Gris-
wold's reasoning was not limited to protecting rights of married couples); Sandel, supra
note 63, at 524, 527-28 (noting that Eisenstadt effectuated shift in meaning of privacy
from interest in preventing disclosure of personal affairs to freedom to engage in cer-
tain activity without State constraint); Arnault, supra note 67, at 764 n.54 (observing
that Eisenstadt extended right of privacy beyond marital couple to individual). But see
Storrow, supra note 61, at 555-56 (arguing that Eisenstadt recognized distinct privacy
rights for married (right of sexual privacy) and unmarried (right of procreative privacy,
insofar as acquiring contraceptives)).
87. See Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note 4, at 1664 (arguing that Griswold and
Eisenstadt protect right to engage in sexual intercourse without State restraint); Conkle,
supra note 59, at 221-22 (arguing that State cannot restrict sexual activity giving rise to
contraception and abortion rights). But see Melissa M. Eckhause, Note, A Chastity Belt
for Lawyers: Proposed MRPC 1.8(K) and the Regulation ofAltorney-Client Sexual Relationships,
75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 115, 129 (1997) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has not
recognized fundamental right to engage in sexual activity); Mischler, supra note 85, at
26 (noting that Carey Court has declared that right of privacy has never been found to
protect private sexual conduct between consenting adults); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498
(Goldberg, J. concurring) (declaring that Connecticut has constitutionally valid statutes
prohibiting adultery and fornication).
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sexual activity. 8 Legal scholars have thus concluded that by pro-
tecting individual autonomy in matters relating to private con-
sensual sexual conduct, the Court creates a zone of privacy for
consenting adults to engage in private acts of intimacy."s Ac-
cording to these interpretations of the Court's privacy jurispru-
dence, the rights enunciated in Griswold and its progeny create a
"freedom of intimate association" between two opposite-sexed
88. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J. concurring) (noting that substantive due
process protects right for unmarried and married persons to engage in non-procreative
sex, including that which others may deem offensive or immoral). See also REDLICH,
supra note 59, at 234 (noting that in his dissenting opinion in Bowers, Justice Stevens
found that Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey protect right to engage in non-procreative
sexual activity); Conkle, supra note 59, at 232 (arguing that Eisenstadt and Roe necessa-
rily protect right of unmarried heterosexual adults to engage in consensual non-repro-
ductive sexual activity); Storrow, supra note 61, at 551-52 (noting that Eisenstadt held
that married and unmarried persons must have same rights to obtain contraception);
Arnault, supra note 67, at 764 n.54 (noting that Eisenstadt struck down legislation for
discriminating against unmarried individuals); Note, Constitutional Barriers, supra note
4, at 1664 (noting that right to use contraception would be meaningless without corre-
sponding fight to engage in sexual intercourse); Conkle, supra note 59, at 221-22 (argu-
ing that right of privacy, which includes right to access and use contraception and right
to procure abortion, at least incidentally protects underlying sexual conduct giving rise
to protected activity).
89. See Arielle Goldhammer, A Case Against Consensual Crimes: Why the Law Should
Stay Out of Pocketbooks, Bedrooms, and Medicine Cabinets, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 237, 263 (2002)
(discussing New York Family Court decision recognizing right to engage in non-repro-
ductive recreational sex); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 230 (citing Hollenbaugh v. Car-
negie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978), for proposition that Court has been reluctant
to extend constitutional protection to extramarital relationships); STONE, supra note 62,
at 955-56 (revealing that while Court's decisions in Griswold line of cases all construed
right of privacy as protecting "the decision whether to bear or beget a child," post-Roe
cases reveal that substantive due process is not so limited). See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (protecting marriage as fundamental right); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extending right of privacy to family relationships). See
also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 229, 230-33 (stating that Court has extended fundamen-
tal rights status to marriage and familial relationships and citing cases where Court has
carefully examined State statutes that unjustifiably interfere with family relationships or
individual rights exercised within family unit); STONE, supra note 62, at 955-56 (sug-
gesting that modern substantive due process protection is not restricted to childbearing
decision and noting that Meyer and Pierce involved matters beyond procreation, and
Moore, Zablocki, and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), addressed association be-
tween right of privacy and family relationship). Post-Eisenstadt cases, extending substan-
tive due process protection to marriage and family relationships, therefore demonstrate
that modern substantive due process provides protection to matters beyond childbear-
ing. Id. But see Storrow, supra note 61, at 553 (arguing that Eisenstadt only protected
narrow right to decide whether to have children, asserting that reasoning of Eisenstadt
does not support right for unmarried persons to engage in non-procreative intimate
activity, and contending that after Eisenstadt, States are free to enact criminal statutes
proscribing sexual activity between unmarried persons).
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individuals, married or single."'
Although the Warren and Burger Courts had not specifi-
cally addressed whether the right of privacy extended to private
sexual activity between consenting adults, State challenges to the
constitutionality of legislation regulating such conduct escalated
pursuant to the Court's construal of a constitutional right of pri-
vacy." The Court's landmark decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,"2
however, limited the scope of these challenges and the potential
scope of the privacy right enunciated in the Griswold line of
cases.
9 3
90. See Mischler, supra note 85, at 26 (asserting that scholars have persuasively ar-
ticulated existence of "freedom of intimate association"); Note, Constitutional Barriers,
supra note 4, at 1663-64, 1666 (arguing that Griswold line of cases affords constitutional
protection to intimate association).
91. See, e.g., Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 678 (Fla. 1979) (involving appellant's
assertion that State fornication statute violated constitutional right of privacy); Com-
monwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. 1983) (concerning challenge that
State adultery statute infringed constitutional right of privacy); Fabio v. Civil Service
Commission of City of Philadelphia, 373 A.2d 751, 752, 754, 755 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1977) (involving police officer's claim that basis for his dismissal (engaging in adultery
in his home while off-duty) infringed constitutional right of privacy); Hollenbaugh v.
Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp 1328, 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1052 (1978) (involving plaintiffs' claim that basis of discharge (living together in open
adultery) violated constitutional right of privacy); Doe v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975) (concerning claim that State sodomy statute infringed con-
stitutional right of privacy); Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570, 576 (Md. 1981) (noting that
in Doe v. Commonwealth, plaintiffs challenged Virginia's sodomy statute as unconstitu-
tional intrusion into right of privacy when applied to consensual active homosexual
relations conducted in private); State v. Worthington, 582 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (concerning challenge to State sodomy statute as violating constitutional
right of privacy); State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994) (concerning chal-
lenge to Texas same-sex sodomy statute).
92. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
93. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2490 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing cases relying on Bowers to limit scope of privacy right). See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (citing Bowers as support for upholding public
indecency statute on grounds of protecting public order and morality); Milner v. Apfel,
148 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Bowers for proposition that morality constitutes
legitimate State interest); Holmes v. California Army National Guard 124 F.3d 1126,
1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on Bowers to uphold regulations prohibiting those who
engage in homosexual activity from military service); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944,
949 (11 th Cir. 2001) (relying on Bowers in holding that statute prohibiting sale of sexu-
ally stimulating devices for purpose of preserving morality withstands rational basis re-
view); Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1482-83 (D. Utah 1994) (citing
Bowers to support holding that plaintiff had no fundamental right to commit adultery);
Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 53 (Md. 1999) (citing Bowers for proposition that individu-
als have no constitutional right to engage in non-marital sexual intercourse); City of
Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 469-71 (Tex. 1996) (holding that, under Bowers test,
there is no fundamental right to engage in adulterous conduct and citing Bowers for
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In Bowers, defendant Hardwick, an adult male, was charged
with violating a Georgia statute by engaging in consensual homo-
sexual sodomy in his bedroom. 4 Defendant challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute insofar as it made private consensual
sodomy a crime. 5 In framing the issue, the majority asked
whether the Constitution provides a fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy. 6 In answering this query, the ma-
support that plaintiff had no fundamental right to commit adultery). See also Hydorn,
supra note 59, at 247 (asserting that Bowers narrowed scope of right of privacy).
94. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88 (stating that defendant challenged constitutional-
ity of Georgia statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-2 (1984) (criminalizing heterosexual and same-sex sodomy). The Official Code
declares the following:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another .... (b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
Id. See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 233 (noting that although prosecutor dropped
charges against defendant, latter sued for declaratory judgment to invalidate statute as
unconstitutional).
95. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188, 195-96 (identifying concerns regarding limitless
nature of defendant's claim, such as potential protection that recognition of asserted
freedom would grant to sexual crimes). See also Debra L. Weiss, The Sex Offender Registra-
tion and Community Notification Acts: Does Disclosure Violate an Offender's Right to Privacy?,
20 HAMLINE L. REv. 557, 564 (1996) (noting that defendants challenged constitutional-
ity of statute on grounds that it infringed fundamental right of privacy to make autono-
mous decisions in matters of consensual intimate conduct).
96. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (characterizing issue as whether Constitution grants
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy). See also Schmidt, supra note 78,
at 182-83 (arguing that Bowers Court did not address issue under broader rubric of
privacy rights, but narrowly framed issue as whether Constitution confers right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 233 (noting that although
Georgia statute's prohibition extended to heterosexual sodomy, including sodomy be-
tween married persons, Bowers majority limited its holding to homosexual sodomy);
Stephanie M. Wildman, Interracial Intimacy and the Potentialfor Social Change, 17 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 153, 161 n.28 (2002) (reviewing RACHEL F. MoRAN, INTERRACIAL IrTIMACV:
THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001)) (asserting that Bowers Court viewed
issue of homosexual sodomy as one of criminal activity and not one of privacy and
fundamental rights); Henry F. Fradella et al., Sexual Orientation, Justice, and HigherEduca-
tion: Student Attitudes Towards Gay Civil Rights and Hate Crimes, 11 LAw & SEXUALTY 11,
19 (2002) (noting that majority's holding in Bowers has been criticized for framing issue
too narrowly). See, e.g., Major Eugene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should be
Constitutionally Protected in the Military by the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REv. 91, 126
(2002) (arguing that Bowers focused too narrowly on ight of individual to engage in
homosexual sodomy); Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Herme-
neutics, 24 CARDozo L. REv. 967, 1029 (2003) (arguing that framing issue as whether
Constitution grants fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy enabled Bowers
Court to distance itself from addressing question of whether anti-sodomy statutes are
prudent or desirable); Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the
Power to "Say What the Law Is," 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 839, 896 n.364 (2002) (noting
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jority defined fundamental rights as those rights without which
neither liberty nor justice would exist, or those liberties that are
deeply rooted in the history and tradition of this Nation.9" This
history-related analysis requires discerning the relevant tradition,
a concept that plays a central role in modern substantive due
process jurisprudence, encompassing the particular practice at
issue.9" Using tradition as the analytical tool for assessing the
claimed fundamental rights status of homosexual sodomy, the
Bowers majority presented the historical criminalization of sod-
omy as evidence that the proposed right did not satisfy either
that Bowers Court's specific formulation of issue fixed its conclusion); Amy D. Ronner,
Scouting for Intolerance: The Dale Court's Resurrection of the Medieval Leper, I1 LAw & SEXU-
ALITY 53, 62 (2002) (arguing that, by narrowly construing Georgia statute as singling out
only homosexual activity, Bowers "excised" heterosexuals from activity of sodomy); Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (holding that Bowers Court misconstrued defendant's claim by
framing issue as whether Constitution grants fundamental right to engage in consen-
sual homosexual sodomy). But see Adam Hickey, Note, Between Two Spheres: Comparing
State and Federal Approaches to the Right of Privacy and Prohibitions against Sodomy, 111 YALE
L.J. 993, 996 (2002) (arguing that given how Court has framed issues concerning pri-
vacy rights in prior cases, it decided Bowers correctly).
97. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (identifying category of rights that qualify for
heightened judicial protection). "[Fundamental rights are those] that are 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[they] were sacrificed."' Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937)). "[Fundamental liberties are] those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). See also Hickey, supra note 96, at 998 (asserting that test adopted
by Court for evaluating whether right of privacy protects homosexual sodomy requires
assessment of traditional status of homosexual sodomy per se); Cornelia Sage Russell,
Comment, Shahar v. Bowers: Intimate Association and the First Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ.
1479, 1512 n.245 (1996) (asserting that U.S. Supreme Court uses Moore and Palko for-
mulations to decide whether asserted fundamental right is rooted in Constitution, even
if impliedly, and noting that, according to Bowers Court, these formulations provide
Justices with basis for their holdings other than their own subjective preferences); Law-
rence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491-92 (citing various definitions of fundamental liberties); Rubin,
supra note 75, at 841-42 (listing numerous formulations employed by Court in deter-
mining whether right is fundamental).
98. See REDLICH, supra note 59, at 232-33 (discussing use of tradition in Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)); Julienne C. Scocca, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Mar-
riages: A Reevaluation of the So-Called "Fundamental Right" of Marriage, 2 SETON HALL
CONsT. L.J. 719, 732 n.71 (1992) (noting that in its substantive due process analysis,
Court has employed tradition as basis for identifying fundamental liberties not ex-
pressly specified in text of Constitution); Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition
and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MiAMi L. REV. 101, 108 (2002) (asserting that tradition is
generally accepted method for assessing claimed fundamental liberties). See also STONE,
supra note 62, at 964 (discussing outcome-determinative aspect of defining tradition in
modern substantive due process jurisprudence).
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test of fundamental liberties.' 9
Finally, the majority criticized the defendant's claim, pre-
mised on the Court's prior decision in Stanley v. Georgia,1°0 that
the Constitution affords protection to the intimate conduct at
issue because it took place in the home.101 Finding that Stanley
relied on the First Amendment, a provision inapplicable in the
case at hand, the majority rejected the defendant's argument
and revealed concern over the flood of sexual crimes that would
99. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (noting that original thirteen States had all
adopted criminal sodomy laws when they ratified Bill of Rights; in 1868, thirty-two of
thirty-seven States in Union had criminal sodomy statutes; until 1961, all fifty States
banned sodomy; and, at time of Bowers, twenty-four States and District of Columbia
continued to criminalize private consensual sodomy). But see EsKRIDGE, supra note 4
(manuscript at 3-5) (demonstrating that history of statutes criminalizing same-sex sod-
omy is complex). See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (holding that neither Palko nor Moore
formulation of fundamental liberties extends fundamental right to engage in consen-
sual homosexual sodomy). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 233 (observing that opin-
ion in Bowers rejected argument that tradition provided fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy); Mootz, supra note 96, at 1029 (observing that because of Court's
specific framing of issue, Bowers reached "obvious" conclusion that Constitution cannot
be fairly read within this Nation's constitutional tradition as granting affirmative right
to engage in homosexual sodomy); Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1075 (asserting that
majority described recognition of fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
as exceeding Court's institutional limitations); Mootz, supra note 96, at 1029 (describ-
ing Court as reasoning that because sodomy laws have ancient roots in moral values,
they are rational products of lawmaking acts and as such, do not contravene fundamen-
tal liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation); Hickey, supra note 96, at 998 (noting
that Court upheld sodomy statute insofar as it applied to homosexual sodomy because
of absence of American tradition accepting such conduct). But see Aaron J. Rappaport,
Beyond Personhood and Autonomy: Moral Theory and the Premises of Privacy, 2001 UTAH L.
REV. 441, 488-89 (2001) (asserting that Court has never accepted position that tradition
must be defined by specific conduct in question, discussing problems associated with
interpreting tradition at this narrow level, including fact that such narrow analysis
would produce outcomes inconsistent with Court's privacy jurisprudence, and noting
that right to interracial marriage or abortion is not found in American tradition); Wolf,
supra note 98, at 108 (noting that judges have employed several analytical formulations
to evaluate claimed fundamental rights). See, e.g., REDLICH, supra note 59, at 234 (ob-
serving that majority and dissent in Bowers distinctly characterized relevant tradition).
100. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
101. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (finding that defendant's reliance on Stanley for
proposition that homosexual sodomy is constitutionally protected when occurring in
privacy of one's home lacks merit because Stanley rested firmly on First Amendment
grounds while private homosexual sodomy finds no similar textual support in Constitu-
tion). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 207-08 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that Stanley's
holding was rooted in Fourth Amendment protection of individual in home). See also
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1695 (1998) (noting that Fourth Amendment played significant
role in Griswold).
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escape prosecution through acceptance of such a claim. 112
Discerning no fundamental right to engage in same-sex sod-
omy, the majority subsequently sought a legitimate State interest
to determine whether Georgia's sodomy statute withstood ra-
tional basis review. 10 Finding that majoritarian beliefs regard-
ing the immorality of homosexual sodomy constituted a legiti-
mate State interest, the majority upheld the Georgia statute
criminalizing private consensual sodomy. 0 4 In rejecting a right
of privacy that exempts all private consensual sexual activity from
State control, the Bowers majority squarely rested its holding on
the presumed moral inclinations of Georgia's electorate. 10 5
102. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96 (identifying concerns regarding limitless nature
of proposed freedom of intimate association, including potential protection that recog-
nition of asserted freedom would grant to sexual crimes, and noting that victimless
crimes (such as possession and use of illicit drugs) are not saved from prosecution when
committed in private). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's comparison of private consensual sex with private possession of
drugs, firearms, or stolen goods, arguing that latter crimes are inherently dangerous or
involve robbed victim). See also Colb, supra note 101, at 1698 (noting that engaging in
criminal activity behind closed doors forfeits right of privacy).
103. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (noting that even if conduct at issue is not funda-
mental right, statute must still have rational basis to withstand review). See also Gold-
stein, supra note 49, at 1075-76 (noting that Bowers Court applied rational basis review
after finding that defendant had no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy); Mootz, supra note 96, at 1031 (characterizing rational basis review as more re-
laxed standard than strict scrutiny).
104. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186, 196 (upholding constitutionality of State sodomy
statute). See also Mootz, supra note 96, at 1034 (arguing that premise of Bowers was that
morality constituted rational basis for State legislation); Sidney Buchanan, A Constitu-
tional Cross-Road for Gay Rights, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1269, 1270 (2001) (characterizing Bow-
ers Court's decision as including three sub-holdings: (1) right of privacy recognized by
Court's prior cases does not extend to homosexual sodomy; (2) Constitution does not
grant fundamental right to engage in same-sex sodomy; and (3) criminalizing activity
that offends majoritarian "notions of morality" is rationally related to legitimate goal of
advancing moral objectives of majority). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (distinguishing between laws banning public indecency and those enforc-
ing private morality). Justice Blackmun argued that the same right of privacy that pro-
tects private consensual sex from unwarranted State intrusion justifies protecting the
individual's right against having sexual conduct "imposed" on him or her in public. Id.
at 213. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (concerning
statute banning public indecency but not private aspects of such conduct).
105. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 196 (holding that majority sentiments regarding
morality of homosexual sodomy constitute adequate basis for law). See also Rebecca L.
Brown, A Government For the People, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 5, 20 (2002) (asserting that Bowers
Court explicitly approved legitimacy of using morals-based legislation). But see Bowers,
478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that religious values cannot provide
adequate basis for secular legislation). In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
Court's prior cases demonstrate that traditional majoritarian beliefs regarding the mo-
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun criticized
the majority for misconstruing the disputed issue, 10 6 and re-
framed the issue in Bowers as "the right to be let alone.' 01 7 Dis-
cussing the Fourth Amendment's protection of personal security
rality of particular conduct are insufficient to support a statutory prohibition of such
conduct. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216. Reasoning that the Georgia electorate had presuma-
bly expressed the belief that all sodomy, and not just same-sex sodomy, was immoral,
Justice Stevens argued that the statutory justification posited by the Bowers Court was
inaccurate. Id. at 219.
106. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200, 202-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court for its "cramped" construal of issue). "[T]he majority has distorted the question
this case presents." Id. at 200. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (characterizing issue as
whether Constitution grants fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy). See
also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003) (holding that Bowers Court miscon-
strued defendant's claim by framing issue as whether Constitution grants fundamental
right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy); Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1076
(stating thatJustice Blackmun rejected majority's representation of issue and summariz-
ingJustice Blackmun's dual rationale for framing issues broadly: (1) statute's use of
anatomical rather than gender-based prohibitions and (2) centrality of sexual intimacy
to individual); Fradella et al., supra note 96, at 19 (noting that Bowers has been criticized
for framing issue too narrowly). See, e.g., Zick, supra note 96, at 896 n.364 (noting that
specific formulation of issue in Bowers fixed Court's holding); Baime, supra note 96, at
126 (arguing that Bowers focused too narrowly on individual's right to engage in homo-
sexual conduct); Ronner, supra note 96, at 62 (arguing that Court narrowly construed
Georgia statute as singling out only homosexual activity); Schmidt, supra note 78, at
182-83 (arguing that Bowers Court narrowly framed issue as whether Constitution con-
fers right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Mootz, supra note 96, at 1029 (arguing
that narrow framing allowed Bowers Court to distance itself from addressing issue of
whether sodomy statutes are prudent); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (holding that Bowers
Court misconstrued defendant's claim by framing issue as whether Constitution grants
fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy). But see Hickey, supra
note 96, at 996 (arguing that given how Court has previously framed issue of privacy
rights, Bowers was correctly decided). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 110-26, 169-70, 290-91 (1990) (finding
that Bowers was rightly decided).
107. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Bowers is
not about fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, as Court declares, but
rather "the right to be let alone"). Justice Blackmun compares the Bowers Court's con-
strual of the relevant issue with the Court's prior holding in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969). Id. "This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy' . . . than [Stanley] was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies." Id. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558 (concerning defendant's alleged violation of
State statute criminalizing knowing possession of obscene matter where federal and
State agents, under authority of search warrant for unrelated activity, found and seized
film containing obscene material from defendant's bedroom); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (revealing that, had Stanley Court examined whether viewing
pornography in one's home was fundamental right protected by Constitution, Court
would have faced challenging task gleaning this right through history and tradition,
and illustrating that Bowers Court faced similar task through its narrow query). See also
Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that it would be difficult to root fundamental right to
engage in sodomy deeply in this Nation's history or tradition).
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within the home, Justice Blackmun demonstrated that the Con-
stitution protects the right of the individual to engage in inti-
mate association in the privacy of her home.""s
108. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Court's
prior decision which held that essence of Fourth Amendment violation is invasion of
personal security), "[T]he essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is 'not the break-
ing of [a person's) doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,' but rather is 'the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.'" Id.
(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)). Jus-
tice Blackmun supports his "privacy of the individual in her home" argument with spe-
cific reference to Stanley, and rejects the Bowers Court's interpretation of Stanley. Id. at
207-08. The Bowers Court found that the defendant's reliance on Stanley (for the pro-
position that homosexual sodomy is constitutionally protected when it occurs in the
privacy of one's home) was misplaced because Stanley rested firmly on First Amendment
grounds. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. Justice Blackmun, however, asserted that Stanley's
holding was rooted in Fourth Amendment protection of the individual in her home.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199, 207. "[Stanley was not about] "a fundamental fight to watch
obscene movies," but rather, "the right [of an individual] to read or observe what he
pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his
own home." Id. (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565). Justice Blackmun argued that Stan-
ley's reliance on the Fourth Amendment is made apparent by the importance Stanley
gave to Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928), a case which
raises no First Amendment claim. Id. at 207. He further noted that the Court in Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), suggested that Fourth Amendment reli-
ance was necessary to the Court's decision in Stanley. Id. at 207-08. See also Colb, supra
note 101, at 1698-99 (arguing that defendant in Bowers asserted Fourth Amendment-
related claim by asserting place-specific and not absolute right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and The Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REv. 359, 422 (2000) (noting thatJustice Blackmun relied on ownership rights of home
to provide sphere of privacy); Mark E. Papadopoulos, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Ev-
ans as a Great Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL' 165, 170
n.34 (1997) (noting that dissenting Justices in Bowers criticized majority's reasoning for
its failure to account for fact that activity occurred in privacy of home where Stanley
provides special protection, and asserting that this argument actually represents chal-
lenge to majority's premise that it would decide case at lowest level of controversy possi-
ble rather than higher levels such as broad language with which statute was written or
broad notions of privacy); Colb, supra note 101, at 1695 (discussing centrality of Fourth
Amendment in Court's privacy jurisprudence, namely in Griswold). See Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 206 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that protecting security of home means more
than merely protecting specific activities occurring in home). "Just as the fight to pri-
vacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in spe-
cific behavior, so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home is more than merely
a means of protecting specific activities that often take place there." Id. justice Black-
mun argues that although the Court alleges that its decision in Bowers merely rejects
recognition of a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy,
the Court has actually refused to acknowledge the fundamental interest all individuals
have in making personal decisions regarding their intimate associations. Id. at 205-06.
He argues that the right of an individual to engage in intimate relationships in the
privacy of her home is "at the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy." Id. at
208. Justice Blackmun also notes that the Court's jurisprudence has long acknowl-
edged that the Constitution protects a certain realm of individual liberty from govern-
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The Court's decision in Bowers created an upheaval, infuri-
ating critics who condemned the majority's narrow framing of
the issue, and even distancing State courts, some of who de-
clined to follow Bowers in interpreting certain provisions of their
State Constitutions.1"9 The Supreme Court itself decided cases
which questioned the continued viability of Bowers." ° First, in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"' the
Court addressed the constitutionality of statutory provisions re-
stricting a woman's right to procure an abortion." 2 A few years
ment intrusion. Id. at 203. He argues that the majority's position, limiting the right of
privacy to decisions relating to family, marriage, and procreation, and disallowing ex-
tension of the right to private homosexual sodomy, ignores the warning in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977), against "clos[ing] our eyes" to essential
reasons that particular rights in the family context have been protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 204. Justice Blackmun also notes that
individual decisions relating to family, marriage, and procreation are constitutionally
protected because of their centrality to individuals' lives, and asserts that sexual inti-
macy is central to many aspects of human existence. Id. at 204-05. He argues that pro-
viding individuals with the freedom to decide how to conduct their lives necessarily
entails acceptance of the reality that different persons will make different choices. Id. at
205-06. "A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned because it is different." Id. at 206 (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972)). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into
the Province ofJudging Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REV. 173, 184 (1995)
(arguing that Justice Blackmun's central point is tolerance).
109. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (noting that five different State courts have re-
fused to follow Bowers in construing their respective State constitutional provisions). See
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 783 (2002) (noting that Bowers Court's
description of claimed fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy as "face-
tious" enraged gay community); Crime in the Bedroom, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1986, at A30
(asserting that Bowers Court "crudely" rejected claim that sodomy statute violates privacy
and personal liberty); Baime, supra note 96, at 126 (arguing that Bowers focused too
narrowly on right of individual to engage in homosexual sodomy); Conkle, supra note
59, at 216 (asserting that Bowers has somewhat sounded death knell for substantive due
process).
110. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (establishing that
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects intimate personal choices of in-
dividuals); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (striking down constitutional
amendment excluding homosexuals from protection under State antidiscrimination
laws as violating Equal Protection Clause); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (noting that
decisions in Casey and Romer eroded premise of Bowers). See also James M. Winner,
Capt., USAF, Comment, Beds With Sheets But No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Mili-
tarys Regulation of Adultery, 31 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1089, 1090 (1998) (suggesting
that Casey and Romer foreshadowed demise of Bowers).
111. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
112. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (discussing provisions of State abortion statute);
REOLICH, supra note 59, at 225 (describing challenged provisions as requiring informed
consent combined with one-day waiting period, spousal notification, parental consent
for minors, and record-keeping). See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847, 848, 851 (discussing Court's
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later, in Romer v. Evans,'1 3 the Court addressed an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution which disqualified a defined class
of persons, namely homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals, from
protection under the State's antidiscrimination laws." 4 Both
cases, respectively illustrating that the scope of liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause encompasses an individual's most inti-
mate personal decisions, and demonstrating that animus towards
a solitary class of persons does not justify disfavorable treatment
in the law, exposed the unstable foundation underlying the
Court's holding in Bowers, and foreshadowed the death knell of
the Court's controversial stance on privacy.'
b. Lawrence v. Texas"'
Seventeen years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court lulled
the agitation of academics and critics when it addressed the con-
stitutionality of another statute banning same-sex sodomy."' In
Lawrence, State officers entered an apartment in response to a
reported weapons disturbance and observed two men ("petition-
ers") engaging in a sexual act."' The petitioners were arrested
privacy jurisprudence). "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter." Id. at 847. See Lawrence, 123 S.
Ct. at 2481-82 (discussing application of Casey to individuals in homosexual relation-
ships). See also Ryan, supra note 50, at 5-6 (discussing Justice Kennedy's view of liberty
in Casey).
113. 517 U.S 620 (1996).
114. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (discussing Amendment 2 of Colorado Constitu-
tion); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (noting that Romer casts doubt on holding in Bowers);
Papadopoulos, supra note 108, at 168-69, 180-84, 188-90 (discussing theory that Romer
overruled Bowers and describing alternative theory distinguishing Romer from Bowers).
115. See Papadopoulos, supra note 108, at 181 n.102 (asserting that authors have
suggested that Romer undermines foundation of Bowers); Cass R. Sunstein., Foreword,
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 64-71 (1996) (discussing Romer's implica-
tions on Bowers); John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDozo L. REV. 1119, 1161 n.201 (1999) (suggesting potential implications of Casey
on gay rights issues); Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that few years after Justice Ken-
nedy was appointed to Court, Justice Powell, upon inquiry at student forum, exposed
regret for his vote in Bowers).
116. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
117. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76 (discussing Texas' sodomy statute). See also
Leonard, supra note 51 (describing Lawrence as "sweeping victory" for homosexuals).
118. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475-76 (noting that petitioners were adults at time
of alleged crime and conduct was consensual and conducted in private, and asserting
that right of law enforcement to enter petitioner Lawrence's home was apparently not
questioned). See alsoJoanna L. Grossman, Does Lawrence v. Texas "change everything"?, 10
HARV. GAY & LESBIAN Riv., 4 (2003), available at 2003 WIL 8862321 (discussing facts of
Lawrence).
20031
404 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:370
and convicted under the Texas Penal Code for engaging in "de-
viate sexual intercourse."" 9 In an opinion by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the majority criticizes the Bowers Court for its failure to
recognize the scope of the liberty at stake in that case by framing
the issue so "simply. '1 20 Employing an alternative method of is-
sue framing, Justice Kennedy sets out to determine whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in consensual sexual
conduct in the privacy of their home. 121
Criticizing the Bowers Court for its analysis of tradition, Jus-
tice Kennedy argues that the Bowers majority overstated historical
premises and simplified a complex body of history. 122 Tracing
the ancient tradition of criminalizing sodomy, the Lawrence ma-
jority declares that early sodomy laws in the United States were
not directed at homosexuals in particular, but rather, to all non-
procreative sexual activity; moreover, such laws were rarely, if
ever, enforced against consenting adults acting in private.' 21 Ac-
119. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (noting that, with respect to substantive due
process claim, Court of Appeals considered Bowers as controlling); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (repealed 2003) (criminalizing same-sex sodomy). "A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex." Id. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (Vernon 2003) (de-
fining "deviate sexual intercourse"). "'Deviate sexual intercourse' means (A) any con-
tact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an
object." Id.
120. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (asserting that framing issue in Bowers as right
to engage in homosexual sodomy demeans defendant's claim just as it would demean
married couple to describe marriage as simply about right to engage in sexual inter-
course). "[The Bowers Court] misapprehended the claim of liberty.., presented to it,
and thus stat[ed] the claim to be whether there is a fundamental right to engage in
consensual sodomy." Id. See Ryan, supra note 50, at 5 (noting that, according to Justice
Kennedy, Bowers Court misstated essential issue and asserting that Justice Kennedy fo-
cused on dignity of free persons and not sexual activity).
121. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476, 2482 (noting that while case could be decided
under Equal Protection Clause, Court must resolve case pursuant to substantive due
process in order to determine continued validity of Bowers). See also Ryan, supra note
50, at 5 (noting that Lawrence Court declined to find statute unconstitutional under
Equal Protection Clause).
122. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (noting that Bowers Court was making broader
assertion regarding long-held beliefs denouncing homosexual sodomy as immoral); Es-
KRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2-5) (discussing complex history underlying
prohibitions of all sodomy in general and same-sex sodomy in particular).
123. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79 (noting that in colonial times and nine-
teenth century, prohibitions against sodomy did not distinguish between heterosexuals
and homosexuals); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing pat-
tern of non-enforcement of Georgia sodomy statute with respect to private consensual
homosexual sodomy). See also Ryan, supra note 50, at 9 (asserting thatJustice Kennedy
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cording to Justice Kennedy, States have only recently singled out
homosexual sodomy for criminal prosecution, and only nine
have done so.' 24  Noting that five of these States have since
moved towards repealing these statutes, Justice Kennedy demon-
strates an "emerging awareness" that liberty affords protection to
adults in deciding how to conduct their intimate lives.'
25
Justice Kennedy subsequently demonstrates the gradual ero-
sion of Bowers by invoking the two Supreme Court cases that
challenged its continuing validity. 126 First, the majority makes
reference to the Casey decision, arguing that the holding in Casey
affords all individuals, including homosexual persons, the right
to decisional autonomy in making the most intimate choices in
their personal lives.' 27 Next, the majority cites Romer, where the
Court invalidated class-based legislation aimed at homosexuals
as violating the Equal Protection Clause. 2 '
demonstrates that sodomy statutes have rarely been enforced in U.S. except to ensure
that alleged rapists who could not be convicted for lack of evidence could still be prose-
cuted for some offense); ESKRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3) (citing nineteenth
century case where court overturned conviction of men engaging in homosexual acts
where witnesses observed three men entangled with one another but could not prove
sexual penetration and noting that reported nineteenth century cases fall into three
groups: (1) sex between adult men and animals; (2) sex between adult men and mi-
nors (boys and girls); and (3) sex between two adults, usually involving force or coer-
cion based on status).
124. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479 (asserting that U.S. laws targeting homosexual
couples are not deeply rooted in history, but developed in last third of twentieth cen-
tury). But see Ryan, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing that Justice Kennedy provides lengthy
but not very convincing discussion that laws specifically directed at same-sex sodomy are
of relatively recent origin). See also ESKRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3) (noting
that first three-quarters of twentieth century marked period of increasing State snoop-
ing, especially into lives of sexual minorities, while in nineteenth century, State did not
intrude into Nation's bedrooms).
125. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (declaring that U.S. laws and traditions
demonstrate this "emerging awareness"). See also Ryan, supra note 50, at 9 (noting that
Justice Kennedy reveals that States have been slowly repealing sodomy laws).
126. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82 (discussing implications of Casey and Romer
on gay rights). See also Winner, supra note 110, at 1089, 1090 (suggesting that Casey and
Romer foreshadowed demise of Bowers); Leonard, supra note 51 (discussing Justice Ken-
nedy's analysis of Casey and Romer).
127. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82 (discussing impact of Casey on continued
existence of Bowers). See also Winner, supra note 110, at 1089 (suggesting that standards
set forth in Casey seem to foreshadow death of Bowers); Leonard, supra note 51 (assert-
ing that language employed in Casey suggested broader concept of personal liberty than
that implied in Bowers).
128. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (providing case summary of Romer). Rejecting
the legitimacy of morals-based legislation, Romer foreshadows the Lawrence Court's treat-
ment of morals-based legislation. See id. The Lawrence Court observes that Romer casts
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Concluding that the precedents both before and after Bow-
ers contradict the central holding of that case, the Lawrence ma-
jority overrules this controversial case which specifically held
that the Constitution does not grant a right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy. 129 Finding that Texas' interest in promoting mo-
rality did not even constitute a legitimate State interest for
criminalizing homosexual sodomy, the Court holds that the
right of privacy protects the intimate decisions of persons in a
homosexual relationship from State intrusion.1 31 Invalidating
Texas' same-sex sodomy legislation under the substantive com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the majority grants a fundamental right to engage in pri-
vate consensual sexual activity.13 1
doubt on the continuing validity of Bowers. Id. at 2481-82. See generally Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (rejecting idea that law is constantly based on morality). Even
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Romer, argued that the Romer Court's rejection of the legiti-
macy of morals-based legislation contradicts Bowers. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636, 644
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Leonard, supra note 51 (asserting that Romer was first
major victory for gay rights in U.S. Supreme Court in long time); Winner, supra note
110, at 1089 (noting that Court in Romer directly contradicted its holding in Bowers).
129. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482-84 (overruling Bowers and asserting that secon-
dary source criticism holds greater significance when Court's precedent is weakened);
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 196 (finding no fundamental right for homosexuals to engage
in consensual sodomy). See also ESKRIDGE, supra note 4 (manuscript at 12) (noting that
Romer and Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998), foreshadowed demise of Bowers);
Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that Lawrence majority ruled that Bowers was incorrectly
decided and arguing that Justice Kennedy focused on destroying Bowers).
130. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476, 2484 (applying rational basis review to invalidate
Texas statute). But see Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's rejection of morality as legitimate State interest). See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at
2484 (asserting that liberty granted by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
protects individual decisions in matters of private intimacy from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion). See also Leonard, supra note 51 (suggesting thatJustice Kennedy was
asserting that Texas' statute failed even most lenient standard of review); Stephanie
Francis Ward, Toys in the Appellate Court: Suit Challenging Alabama's Ban on Sale of Sexual
Devices Cites Lawrence Decision, 2 A.B.A.J. EREP., No. 40, at 3 (2003) (noting that Lawrence
invalidates State sodomy law as unconstitutional violation of right of privacy); Elizabeth
R. Baldwin, Note, Damage Control: Staking Claim to Employment Law Remedies for Undocu-
mented Immigrant Workers After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 27 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 233, 263 n.265 (2003) (noting that Lawrence holds that all American sodomy laws
are unconstitutional and unenforceable when applied to consenting adults acting in
private).
131. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82, 2484 (protecting individual autonomy in
matters of private intimacy). But see Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority rests its holding on claim that law lacks rational basis). See also A.
Scott Loveless, Children on the Front Lines of an Ideological War: The Differing Values of
Differing Values, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 371, 396 n. 77 (2003) (arguing that Law-
rence elevates private consensual sodomy to fundamental rights status); Suzanne B.
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c. Bowers and Lawrence: The Outcome-Determinative
Aspect of Inquiry Framing
In its analysis of privacy rights, the Supreme Court has iden-
tified two privacy interests safeguarded by the Federal Constitu-
tion: the right to be free from governmental intrusion (or the
right to be let alone) and the right to decisional autonomy. 3 '
Consistent federal recognition of this dichotomy, as well as the
Court's pivotal decisions in Bowers and Lawrence, reveal the com-
pelling implications of this duality.'33 These latter cases demon-
strate that the "right to be let alone" aspect of privacy jurispru-
dence affords greater protection to private sexual activity be-
tween consenting adults than the right to decisional
autonomy. 134  Reaching diametrically-opposed holdings, these
Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR.
L. REV. 629, 631 n.7 (2002) (describing Lawrence as recognizing liberty interest of ho-
mosexual persons in making decisions regarding private consensual sexual activity);
Michelle Mann, Will Canada Lead the Way in Same-Sex Marriages?: Winds of Change in the
United States May Come From Up North, 2 A.B.A. J. EREP., No. 27, at 5 (2003) (asserting
that Lawrence reflects principle articulated by former Canadian prime minister Pierre
Trudeau who declared that State has no business in Nation's bedrooms); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 4 (manuscript at 1, 2) (arguing that Lawrence Court's reasoning forbids
States from treating homosexuals as outlaws and requires States to treat gays with re-
spect, and noting that after Lawrence, homosexuals have risen in status from public
outlaws to public citizens); Leonard, supra note 51 (suggesting that as result of Law-
rence, all remaining sodomy statutes in United States are unconstitutional).
132. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (discussing dual interests pro-
tected by Court's privacy jurisprudence); Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (noting
that Framers of Constitution conferred "right to be let alone"). See also City of Sherman
v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 467-68 (Tex. 1996) (discussing privacy interests conferred by
Constitution); Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiffs Physician and Defense
Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant's Right To a Fair Trial, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1001,
1034 n.158 (2000) (characterizing privacy interests as substantive and informational).
133. See, e.g., City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at 468 (noting that lower federal courts
have regularly recognized dichotomy of privacy right); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding that abortion right protects both privacy
interests); Woodland v. City of Houston, 940 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1991) (asserting
that Court's privacy jurisprudence implicates distinct privacy interests); Fleisher v. City
of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988)
(noting that liberty protected by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes
two privacy interests); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984) (finding that case implicated both privacy interests).
See also Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior Coll., 498 F. Supp. 555, 574 (S.D. Tex 1980)
(construing decisional autonomy aspect of right of privacy as encompassing three dis-
tinct interests).
134. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 192-94, 195 (1986) (finding that
Constitution does not confer and Nation's history and tradition do not support funda-
mental right for homosexual persons to engage in consensual sodomy); Lawrence, 123
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cases suggest that in privacy jurisprudence, inquiry framing is
outcome-determinative. '35
Both Bowers and Lawrence address the constitutionality of
sodomy statutes pursuant to the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 In Bowers,
the Court specifically examined whether the defendant's individ-
ual conduct was constitutionally insulated, and thereby con-
strued the case under the more specific individual autonomy as-
pect of privacy."3 7 Demonstrating that the right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy is not deeply rooted in the history and
tradition of this Nation, Bowers concluded that the claimed right
did not satisfy the Palko/Moore test.'" 8
Deciding the level of generality at which to frame the rele-
S. Ct. at 2484 (holding that liberty protects private consensual homosexual intimacies
from State intrusion). See also Francis J. Beckwith, Cloning and Reproductive Liberty, 3
NEv. L.J. 61, 83 n.109 (2002) (asserting that Justice Blackmun understood Court's pri-
vacy jurisprudence as premised on right to be let alone, and noting that this conception
of privacy would render statutes criminalizing private consensual homosexual sodomy
unconstitutional); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 234 (noting that majority and dissent in
Bowers distinctly described relevant tradition).
135. See STONE, supra note 62, at 964 (discussing outcome-determinative aspect of
defining tradition in modern substantive due process jurisprudence); Rappaport, supra
note 99, at 488-89 (stating that Court has never accepted position that tradition must be
defined by specific conduct at issue and noting that narrow analysis would produce
outcomes inconsistent with Court's privacy jurisprudence); Zick, supra note 96, at 896
n.364 (noting that Bowers Court's specific formulation of issue fixed its conclusion);
Mootz, supra note 96, at 1029 (observing that Bowers Court came to "obvious" holding
that within American constitutional tradition, Constitution cannot be read as confer-
ring affirmative right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
136. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94 (assessing whether homosexual sodomy is fun-
damental right under Due Process Clause); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476 (resolving case
specifically under substantive due process component of Fourteenth Amendment). See
also Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due Process
Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1359 (2003) (noting that Bowers
Court held that, for purposes of substantive due process, there was no fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Ryan, supra note 50, at 5 (noting that Lawrence
Court declines to strike down statute pursuant to Equal Protection Clause).
137. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 195 (finding no Constitutional text protecting
right at issue); Jody Lynee Madeira, Comment, Law As a Reflection of Her/His-stoy: Cur-
rent Institutional Perceptions of and Possibilities for, Protecting Transsexuals' Interests in Legal
Determinations of Sex, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 128, 162 (2002) (asserting that Bowers cast
shadow on individual autonomy-based claims for right of privacy to engage in any sex-
ual activity). See also Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that Bowers narrowly framed issue
as encompassing homosexual sodomy); Schmidt, supra note 78, at 182-83 (arguing that
Bowers Court did not address issue under broader umbrella of privacy rights).
138. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (discussing history of sodomy criminalization to
determine whether right to engage in homosexual sodomy is fundamental liberty). See
also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 232-34 (noting significance of defining appropriate tra-
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vant inquiry is closely related to identifying the appropriate level
of tradition that will define the content of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.1 39  This problem was illustrated in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 4 ° where a California statute, establishing
that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is
conclusively presumed to be the husband's child, denied visita-
tion rights to the child's genetic father. 4 ' Writing for a plural-
ity, Justice Antonin Scalia upheld the statute, finding no specific
tradition protecting the rights of an adulterous natural father.1 4 2
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Brennan, Jr. espoused a
more general framing of the relevant tradition, characterizing
the appropriate tradition as the historical protection afforded to
parenthood. 143
dition in modern substantive due process jurisprudence). See generally Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (involving Justices' distinct formulations of tradition).
139. See STONE, supra note 62, at 975 (emphasizing problem associated with decid-
ing level of generality at which to define tradition); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 232
(noting that concept of tradition is central theme in the Court's modern substantive
due process analysis); Wolf, supra note 98, at 108 (asserting that tradition is generally
accepted method for assessing proposed fundamental liberties).
140. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
141. See id. at 111, 121, 127 (finding that substantive due process does not protect
parental rights of adulterous natural father); STONE, supra note 62, at 965 (discussing
statute in Michael H.); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 232-33 (discussing split amongst Jus-
tices in Michael H.). Cf Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, The Hudood Punishments in Northern Nige-
ria: A Muslim Criticism, available at http://www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm (Oct. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism] (describing sleeping fetus doctrine in Maliki
jurisprudence whereby child of pregnant unmarried divorcee is presumed to be child
of former husband during recognized gestation period).
142. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126-27 (finding no tradition protecting parental
rights of adulterous natural father). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 233 (discussing
diverse conceptions of tradition in Michael H.); Merry Jean Chan, Note, The Authorial
Parent: An Intellectual Property Model of Parental Rights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1193
(2003) (noting that in Michael H., plurality found that history and tradition did not
protect liberty interest of adulterous natural father); Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-
Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Determining
Parentage, 34 McGEORGE L. REv. 637, 640 n.15 (2003) (noting that in Michael H.,Justice
Scalia possibly had narrowest view of tradition among all Justices); Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that by limiting concept of tradition, plural-
ity limited concept of liberty).
143. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (asserting that Justice Brennan focused
more generally on traditional protection afforded parenthood, and criticizing Justice
Brennan's broad definition of relevant tradition); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (asserting that if Court in prior cases had viewed tradition as narrowly as
plurality does in Michael H., those cases would have reached different holdings). See
also STONE, supra note 62, at 965 (discussing Michael H.); Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed
Children" and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H.:
Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 42 (1999) (assert-
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The Bowers majority, like Justice Scalia in Michael H., in-
voked the historical protection of the conduct at issue as the rel-
evant tradition with which to evaluate the fundamental rights sta-
tus of same-sex sodomy.'44 The dissenting Justice Blackmun,
however, did not adhere to the majority's narrow definition of
the issue at stake, but framed the pertinent query in terms of a
general right of privacy based on freedom from governmental
intrusion. 45 Consequently, Justice Blackmun found the defen-
dant's conduct within the ambit of constitutional protection
while the Bowers majority found the conduct well outside this
protected sphere.
Opting for general framing, Justice Kennedy, like Justice
Blackmun in his dissent in Bowers, presents the issue in Lawrence
as implicating the more inclusive "right to be let alone" aspect of
privacy.146 Recognizing the problematic nature of discerning
whether the particular act of homosexual sodomy is deeply
ing thatJustice Brennan argued that history and tradition protected general interest in
parenthood); Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36
GoNz. L. REV. 433, 464 n.144 (2000-2001) (noting that Justices Scalia and Brennan
employed competing traditions in Michael H.).
144. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (finding that neither history nor tradition pro-
tects fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy). See also REDLICH, supra note
59, at 233 (observing that opinion in Bowers rejected argument that tradition provided
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy and relied on concept of tradition
to limit scope of substantive due process). But see Rappaport, supra note 99, at 488-89
(asserting that Court has never accepted position that tradition must be defined by
specific conduct in question); Wolf, supra note 98, at 108 (noting that judges have em-
ployed several analytical formulations to evaluate claimed fundamental rights). See, e.g.,
REDLICH, supra note 59, at 234 (observing that majority and dissent in Bowers distinctly
characterized relevant tradition); Huhn, supra note 143, at 464 n.144 (noting thatJus-
tices in Michael H. employed opposing traditions).
145. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199, 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (framing issue as
"right to be let alone"). See also REDLICH, supra note 59, at 234 (distinguishing between
Justices' different conceptions of appropriate tradition at stake in Bowers); Mitchell
Lloyd Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate
Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 189 (1988) (asserting that by framing issue in broad
terms, Justice Blackmun recognized that all individuals, whether homosexual or hetero-
sexual, have same interest in privacy).
146. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (affording homosexual
persons liberty to engage in private consensual intimacies free from State interference).
See also Neda Matar, Comment, Are You Ready For a National ID Card? Perhaps We Don't
Have to Choose Between Fear of Terrorism and Need For Privacy, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 287,
306-07 (2003) (noting that in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy asserts that liberty protects
individuals from unwarranted State intrusion into one's home); Neal Hutchens, The
Legal Effect of College and University Policies Prohibiting Romantic Relationships Between Stu-
dents and Professors, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 411, 425-26 (2003) (noting that Lawrence Court
holds that liberty protects personal relationships from unwarranted State regulation).
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rooted in this Nation's history and tradition (much like the ardu-
ous task of linking the private viewing of pornography to United
States history and tradition) ,Justice Kennedy emphasizes the im-
plications of narrow issue framing.1 47 Employing this broader
query, the Court finds that the Constitution affords petitioners
the right to engage in consensual sexual conduct free from gov-
ernmental intervention.14  Concluding that the State cannot
punish adults for engaging in private consensual sexual behav-
ior, Lawrence demonstrates that the current judicial position on
private sexual conduct between two consenting individuals who
are legally capable of consent is colored by the framing of the
query. 14
9
147. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (criticizing Bowers for framing issue narrowly).
See also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (revealing that if Stanley Court
examined whether viewing pornography in one's home was fundamental right pro-
tected by Constitution, Court would have faced challenging task gleaning this right
through history and tradition); Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that it would be diffi-
cult to root fundamental right to engage in sodomy deeply in this Nation's history or
tradition); STONE, supra note 62, at 975 (establishing that tradition can be defined at
different levels of generality).
148. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (holding that liberty affords petitioners right
to engage in consensual intimate relations without State interference); Ryan, supra note
50, at 5 (noting that Justice Kennedy focuses on dignity of free persons rather than
sexual activity); Leonard, supra note 51 (asserting that Justice Kennedy espouses broad
ruling based on liberty protected by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
149. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (finding that State cannot demean homosex-
ual existence or control lives of homosexuals by criminalizing private consensual same-
sex sodomy); Leonard, supra note 51 (asserting that Justice Kennedy demonstrates
emerging awareness by courts that State should protect liberty of consenting adults to
engage in private consensual intimacies). See also Fabio v. Civil Service Commission of
City of Philadelphia, 373 A.2d 751, 752, 754, 755 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (rejecting
police officer's claim that basis for his dismissal infringed constitutional right of privacy
where officer was dismissed for violating police department manual by engaging in
adulterous conduct in his home while off-duty). Using Bowers as its template, a lower
federal court similarly rejected the application of the right to privacy to adulterous
relationships. Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1482, 1485 (D. Utah
1994) (declaring that plaintiff has no fundamental right to engage in adultery). "[T ] he
ight to commit adultery cannot be considered 'fundamental.'" Id. at 1482. See also
City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 467, 468, 469 n.2 (Tex. 1996) (involving
police officer's claim that basis for denial of promotion (engaging in private adulterous
conduct with co-officer's spouse) violated constitutional right of privacy). In many pre-
Lawrence State cases addressing the applicability of the right to privacy to adulterous
conduct, the judiciary was asked to recognize "a right to commit adultery." Most con-
servative and even moderate judiciaries balked at such a request. A broader inquiry,
such as the "right to be let alone," would likely have afforded protection to two adults
engaging in private, consensual, adulterous conduct. See City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at
474 (addressing whether adultery is fundamental right). The City of Sherman Court held
that, under the Bowers test, the right to engage in adultery is neither "implicit in the
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II. PRIVACY, MORALS, AND PUNISHMENT: EXAMINING THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF CONSENSUAL INTIMACIES
A. Zina: Privacy Infringement or Public Indecency Crime?
After Lawrence, the Court has expanded the scope of privacy
by affording protection to private intimacies between consenting
adults of the same sex. While Islamic law criminalizes extramari-
tal sexual intercourse, the standard of proof for establishing the
crime, regulations addressing the consequences of transgressing
these evidentiary requirements, and proprietary and personal se-
concept of ordered liberty" nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
and therefore found that the adultery-based denial of respondent's promotion did not
implicate respondent's constitutional right to privacy under either the State or Federal
Constitution. City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at 469, 470-71, 474. In City of Sherman, the
court discussed its application of the two-pronged right of privacy in its prior holding in
Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retarda-
tion ("TSEU"), 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987). Id. at 468, 474. In that case, the Texas
Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation established a policy requiring em-
ployees to submit to a polygraph test during the course of an investigation of suspected
criminal behavior. Id. at 468. Addressing the constitutionality of the government's in-
trusion into the affairs of its employees, the case implicated the "right to be let alone"
aspect of privacy. Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that the right of privacy, afforded
by the State Constitution, protects employees from unreasonable governmental imposi-
tion of mandatory polygraph testing. Id. Although the decision in TSEU was based on
the Texas Constitution, the court noted that the State constitution "contains several
provisions similar to those in the United States Constitution that have been recognized
as implicitly creating protected 'zones of privacy.'" Id. (quoting TSEU, 746 S.W.2d at
205). As the individual autonomy aspect of privacy does not afford constitutional pro-
tection to criminal activity, the case did not address the constitutionality of the employ-
ees' individual conduct. Id. The City of Sherman court declared that, by applying solely
the "right to be let alone" feature of privacy, the court in TSEU did not afford constitu-
tional protection to the individual conduct, of the employees. Id. The City of Sherman
court stated that "[t]he meaning of TSEU was not that the employees' conduct was
constitutionally protected; but rather that the government impermissibly intruded on
the employees' 'ight to be let alone.'" Id. The flip side is revealed in City of Sherman,
where the police chief, who had denied respondent's promotion, had initiated an inves-
tigation to confirm respondent's adulterous relationship with the wife of a fellow of-
ficer. Id. at 465. Deciding this case under the individual autonomy facet of privacy, the
court specifically examined whether adultery was a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Id. at 468, 470. Finding no fundamental right to commit adultery, the
court emphasized that its ruling "does not mean . . . that the government is free to
engage in intrusive investigation methods to determine the sexual practices of individu-
als." Id. at 474. Thus, the court's rejection of respondent's individual autonomy claim
had no preclusive effect on a claim, which was not presented in this case, asserting the
"right to be let alone." Id. at 468. This case left open whether respondent could have
successfully claimed a constitutional right to privacy by framing the query in a different
manner, and asserting the right to be free from governmental intrusion. Id.
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curity rights influence the viability of prosecuting individuals
who engage in private consensual sex outside of marriage.
1. Quadruple Testimony Requirement
The majority view among Muslim schools of thought recog-
nizes two forms of evidence in cases of hudood: witness testi-
mony and confession by the party accused of committing the
criminal act in question.5 ° We turn first to witness testimony.
After subjecting zina to criminal penalty, the Qur'an sets
forth strict evidentiary requirements by calling on four witnesses
to substantiate a claim of zina.t S' Islamic jurisprudence has fur-
ther construed the Qur'an's quadruple testimony standard for
zina as requiring actual observance of sexual penetration. 152 All
150. See Salama, supra note 52, at 115, 119, 121 (noting that majority of scholars
limit criminal evidence in hudood cases to witness testimony and confession); SANAD,
supra note 11, at 99 n.1, 104-05 (discussing majority and minority views on criminal
evidence in Islam); Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that while majority of Muslim
schools of thought do not admit circumstantial evidence as proof of zina, Maliki school
accepts pregnancy of unmarried woman as evidence of fornication). See also Quraishi,
supra note 2, at 300, 301 (noting that majority view in classical Islamic jurisprudence is
that pregnancy alone is insufficient as proof of zina, and arguing that notion of preg-
nancy as automatic proof of zina contravenes Qur'anic aversion for presumptions re-
garding woman's sexual activity without four witnesses).
151. See QUR'AN 24:4 (describing evidentiary requirements for establishing proof
of zina). "And those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not four
witnesses (to support their allegations) - flog them with eighty stripes; and reject their
evidence ever after: for such men are wicked transgressors." Id. See Quraishi, supra note
2, at 294 (discussing Qur'anic requirement of quadruple testimony in cases of zina). See
also Salama, supra note 52, at 116 (noting that four witnesses are required to prove
zina); QUR'AN 24:6-9 (placing different burden upon husband who accuses wife of adul-
tery):
And for those who launch a charge against their spouses, and have (in sup-
port) no evidence but their own -
Their solitary evidence (can be received) if they bear witness four times (with
an oath) by [God] that they are solemnly telling the truth;
And the fifth (oath) (should be) that they solemnly invoke the curse of [God]
on themselves if they tell a lie.
But it would avert the punishment from the wife, if she bears witness four
times (with an oath) by [God], that (her husband) is telling a lie;
And the fifth (oath) should be that she solemnly invokes the wrath of [God]
on herself if (her accuser) is telling the truth.
Id. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 294 n.24 (noting that Qur'an provides lower eviden-
tiary burden for husband who accuses wife of adultery); al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 137
(discussing process of li'an, or husband's allegation taken under oath that his wife com-
mitted adultery where he is sole witness); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141
(noting that if husband pursues this process, he rejects paternity).
152. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 295-96 (discussing requirement of actual obser-
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witnesses must have seen the act like "a stick disappearing in a
kohl container."' In this way, four persons who witness two un-
dressed individuals engaging in presumably intimate behavior
underneath a blanket have not met the evidentiary requirements
for proving zina.154  Given these strict evidentiary conditions,
proof of zina is virtually impossible to establish through eyewit-
ness testimony unless two individuals were having sex completely
uncovered in a public space.155 In effect, scholars have argued
vance of sexual penetration); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and The Protec-
tion of Human Rights in The Islamic Criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasizing that proof of zina requires actual obser-
vance of sexual penetration); MUHAMMAD 'ATA ALSID SIDAHMAD, THE Hun[oo]D: THE
HUD[90]D ARE THE SEVEN SPECIFIC CRIMES IN ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND THEIR
MANDATORY PUNISHMENTS 163 (1995) (noting that requirement of intercourse is evi-
denced by incident where Ma'iz b. Malik confessed to Prophet Muhammad that he
committed zina and Prophet spoke with Ma'iz to confirm that act involved actual pene-
tration). See CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 83 (noting that during time of Prophet
Muhammad, woman who openly practiced prostitution was not punished because there
was no proof of zina); PETERS, supra note 22, at 127 (noting that importance of requir-
ing penetration for hadd punishment was apparently public knowledge).
153. See Peters, supra note 1, at 510 (asserting that four male eyewitnesses must
provide testimony for zina but noting distinction in Shi'i school regarding testimony of
women); Salama, supra note 52, at 118 (stating that "[aill jurists" reject testimony of
women as prosecution witnesses in cases of zina while testimony of women is accepted
and sometimes required for defense, but asserting that minority of jurists accept testi-
mony of women in cases of zina where there are two women for each man); Quraishi,
supra note 2, at 305-10 (noting that Qur'anic verse setting forth evidentiary require-
ments for zina does not exclude testimony of women, criticizing restriction of testimony
to men as example of cultural practice and biases, and arguing against excluding testi-
mony of women). See generally AFrAB HUSSAIN, STATUS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 242-89
(1987) (discussing juristic variations on admissibility of women's testimony, and noting
that theory that women are weak in memory is proved incorrect by Qur'an, which does
not draw distinction between male and female testimony, and Sunnah, which proves
that Prophet Muhammad decided disputes on solitary testimony of woman); Quraishi,
supra note 2, at 305-06, nn.74-75 (discussing majority and minority views regarding all-
male witness requirement). Islamic evidence law also limits criminal testimony to wit-
nesses who are mature, sane, and of upstanding character. See id. at 295; CHAUDHRY,
supra note 14, at 76-77 (citing report where Caliph 'Ali ibn 'Abi Talib prohibited pun-
ishment of insane persons); Salama, supra note 52, at 116-19 (discussing criteria for
witness testimony, disqualified testimony, special conditions for testimony in adultery
cases, and juristic variations); SANAD, supra note 11, at 100-02, 105-06 (discussing criteria
for admissibility of criminal evidence and juristic variations); Salama, supra note 52, at
12 (noting that testimonies must be explicit and describe crime in all its details); PE-
TERS, supra note 22, at 84 (noting that testimony of fornication must use term fornica-
tion and not simply synonyms for sexual intercourse).
154. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296 (discussing practical consequences of zina's
evidentiary requirements). See Bassiouni, supra note 152, at 5 (discussing requirement
of observing actual penetration).
155. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296 (asserting that practical implications of evi-
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that the crime of zina is one of public indecency rather than
private sexual activity.'56 Rather than infringing privacy rights,
criminalization of the public display of two nude individuals en-
gaging in sexual conduct serves to protect public health, order,
and morality, interests that the U.S. Supreme Court has itself
considered legitimate in upholding the validity of public inde-
cency statutes. 1
57
Besides Islamic evidence law, jurisprudential and theologi-
cal regulations demonstrate that the criminalization of zina is
seemingly more apparent than real. After setting forth the evi-
dentiary requirements for establishing proof of zina, the Qur'an
describes the repercussions for failure to meet this strict stan-
dard of evidence.' If the accuser presents only three witnesses
as proof of zina, he/she and the witnesses are all liable for slan-
der, or qadhf, another offence of hudood.159 According to the
dentiary requirements render crime of zina liable to punishment only if two parties are
committing zina in public in nude).
156. Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296 (noting that crime of zina is one of public
indecency). See Salama, supra note 52, at 118 (noting that scholars have argued that
strict evidentiary standards render criminal act of zina as crime of public indecency);
Bassiouni, supra note 152, at 5-6 (arguing that standard of proof establishes that pur-
pose of hadd penalty for zina is to deter public aspects of such activity).
157. See, e.g., In re Tennessee Pub. Indecency Statute v. Metro Gov't, Nos. 96-6512,
96-6573, 97-5924, 97-5938, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 535 (6th Cir. 1999). In addition to
morals-based statutes prohibiting public. indecency, the Court has also justified public
indecency statutes by ancillary non-moral effects. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter,J.,
concurring) (arguing that State has sufficient interest in prohibiting secondary effects
that nude barroom dancing may encourage, such as criminal activity and violence
against women).
158. See QUR'AN 24:4 (describing consequences for failure to meet quadruple wit-
ness requirement). This Qur'anic verse states: "And those who launch a charge against
chaste women and produce not four witnesses (to support their allegations) - flog them
with eighty stripes; and reject their evidence ever after: for such men are wicked trans-
gressors." Id. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296-99 (discussing Qur'anic verse punishing
slander and arguing that subsequent verses honor privacy and dignity of women); EL-
AWA, supra note 1, at 126 (discussing connection between slander rule and zina).
159. See SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 69 (noting that qadhf is crime of hadd);
Quraishi, supra note 2, at 297-98, 311 (defining qadhf as slander); EL-AwA, supra note 1,
at 1-2 (defining qadhf as slanderous accusation of unchastity); Salama, supra note 52, at
112 (defining qadhf as defamation and citing case where Caliph Umar imposed hadd
penalty for qadhf on three witnesses who testified against person accused of zina where
testimony of fourth witness failed to corroborate theirs); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 20-23
(discussing crime of qadhJ). See also D.A. SPELLBERG, POLITICS, GENDER, AND THE ISLAMIC
PAST: THE LEGACY OF 'A'ISHA BINT Ai BAKR 66-74 (1994) (discussing context in which
Qur'anic verse on qadhf was revealed). This is a primarily Sunni account of the back-
ground of these verses. Many Shi'i scholars take a different position. Id. at 81-82. See
also Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296-99 (discussing qadhf verse and ensuing verses that
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prevailing view, the accused must be acquitted unless all four wit-
nesses testify together at the same hearing.' 61 In the absence of
this concurrent testimony, the accuser and four witnesses are all
guilty of qadhf, even if the defamatory accusation is true. 6'
Some scholars further require the presence of all witnesses at the
commencement of each witness' testimony. 62 Finally, according
to all schools except the Hanafi, qadhf also applies to evidentiary
transgressions associated with proving an accusation of homosex-
condemn public speculation of women's sexual activities (see QUR'AN 24:11-17), and
arguing that these verses demonstrate Qur'anic protection of woman's honor and dig-
nity); al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 137 (noting that qadhf does not apply in cases of /'an,
pointing out that penalty is mitigated if slanderer is husband, and discussing purpose of
lian).
160. See Salama, supra note 52, at 118-19 (noting that while Imams Malik, Abu
Hanifa, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal espouse this view, Imam al-Shafi'i accepts presentation
of testimony at separate sessions); EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that, except in
Shafi'i school, testimonies in zina cases must be presented to court in one sitting). Cf
U.S. Const. amend. VI (discussing rights of accused in criminal trial). "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...." Id. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (discussing Confronta-
tion Clause of Sixth Amendment); Radha Natarajan, Note, Racialized Memory and Relia-
bility: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1821,
1831 n.54 (2003) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), for holding that defen-
dant has constitutional right to confront witnesses, including right to cross-examine key
prosecution witness); Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1771,
1836 (2003) (noting that Confrontation Clause protects defendant's interest in having
witnesses physically present at trial). But see Craig, 497 U.S. at 837 (holding that physical
face-to-face confrontation is not vital to satisfy rights guaranteed by Confrontation
Clause, but noting that right to confront opposing witnesses may be satisfied without
face-to-face confrontation at trial only where deprivation of such confrontation is essen-
tial to serve important public policy).
161. See Salama, supra note 52, at 118-19 (noting that Shafi'i school does not ad-
here to this rule); EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that this rule does not apply in
Shafi'i school of thought); PETERS, supra note 22, at 85 (asserting that withdrawal of
testimony of at least one witness, even post-trial, precludes infliction of punishment);
Quraishi, supra note 2, at 299 (revealing that truth of accusation is irrelevant where
person has committed slander in violation of evidentiary requirements). Cf Diane
Heckman, Comment, Educational Athletics and Freedom of Speech, 177 ED. LAW. REP. 15, 20
(2003) (noting that no matter how offensive, speech is not defamatory if true). See, e.g.,
James v. DeGrandis, 138 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting 43A N.Y. JUR.
2D, Defamation and Privacy, § 98 for rule that truth is absolute defense to action for
slander). This Section states that: "Proof of the truth of defamatory words constitutes a
complete and absolute defense to an action for libel or slander, regardless of the harm
done by the statement and regardless of the malicious or evil motives that may have
prompted its publication." Id.
162. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (noting that Imams Malik and Abu Hanifa
espouse this view); PETERS, supra note 22, at 132 (asserting that if testimonies do not
satisfy legal conditions, witnesses are liable to penalty for qadhJ).
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ual sodomy. 163
Apart from these evidentiary requirements and procedural
repercussions, the Islamic concern for personal security in one's
home and reputation also affects the initiation of zina prosecu-
tions. First, the Islamic interest in the security of the home and
the persons dwelling within affects the initiation of zina accusa-
tions. Qur'anic provisions, describing the privacy rights of a pro-
prietor, prohibit entry into a dwelling without consent of the
owner.'6 4 This proscription includes entry into a home occu-
pied by the owner as well as entry onto the owner's property in
the absence of the owner. 165 The Sunnah echoes this proprie-
tary privacy by safeguarding homes, correspondence, and con-
versations from unlawful intrusion.166 If government agents
choose to disregard these injunctions and unlawfully search,
enter, or even spy into one's home (contravening the Qur'an's
injunction against spying),167 most scholars agree that the evi-
163. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that three major Sunni schools classify
homosexual sodomy as zina); Interview with Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Head of Risk Man-
agement, United Bank for Africa, in New York, New York (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter
Interview with Sanusi] (asserting that sodomy between two women does not constitute
zina because of penetration requirement).
164. See QUR'AN 24:27-28 (protecting privacy of home). This verse reads:
Enter not houses other than your own, until ye have asked permission and
saluted those in them: that is best for you .... If ye find no one in the house,
enter not until permission is given to you: if ye are asked to go back, go back:
that makes for greater purity for yourselves: and God knows well all that ye do.
Id. See Osman Abd-el-Malek al-Saleh, The Right of the Individual to Personal Security in
Islam, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing Qur'anic
verses and hadith protecting privacy of home); SIDDIQI, supra note 22, at 20 (noting that
requirement of seeking permission before entering home extends to homes of family
members).
165. See al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68 (discussing proprietary and personal privacy
in Islam); Sanusi, Between the Shari[']ah and "Barbarism, "supra note 2 (discussing individ-
ual liberty in Islam).
166. See al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68-69 (citing hadiths where Prophet disallowed
persons from looking inside home without permission and prohibited reading personal
correspondence without permission of owner); Awad M. Awad, The Rights of the Accused
Under Islamic Criminal Procedure, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1,
at 104 (noting hadith where Prophet prohibited eavesdropping on another's conversa-
tions); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68 (asserting that reasonable expectations of privacy
extend to individuals, protecting persons from unreasonable searches and seizures);
SANAD, supra note 11, at 76-77 (discussing guarantees against warrantless searches and
seizures, legal bases for obtaining search warrant, and methods of conducting lawful
search). See also al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 69-70 (discussing confidentiality of corre-
spondence and freedom of expression in Islam).
167. See QUR'AN 49:12 (prohibiting spying). "[A]nd spy not on each other.
Id. See al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68 (citing hadith prohibiting individuals from looking
20031
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dence obtained through this violation is inadmissible as proof of
criminal wrongdoing.168
Second, the Islamic interest in personal reputation impli-
cates the initiation of zina accusations. Qur'anic verses prohibit-
ing the propagation of scandal and Islamic prescriptions encour-
aging the preservation of another's moral character, deterring
Muslims from disseminating gossip and encouraging Muslims to
refrain from disclosing the immoral acts of others, strongly dis-
courage public discussion of another's sexual indiscretions.169
Given the strict standard of proof attached to zina prosecutions,
the consequences of evidentiary transgression, namely the of-
fense of slander, and proprietary and personal security protec-
tions, eyewitness testimony is virtually unattainable in cases of
inside another's home without permission); SIDDIQI, supra note 22, at 19-20 (noting that
hadith prohibit peeking into another's home); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 70 (citing
incident where Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab and companion chanced upon private gath-
ering where, behind locked doors, alcohol was being consumed; realizing they had un-
lawfully spied upon individuals in privacy of their home, they disregarded party and
left):
Once at night I accompanied [U]mar on one of his wanderings at Medina. As
we traveled we saw the light of a lamp. We went toward it. When we ap-
proached it, we found a locked door concealing some people noisily reveling.
[U]mar took my hand and said, "Do you know whose home this is?" I said I
did not. He said "It is the home of Rabiaa ibn Omaya ibn Khalef. They are
drinking. What is to be done?" I said, "I see that we did what God prohibited.
God forbids us to spy." [Ulmar returned and disregarded them.
Id. See also Quraishi, supra note 2, at 295 n.30 (noting requirement of knocking before
entering dwelling, even of family).
168. al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 69 (noting that evidence obtained from spying
(i.e., eavesdropping or poking holes through a door) is inadmissible). But see Quraishi,
supra note 2, at 295 n.30 (noting that some scholars admit evidence unlawfully ob-
tained). Cf FED. R. EviD. 402 (describing rules of admissibility for evidence).
169. See QUR'AN 24:19 (prohibiting spread of scandal). This verse reads in part:
"Those who love (to see) scandal published broadcast among the Believers, will have a
grievous Penalty in this life and in the Hereafter: [God] knows, and ye know not." Id.
See also id. at 49:12 (prohibiting gossip). The Qur'an states: "Avoid suspicion as much
(as possible): for suspicion in some cases is a sin . . . nor speak ill of each other behind
their backs." Id. See SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 359 n.720 (quoting hadith encourag-
ing upholding character of fellow Muslim). The Prophet Muhammad is reported to
have said: "Whoever protects the reputation of his brother (by veiling his wrongful
act), God will do the same to him in this world and the world to come." Id. See id.
(quoting hadith discouraging disclosure of indiscretions of fellow Muslim). "Whoever
veils his Muslim brother's 'uwrah (discreditable act), God will veil his 'uwrah in the
hereafter. And whoever unveils his Muslim brother's 'uwirah, God will unveil his 'uwrah
until He scandalizes him with it [even if he commits it] in the innermost part of his own
home." Id. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296-99 (discussing Qur'anic ban on speculat-
ing about sexual improprieties of women).
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zina. 7° Consequently, prosecutions are initiated almost
uniquely through confession, the second form of hudood evi-
dence accepted in Islamic jurisprudence. 1 '
2. Jurisprudential Alternatives to Four Witness Standard
a. Confession
As with witness testimony, guidelines for admitting confes-
sions are exacting. First, the accused must offer confession with
free will.' 7 2 Torture, coercive tactics, or deception by the judge
nullify confession.' 3  The judge must also inform the accused
that she is free to retract her confession, and actually suggest
that the confessor abandon her confession.174 Next, the confes-
sion must be clear and unambiguous.7 5 The accused must de-
scribe the criminal act in detail, leaving no room for doubt.7 6
170. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296, 299 (demonstrating that evidentiary re-
quirements render prosecution of zina virtually impossible, revealing that slander pen-
alty discourages accusations of zina, and asserting that Qur'an prohibits speculation
about sexual activity of women); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that throughout
Islamic history, zina has never been established through witness testimony).
171. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119, 121 (discussing juristic variations regarding
admitting evidentiary presumptions in cases of hudood); PETERS, supra note 22, at 83-87
(discussing evidence in hudood crimes).
172. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (discussing conditions for admitting confes-
sions in Islamic criminal jurisprudence); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 160 (noting that
confession must be completely voluntary and offered when the confessor is completely
free).
173. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (providing examples of involuntary confes-
sions); SANAD, supra note 11, at 80 n.14, 102 (noting that official who engages in inhu-
mane treatment or coercion, and judge who accepts confession without verifying
whether it was rendered with free will are both subject to punishment). Jurists disa-
gree, however, on the admissibility of confessions obtained through inhumane treat-
ment, and whether the coercer must be punished. Id.
174. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 84 (discussing conditions for testimony and con-
fession); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 73 (discussing requirements for valid confession);
SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 162-63 (noting that in case where Ma'iz confessed to
Prophet Muhammad that he committed zina, it is reported that Prophet offered Ma'iz
opportunity to retract his confession; and when Ma'iz confessed for fourth time,
Prophet attempted to dissuade Ma'iz from confessing). The Prophet is reported to
have asked Ma'iz: "Perhaps you kissed, poked, or looked?" Id.; al-Saleh, supra note 164,
at 73 (discussing Ma'iz's confession of adultery). See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INrRODUC-
TION TO IstAMIc LAw 177 (1982) (noting that in all crimes of hudood except for qadhf, it
is even recommended that judge suggest retraction to confessor).
175. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (noting that confessor must describe act in
such detail so as to preclude doubt); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128 (noting that confes-
sion must be clear and specific, and discussing rationale for requiring detailed confes-
sion).
176. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119 /noting that Sunnah disallows doubtful con-
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Some jurists hold that the Qur'an requires repetition of the zina
confession four times, corresponding to the quadruple witness
requirement. 177 Additionally, if criminal penalty is based solely
on confession of the accused, withdrawal of confession at any
time before or after sentencing, or during execution of the sen-
tence, prevents hadd punishment, except in the case of qadhf,
where confession cannot be retracted.
1 78
fessions); SANAD, supra note 11, at 102 (noting that doubtful and vague confessions are
inadmissible in Islamic jurisprudence). Admission that the accused held hostile feel-
ings towards the victim and had warned the victim that revenge would be taken is not
sufficiently explicit to constitute a valid confession. Id.
177. See Salama, supra note 52, at 119-20 (noting that the Hanafi school adopts this
view); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 161, 163-64 (noting that this rule derived from
incident where Ma'iz confessed to Prophet Muhammad that he committed zina and
Prophet sent Ma'iz away, telling him to turn to God for repentance). Ma'iz went away
and returned to the Prophet to ask for his punishment and the Prophet repeated his
previous statement. Id. at 161. This dialogue continued until Ma'iz's fourth confession.
Id. Only then did the Prophet begin to consider Ma'iz's case, asking Ma'iz specific
questions to ensure actual penetration. Id. at 161, 163-64. CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at
73-74 (citing hadith where Ma'iz approached Prophet Muhammad to confess commis-
sion of zina); EL-AwA supra note 1, at 127 (noting that Hanbali school also requires
quadruple testimony in confessions of zina but Maliki and Shafi'i schools regard one
confession as sufficient); PETERS, supra note 22, at 130 (noting that Hanafi and Hanbali
schools require quadruple confession in cases of zina).
178. See Salama, supra note 52, at 112, 120 (describing majority view that retraction
halts execution of hudood and minority view that it does not); SANAD, supra note 11, at
80 (asserting that in crimes of hudood, jurists hold that silence of accused should not be
held against him). Cf U.S. Const. amend. V. (safeguarding individual's right to remain
silent in face of police questioning). "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-
79 (1966) (creating procedural safeguards, or "Miranda warnings," to protect individ-
ual's Fifth Amendment rights, and holding that officer must inform suspect who is
taken into custody and subjected to questioning that he has right to remain silent);
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 610 (1976) (holding that defendant's silence after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings cannot be used against him at trial). See also EL-AwA, supra note
1, at 128 (noting that hadd penalty cannot be applied where accused has retracted con-
fession because withdrawal of confession introduces doubt). But see Salama, supra note
52, at 120 (noting that some jurists reject view that retraction of confession nullifies
infliction of hadd). See also PETERS, supra note 22, at 86 (stating that escape of prisoner
who has confessed to hadd offense is considered withdrawal of confession); SIDAHMAD,
supra note 152, at 143-44, 293 n.593 (noting that after feeling pain of stoning, Ma'iz
attempted to run away but was caught and executed, and quoting hadith where Prophet
Muhammad, upon learning of Ma'iz's attempt to escape, addressed executors of hadd
punishment and said: "You could have let him go"). The concept that escape amounts
to withdrawal of confession is supported by this incident. Id. See al-Saleh, supra note
164, at 73 (discussing Ma'iz's escape from execution). See also PETERS, supra note 22, at
85 n.67 (noting that qadlfinvolves rights of persons and notjust rights of God); Sanusi,
A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (asserting that qadhf involves rights of God and rights
of persons); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 122-23 (discussing juristic variations in classifying
penalty for qadhf as right of God [haqq Allah] or right of persons [haqq adami].
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Finally, consistent with the Islamic principle of individual
responsibility," 9 self-incrimination applies only to the confessor
and not to any co-conspirators.18 0 In this way, where a confessor
identifies her partner in zina, the partner incurs no penalty un-
less he also confesses. 8' Unilateral confessions, however, pose a
distinct problem in cases of zina where the crime necessarily en-
tails commission by both parties involved."8 2 Islamicjurists disa-
gree as to whether one party's denial invalidates the other's con-
fession.' The Shafi'i and Hanbali schools hold that regardless
of the alleged co-conspirator's denial, the confessor should be
punished.'8 4 However, Imam Abu Hanifa argues that neither
party can be punished if the alleged co-conspirator denies com-
179. See al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 56-58 (discussing principle of individual re-
sponsibility in Islamic criminal law); SANAD, supra note 11, at 89-98 (discussing grounds
for withholding criminal responsibility and reasons for permissibility in Islamic law).
See generally Ahmad Fathi Bahnassi, Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law, in THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 173-93 (discussing individual responsibility
and justifications for withholding responsibility in Islamic jurisprudence).
180. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128 (noting that in all cases, confession applies
only to confessor); SIOAHMAD, supra note 152, at 164 (noting that where individual con-
fesses to committing zina, alleged co-conspirator does not incur punishment unless he
or she also confesses); Salama, supra note 52, at 120 (asserting that concept that confes-
sion only implicates confessor derives from principle of individual responsibility).
181. See SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 164 (discussing hadith where confessor in-
curred hadd penalty for zina but co-conspirator was not punished because she did not
confess, and noting that there is no report that Prophet Muhammad summoned or
questioned woman with whom Ma'iz committed zina); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 82
(noting that in situation where confessor names partner in zina and partner denies
guilt, confessor may also be subjected to penalty for qadhj); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152,
at 165 (discussing hadith where confessor identified partner in zina and partner denied
culpability; confessor received hadd penalty for zina and when asked to furnish evidence
regarding alleged partner's guilt, confessor was unable to do so and incurred punish-
ment for qadhj); PETERS, supra note 22, at 130 (noting that the absence of one party's
confession constitutes shubha, or doubt, under Hanafi jurisprudence); Salama, supra
note 52, at 120 (defining shubha as doubt); PETERS, supra note 22, at 92 (defining
shubha as mistake).
182. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128 (discussing requirements for admitting con-
fessions); Salama, supra note 52, at 120 (noting that confession only implicates confes-
sor).
183. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128-29 (discussing juristic variations regarding
implications of unilateral confessions); Salama, supra note 52, at 120 (suggesting that
co-conspirator's lack of confession introduces doubt and invalidates hadd penalty);
SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 209 (citing hadith on shubha); PETERS, supra note 22, at 92
(quoting hadith on shubha). The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: "Ward
off the hadd punishments from the Muslims on the strength of shubha as much as you
can." Id.
184. See EL-AWA, supra note 1, at 128-29 (discussing juristic views on unilateral con-
fessions); al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 144 (noting that doctrine of nullifying hudood in
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mission of the crime. 8 ' Imam Abu Hanifa asserts that in crimi-
nal acts which by definition can only be carried out by all parties
involved, if the conduct of one is not proven, then the conduct
of the other has not been definitively established.' 86 As a result,
he argues that punishing one or both parties in this circum-
stance would be unjust.18 7
An overarching principle, governing Islamic criminal law in
general and the crime of zina in particular, is the doctrine that
doubt invalidates application of the hudood.188 This jurispruden-
tial principle acts as a recurring theme in the context of zina
confessions, as evidenced from the juristic determinations that
(1) zina must be described in detail, leaving no room for doubt;
(2) one co-conspirator's denial of zina casts doubt on the truth
of the other party's confession; and (3) withdrawal of zina con-
fession at any time nullifies the hadd punishment. Similar in
form to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard employed in
U.S. jurisprudence, this principle, along with the stringent re-
quirements placed on the admission of confessions, demon-
strates an overriding objective in limiting and discouraging con-
fessions in Islamic jurisprudence.' 89
cases of doubt is closely connected to Shari'ah principles of presumption of innocence
and proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
185. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 129 (arguing that doctrine of nullifying hudood in
cases of doubt supports Hanafi view); al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 143 (noting that prac-
tice of avoiding hadd in cases of doubt is based on rule prohibitingjudge from imposing
hadd penalty where he experiences doubt or uncertainty regarding whether accused
committed crime).
186. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 129 (providing support for Hanafi view on unilat-
eral confessions); Salama, supra note 52, at 112-13 (noting that conflicting evidence
prevents imposition of hadd penalty).
187. See EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 129 (arguing that exacting conditions of and
broad ability to retract confessions in Islamic jurisprudence support idea that self-in-
crimination has limited role as form of evidence in criminal cases); al-'Awwa, supra note
22, at 144 (asserting that principle of presumption of innocence is necessary to protect
individual liberty from threat of injustice).
188. See Salama, supra note 52, at 112 (noting that in crimes of hudood, evidence
must be conclusive); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 209 (discussing legal principle that
benefit of doubt must go to accused and asserting that Prophet Muhammad particularly
emphasized doubt principle with respect to crimes of hudood); Interview with Sanusi,
supra note 163 (stating that jurists adhered to concept that individual cannot be con-
victed for zina unless there is absolutely no doubt of commission).
189. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 362 (1970) (holding that in criminal
cases, prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and describing this stan-
dard as constitutionally required); Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (explaining that pur-
pose of strict requirements for admissibility of self-incriminations is to limit confes-
sions); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 143 (citing hadith where, before approaching
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b. Pregnancy of Unmarried Woman
While the majority view among Muslim schools of thought
limits hudood evidence to witness testimony and confession, the
Maliki school admits pregnancy of an unmarried woman as suffi-
cient proof of zina. 9 ° Although only one school of thought ad-
mits this circumstantial form of proof, the application of this evi-
dentiary rule in Muslim countries has been widely broadcast,
causing the international community to condemn the seemingly
gender-biased criminalization of consensual sexual conduct.19 1
Prophet Muhammad to confess commission of zina, Ma'iz consulted his confidant, Huz-
zal, who advised Ma'iz to confess to Prophet Muhammad and ask his prayer for God's
forgiveness). After Ma'iz was stoned to death, the Prophet advised Huzzal about the
preference for concealing Ma'iz's sin). Id. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have
said: "Oh Huzzal! If you had veiled [Ma'iz] with your mantel it would have been better
for you." Id. See CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 82 (noting preference for concealing
offense of zina by parties involved and others with such knowledge). In a hadith, it is
stated that a man approached the Prophet and confessed that he engaged in sexual
behavior with a woman. Id. at 75. When the man asked for his punishment, Caliph
Umar declared the preference for concealing sins: "God has concealed your fault; it
would have been better if you also had concealed it yourself." Id. See SIDAHMAD, supra
note 152, at 117 (quoting hadith where Prophet, in addressing community after Ma'iz
was stoned for zina, encouraged private repentance over public disclosure of sins):
"Avoid these impurities which God has prohibited. Whoever commits any should con-
ceal his act with the shelter of God and repent to Him. Verily, if he divulges his act to
us, the law of God will, certainly, be applied to him." Id.
190. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that majority of Muslim schools of
thought do not admit circumstantial evidence of zina except Maliki school, which ac-
cepts pregnancy of unmarried woman as evidence of fornication); Salama, supra note
52, at 121 (noting that Maliki conclusion is based on statements by Caliphs Umar ibn al-
Khattab, 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, and 'Ali ibn 'Abi Talib): "Adultery is public when preg-
nancy appears or confession is made." Id. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 86-87 (noting
that circumstantial evidence is prohibited in hadd cases and explaining that Maliki
school, by generously fixing maximum duration of pregnancy, protects women by rec-
ognizing protracted periods of gestation based on the doctrine of sleeping fetus);
Quraishi, supra note 2, at 300 (noting that majority view in classical Islamic jurispru-
dence is that pregnancy alone is insufficient as proof of zina). However, Quraishi ar-
gues that the notion of pregnancy as automatic proof of zina contravenes the Qur'anic
aversion for formulating presumptions about a woman's sexual activity without four
witnesses. Id. at 301. Quraishi notes that if a victim of rape who finds herself pregnant is
convicted of zina without four witnesses while the rapist walks away without punish-
ment, "[t]he woman-affirming spirit of the zina verses is lost"). Id. CHAUDHRY, supra
note 14, at 81 (discussing juristic reliance on principle that Islam provides benefit of
doubt to accused in hudood cases); AL-'AwwA, supra note 22, at 143-47 (discussing Is-
lamic presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt standard, and principle of nullify-
ing hudood penalties in case of doubt); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 55, 66-67 (discussing
presumption of innocence in Islamic jurisprudence); Salama, supra note 52, at 109
(noting that in Islamic jurisprudence, plaintiff has burden of proof).
191. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that Maliki school admits pregnancy of
unmarried woman as circumstantial evidence of fornication); Nigeria: Amina Lawal's
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One such condemnation occurred on March 22, 2002,
when an Upper Area Court in Katsina State in northern Nigeria
("lower court") convicted Amina Lawal ("defendant") of adul-
tery and sentenced her to capital punishment by stoning. 19 2 In
the lower court, the judge specifically asked the defendant
whether she conceived a child out-of-wedlock.193 The defendant
replied affirmatively.'94 The judge then asked the defendant if
she knew this conduct constituted zina.'95 The defendant again
replied affirmatively.196 According to the Shari'ah legislation in
place in several northern Nigerian States since 1999, the defen-
dant's illegitimate child represented sufficient proof that the de-
fendant engaged in non-marital sexual intercourse.' 97 Adultery
death sentence quashed at last but questions remain about discriminatory legislation, at http://
web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr440322003 [hereinafter Amina Lawal's death sen-
tence quashed] (discussing application of Shari'ah punishments in Nigeria).
192. See Nigeria: Amina Lawal Freed, at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/action/amina
lawal.shtml [hereinafter Nigeria: Amina Lawal Freed] (discussing procedural background
of Lawal case); Ayesha Imam & Sindi Medar-Gould, Women Living Under Muslim Laws,
available at http://wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157]=x-157-18546&cmd
[189]=x-189-18546 [hereinafter Imam & Medar-Gould] (discouraging international pe-
titions and letter writing campaigns protesting Lawal's sentence as damaging to Lawal's
defense and discussing inaccuracies in these petitions); Stephen Mcginty, The End of
Innocence, THE SCOTSMAN, June 7, 2003, at 11 (discussing factually incorrect electronic
petition with five million signatures protesting Lawal's sentence and online appeal by
Nigerian women's rights group discouraging individuals from supporting Lawal cam-
paigns at that time).
193. Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing Amina Lawal case); E-mail
from Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Head of Risk Management, United Bank for Africa, to
Seema Saifee (Nov. 7, 2003, 23:08:24 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-MAIL
FROM SANUSI] (discussing conversation between defendant and judge in lower court).
194. Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (noting that judge in lower court asked
defendant leading questions); E-MAIL FROM SANUSI, supra note 193 (discussing judge's
questioning of defendant).
195. Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing procedural errors in Lawal
case); E-MAIL FROM SANUSI, supra note 193 (noting that judge's actions violated Islamic
criminal procedure).
196. Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing errors committed by judge
in lower court). Thejudge in the lower court led the defendant to incriminate herself
by asking her leading questions. Id. E-MAIL FROM SANUSI, supra note 193 (discussing
proceedings in lower court).
197. See Amina Lawal's death sentence quashed, supra note 191 (discussing Amina
Lawal Case); Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Urban Legends Reference Pages:
Inboxer Rebellion (Amina Lawal), at http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/petition/amina.
asp [hereinafter Mikkelson & Mikkelson] (asserting that since 1999, twelve of Nigeria's
nineteen northern Islamic States have espoused this Shari'ah code); Nigeria: Amina
Lawal Freed, supra note 192 (noting that defendant offered confession without aid of
counsel at first trial and asserting that some northern Nigerian states applying Shari'ah
law consider pregnancy outside of marital relationship as sufficient evidence for convic-
2003] PRIVACY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
charges, were, however, dropped against Yahay Mohammed, the
man named as the father of the defendant's daughter, after Mo-
hammed denied engaging in sexual intercourse with the defen-
dant and as there was no other proof against him." 8
After procuring an attorney, the defendant appealed to the
Upper Shari'ah Court in Funtua ("regional appeals court"), ar-
guing that the judge in the lower court used leading queries in
questioning the defendant, failed to define zina for the defen-
dant, and neglected to explain to the defendant the implications
of confessing to that crime.199 In August 2002, the regional ap-
peals court rejected the defendant's appeal and affirmed the
lower court's death sentence which was based on the defen-
dant's confession and pregnancy.200 The regional appeals court
disallowed retraction of the defendant's confession and sus-
pended execution of the sentence until January 2004 or after-
wards to allow the defendant to wean her child for two years.20'
tion of adultery). But see Mikkelson & Mikkelson, supra (asserting that defendant
"freely" confessed to zina). See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that Maliki law ac-
cepts pregnancy of unmarried woman as circumstantial evidence of fornication);
Salama, supra note 52, at 121 (noting that in Maliki law, pregnancy of unmarried wo-
man, whether divorced, widowed, or never married, who has not claimed rape, is cir-
cumstantial evidence of zina).
198. Mikkelson & Mikkelson, supra note 197 (noting that after birth of defendant's
child, Mohammed admitted paternity but later retracted admission); Mcginty, supra
note 192, at 11 (discussing relationship between Lawal and Mohammed).
199. E-mail from Ayesha Imam, Independent Consultant on Gender and Human
Rights, SOROS Reproductive and Sexual Rights Fellowship (Columbia University), to
Seema Saifee (Nov. 2, 2003, 06:12:17 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-MAIL
FROM IMAM] (discussing times when Lawal was represented by counsel); Interview with
Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing grounds of appeal to regional appeals court).
200. Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing holding of regional appeals
court); Mikkelson & Mikkelson, supra note 197 (noting that defendant's child was born
sixteen months after her divorce); Nigeria: Amina Lawal Freed, supra note 192 (noting
that at least three adultery cases were on appeal as of September 25, 2003, but no ston-
ing has yet been executed in Nigeria). See also Mcginty, supra note 192, at 11 (asserting
that Safiya Hussein [i]'s death sentence was quashed on same day Lawal was convicted).
But see Barbara Mikkelson & David P. Mikkelson, Urban Legends Reference Pages: Inboxer
Rebellion (Safiya Huss[e]ini), at http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/petition/safiya.htm
(Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Mikkelson, Safiya] (noting that Hussein[i]'s conviction
was overturned on March 25, 2002).
201. See Mikkelson & Mikkelson, supra note 197 (discussing ruling of regional ap-
peals court); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 74 (citing hadith regarding pregnant woman
who approached Prophet Muhammad, asking him to purify her). The Prophet at-
tempted to persuade the woman to go back and repent. Id. When she confessed to
zina, the Prophet told her to go back until she delivered. Id. When she returned, the
Prophet told her to go back until she weaned her child. Id. Only after she returned
again was punishment imposed. Id.
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A Nigerian women's rights organization ("BAOBAB") ap-
pealed the regional appeals court's decision to the Katsina State
Shari'ah Court of Appeal ("Katsina Court of Appeal").2°2 On
September 25, 2003, after several adjournments, the Katsina
Court of Appeal quashed the defendant's death sentence, hold-
ing that the defendant's withdrawal of confession was valid and
finding that investigation into the ex-husband's paternity should
have taken place pursuant to the Maliki doctrine of the sleeping
fetus. 20 3 The Katsina Court of Appeal's reversal was also based
on numerous procedural errors of the lower court including the
judge's failure to define the offense of zina to the defendant in
order to ensure that she understood the crime with which she
was charged; the judge's neglect in explaining the implications
of confession to the defendant; and the judge's procedural trans-
gression of the Shari'ah laws of Katsina State which require at
least three judges to entertain a hadd case.2 °4
At the outset, it is imperative to note that the Lawal case
raised several cries from Western as well as Muslim critics.20 5
While both groups condemned the stoning sentence, their criti-
cisms were grounded in distinct rationales. 20 6 Digressing a mo-
202. See Imam & Medar-Gould, supra note 192 (discussing Lawal case); Nigeria:
Amina Lawal Freed, supra note 192 (discussing procedural history of Lawal case)
203. See Nigeria: Amina Lawal Freed, supra note 192 (discussing adjournments in
Lawal case); Audio tape: Democracy NOW! "Miss World 2002 Will Be the Most Lavish
and Spectacular Production That We've Ever Undertaken": Now There are 220 People
Dead, 1000 Injured, and 8000 Homeless From the Miss World Riots in Nigeria (Nov. 27,
2002), available at http://archive.webactive.com/pacifica/demnow/dn20021127.html
[hereinafter Democracy NOW!] (discussing protests against holding Miss World Pag-
eant in Nigeria due to Lawal case).
204. Jare Ilelaboye, Amina Lawal: Court Quashes Death Sentence, THIs DAY, Sept. 26,
2003, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/news/20030926news02.html (discuss-
ing ruling by Katsina Court of Appeal);Jare Ilelaboye, THis DAY, Aug. 28, 2003, available
at http://www.religionnewsblog.com/html/4166-AminaLawalShariaAppeal-Court
_JudgementSept._25.html (noting argument posited by Lawal's counsel that judge in
lower court heard case alone).
205. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (distinguishing between non-
Muslim and Muslim discourses criticizing implementation of hudood penalties); Bob
Abernethy, Nigerian Islamic Appeals Court overturns stoning sentence of Amina Lawal, RELIG-
ION & ETHiCS NEWSWEEKLY, Sept. 29, 2003 (noting that Lawal case drew international
criticism from human rights organizations); Democracy NOW!, supra note 203
(presenting Muslim critique on Lawal conviction). But see Court Spares Nigerian Mom
From Stoning, NEWS DAY, Sept. 26, 2003, at A6 (presenting Muslim and non-Muslim views
on Lawal conviction).
206. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (criticizing timing and method
of implementing Islamic criminal law in northern Nigeria); Democracy NOW!, supra
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ment from the particulars of this case, consider the divergent
sources of condemnation for sentences declared upon women
like Amina Lawal.2 °7
The widely-publicized application of hudood penalties for
engaging in consensual sexual conduct has led human rights or-
ganizations to link Islamic criminal law with "cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishments; "208 the international community to
characterize the penalty as an example of the "barbaric laws of
[Islam] ;-209 and the United States Congress to issue a resolution
condemning the practice as a gross human rights violation.21 °
Muslim scholars have also rejected the imposition of these pun-
ishments, but for dramatically different reasons.21 Muslim crit-
ics have argued that application of the hudood punishments must
be limited to societies which have provided for the welfare of all
its inhabitants, Muslim and non-Muslim, where each individual
note 203 (presenting statement by Azizah al-Hibri, Professor of Law at University of
Richmond Law School, that northern Nigeria adheres to Maliki law).
207. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (presenting arguments against
implementing Islamic law in regions lacking strong welfare base); Democracy NOW!,
supra note 203 (featuring debate on Lawal case).
208. See Amnesty International, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENG
AFR540012002?open&of=ENG-2AF (discussing penalties inflicted upon persons in Mus-
lim States); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing non-Muslim rationales
for criticizing implementation of hudood punishments); John F. Burns, Stoning of Afghan
Adulterers: Some Go to Take Part, Others Just to Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at 18, at
http://www.pulitzer.org/year/1997/international-reporting/works/8/index.html (dis-
cussing application of stoning penalty to woman who was convicted of adultery); Afghan
Death By Stoning, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2000, at A4 (discussing application of stoning as
method of capital punishment). Anecdotes depicting images of religious rulers stoning
women to death for engaging in consensual promiscuous behavior have repeatedly
flooded the pages of widely-read publications, inculcating vivid impressions of this se-
vere form of capital punishment into the memories of the international community. See
id.
209. Shari['Ja[h] Law: What do you Think?, supra note 3 (presenting various interna-
tional criticisms and assumptions regarding Islamic criminalization of intimate activity);
Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing non-Muslim characterization of
hudood penalties).
210. See H.R. Con. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) (condemning capital punishment
by stoning as gross violation of human rights); Tom Ford, House Passes McCollum resolu-
tion condemning stoning, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 2003, at 8A (noting that Rep. Betty
McCollum, D-Minn., introduced resolution in 2002 after hearing about case of Safiya
Husseini, Nigerian woman who was found guilty of adultery and sentenced to execution
by stoning); Mikkelson, Safiya, supra note 200 (noting that Hussein [i]'s conviction was
overturned in March 2002).
211. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (presenting Muslim criticisms
regarding enforcement of hudood); Democracy NOW!, supra note 203 (featuring Mus-
lim and non-Muslim critiques of Lawal case).
428 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:370
enjoys economic, social and political protection, an argument
that is consistent with actions taken by the Caliph Umar ibn al-
Khattab, who suspended punishment for theft during a time of
famine.212 In spite of this necessary backdrop, hudood penalties
have burgeoned in many unjust societies, causing a number of
unfortunate and avoidable rulings and effectively exposing Islam
to unwarranted ridicule and misunderstanding.2 3
One such avoidable ruling occurred in the case of Amina
Lawal. The lower court convicted the defendant on the basis of
her confession to zina and pregnancy/out-of-wedlock child-
birth.1 4  With respect to the defendant's confession, the
Shari'ah clearly holds that withdrawal of confession at any time,
even during execution of the sentence, nullifies the hadd pen-
alty.2 15 Furthermore, jurisprudential rules require the judge to
inform the accused that she is free to retract her confession and
even recommend that the judge suggest retraction to a defen-
dant who incriminates herself.216 Lawal's confession therefore
212. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (recognizing existence of debate
in Islam regarding interpretation of Qur'anic verses and application of these verses in
particular historical contexts); Ruud Peters, Islamic Law in Nigeria, 12 NYU: THE LAW
SCHOOL MAGAZINE, Autumn 2002, at 85 (suggesting argument that Shari'ah penalties
may not be applied until just Islamic society has been set up); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism,
supra note 141 (providing example of Muslim country that implemented hudood penal-
ties without considering social and economic conditions of majority and ramifications
of such implementation).
213. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing implementation of
hudood penalties in Sudan); Peters, supra note 212, at 85 (discussing practical problems
associated with re-introduction of Shari'ah in northern Nigerian States, including use
of incorrect definitions, ignorance of Islamic law among judiciary and attorneys, and
growth of Islamic vigilante factions).
214. See Nigeria: Amina Lawal Freed, supra note 192 (asserting that in lower court,
defendant confessed to bearing child outside of marriage); Mcginty, supra note 192, at
11 (discussing Lawal case); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing misap-
plication of legal principles in Lawal case).
215. See Salama, supra note 52, at 112, 120 (discussing implications of retracting
confession and describing minority view). See SANAD, supra note 11, at 80 (asserting that
in crimes of hudood,jurists hold that silence of accused should not be held against him);
EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128 (noting that hadd penalty cannot be applied where accused
has retracted confession because withdrawal of confession introduces doubt). But see
Salama, supra note 52, at 120 (noting that some jurists reject view that retraction of
confession nullifies infliction of hadd punishment).
216. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 84 (discussing conditions for admitting testimony
and confession in Islamic law); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 73 (discussing requirements
for valid confession); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 162-63 (noting that in case where
Ma'iz confessed to Prophet Muhammad that he committed zina, it is reported that
Prophet Muhammad offered Ma'iz opportunity to retract his confession). It is reported
that the Prophet even attempted to dissuade Ma'iz from confessing. Id. at 163. See al-
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became invalid when it was retracted on appeal.217
With respect to the defendant's pregnancy and resulting
childbirth, northern Nigeria is a Maliki jurisdiction and there-
fore adheres to the minority view that pregnancy of an unmar-
ried woman constitutes circumstantial evidence of zina.
Under Maliki jurisprudence, however, it is virtually impossible to
convict a pregnant unmarried divorc6e, like Amina Lawal, of
zina based on her pregnancy alone. 2 9 Rather, like the majority
view, conviction will inevitably require confession or four eyewit-
nesses because of the Maliki doctrine of the sleeping fetus.
2 20
Maliki law recognizes a theory, known as the doctrine of the
sleeping fetus, whereby the child of an unmarried pregnant di-
vorcee is automatically presumed to belong to the ex- or de-
ceased husband as long as the child was born within the recog-
Saleh, supra note 164, at 73 (discussing Ma'iz's confession of adultery); SCHACHT, supra
note 174, at 177 (noting that in crimes of hudood, it is even recommended that judge
suggest retraction to confessor, except in cases of qadl/).
217. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (criticizing application of
Shari'ah law in Lawal case); E-MAIL FROM IMAM, supra note 199 (noting that Lawal was
not represented by counsel in lower court); Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (not-
ing that in absence of counsel, Lawal confessed to committing adultery); E-mail from
Asifa Quraishi, S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, to Seema Saifee (Oct. 5, 2003,
22:39:14 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter OCTOBER E-MAIL FROM QURAISHI] (not-
ing that one reason Katsina Court of Appeal overturned Lawal's conviction was because
Lawal's confession was made without presence of counsel, and describing this ground
as interesting application of contemporary requirements of fully informed voluntary
confession). Salama, supra note 52, at 119 (discussing conditions for admitting confes-
sions in Islamic criminal jurisprudence, including requirement that confession be vol-
untary and freely given); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 160 (noting that confession must
be completely voluntary and offered when confessor is completely free); Interview with
Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing procedural bases for Katsina Court of Appeal's rever-
sal of Lawal's conviction, and noting that Court's use of leading questions and procedu-
ral errors invalidated defendant's confession).
218. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that circumstantial evidence is not
admitted as proof of zina, with one exception: Maliki jurisprudence accepts pregnancy
of unmarried woman as evidence of fornication); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 300 (noting
that majority view in classical Islamic jurisprudence is that pregnancy alone is insuffi-
cient as proof of zina); Democracy NOW!, supra note 203 (presenting statement by
Azizah al-Hibri, Professor of Law at University of Richmond Law School, that northern
Nigeria adheres to Maliki law).
219. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing application of Maliki
law to Lawal case); PETERS, supra note 22, at 86-87 (explaining that Maliki school pro-
tects women by recognizing protracted periods of gestation based on sleeping fetus
doctrine).
220. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing Maliki law in north-
ern Nigeria); Salama, supra note 52, at 115, 119, 121 (noting that majority of scholars
limit criminal evidence in hudood cases to witness testimony and confession).
430 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:370
nized gestation period of pregnancy.22t As the maximum gesta-
tion period has not been fixed by the Qur'an or Sunnah, as
Imam Malik himself placed a ceiling at four different intervals,
and as jurists have disagreed in determining a limitation for the
gestation period, the element of uncertainty in gestation length
raises doubt in convicting a divorced or widowed woman of
222zina. 2 As jurists are reluctant to convict a pregnant unmarried
divorcee for zina in the face of any doubt (remember, doubt nul-
lifies hudood), the doctrine of the sleeping fetus affords substan-
tial protection to widows and divorcees.
223
Next, in the case of a pregnant woman who has never been
married, Malikijurisprudence is not as protective. 224 Here, preg-
221. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing sleeping fetus doc-
trine); Peters, supra note 212, at 85 (asserting that sleeping fetus doctrine is well recog-
nized tenet in Islamic jurisprudence); PETERS, supra note 22, at 86-87 (observing that
Maliki sleeping fetus doctrine affords substantial protection to previously married wo-
men). But see Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (noting that child born within
recognized gestation period is presumed to belong to former husband unless former
husband refuses to accept paternity through process of i'an). See al-'Awwa, supra note
22, at 137 (discussing process of li'an); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (as-
serting that if husband wishes to pursue i'an, he places himself at risk for punishment if
woman refutes accusation).
222. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (asserting that jurists disagree as
to maximum gestation period, and quoting jurist who described Imam Malik's conflict-
ing rulings on maximum gestation as indicative of doubt which prevents hadd penalty);
al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 143-47 (discussing principle of nullifying hudood penalties in
case of doubt); Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing juristic adherence to
concept that individual cannot be convicted for zina unless there is absolutely no doubt
of commission). See also Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Amina Lawal: Sex, Pregnancy and Muslim
Law, (Aug. 22, 2002), available at http://www.gamji.com/sanusi.htm [hereinafter
Sanusi, Amina Lawal: Sex, Pregnancy and Muslim Law] (discussing variations among Mus-
lim schools of thought regarding maximum gestation period).
223. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (noting that Maliki jurispru-
dence provides widows and divorced women greater protection than other Islamic
schools of thought).
The difficulty of convicting [a previously married woman of zina based on
her pregnancy] arises because quite apart from the very long gestation period
for pregnancy in Maliki Law of Personal Status, the contradictions amongju-
rists in fixing it are considered by leading jurists of the Maliki School sufficient
reason to prevent the hadd in criminal law.
Id. PETERS, supra note 22, at 86-87 (explaining that Maliki school, by generously fixing
maximum duration of pregnancy, protects women by recognizing protracted periods of
gestation based on sleeping fetus doctrine); Sanusi, Amina Lawal: Sex, Pregnancy and
Muslim Law, supra note 222 (revealing that of all schools, Malikis provide greatest bene-
fit of doubt in setting high maximum gestation period).
224. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing application of Maliki
law on zina to pregnant woman who has never been married). Interview with Sanusi,
supra note 163 (discussing Maliki pregnancy rule).
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nancy constitutes sufficient evidence of zina and the woman is
liable to hadd.225 Besides the fact that the majority ofjurists limit
proof of zina to confession or four eyewitnesses, Islamic scholars
have criticized the use of pregnancy as proof of zina, and have
argued that even the conduct of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab,
whose statement forms the basis of the Maliki pregnancy rule,
casts doubt on his assertion regarding the evidentiary quality of
pregnancy. 226
Finally, Muslim rulers and courts in Islamic countries have
often penalized pregnant and non-pregnant women who have
claimed rape with the punishment for zina, classifying the non-
consensual violent crime as a subset of zina, considering a wo-
man's claim of rape as confession to zina, and allowing the rapist
to escape unscathed in the absence of four witnesses to the vio-
lent act.2 2 7 The classification of rape as a subcategory of zina,
however, disregards various aspects of Islamic teachings and le-
gal thought.2 28
225. See Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing categories of preg-
nant women and application of Maliki law on zina to each category); Interview with
Sanusi, supra note 163 (discussing implications of pregnancy in cases of zina). But see
generally Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Annotating Safiya's Diary: The Refutation of "Rushdie-fica-
tion," available at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/articles/annotating-safiya.htm
[hereinafter Sanusi, Annotating Safiya's Diary] (critiquing Maliki rule that pregnancy
constitutes prima facie evidence of zina); Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Class, Gender and a
Political Economy of Shari[]a[h], available at http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/carti
cles/class%20gender%20and%20the%20political%20economy%20of%20shar.htm
(discussing Maliki pregnancy rule).
226. See E-mail from Asifa Quraishi, S.J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, to
Seema Saifee (Nov. 5, 2003, 11:44:29 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter NOVEMBER
E-MAIL FROM QURAISH] (arguing that Maliki rule of pregnancy as prima facie proof of
zina seems inconsistent with Qur'anic verses which emphasize protection of women
against random zina prosecution by requiring four witnesses). At least one scholar has
argued that the Maliki rule results in randomly punishing those women whose inter-
course has happened to result in pregnancy. Id. See Interview with Sanusi, supra note
163 (discussing incident where man brought report that unmarried woman was preg-
nant and Caliph Umar did not act on report, declaring that man was bearer of bad
news).
227. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 290-92, 302, 312 (discussing rape cases in Paki-
stan); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing risk of convicting rape vic-
tims of zina).
228. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 302, 314 (noting that Pakistan's Zina Ordinance
classifies zina-bil-jabr, or zina by force, as subcategory of crime of zina); Rizvi, supra note
23, at 225-26 (discussing cases in early Islam where rapist, but not victim, was punished).
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i. Pregnancy as Result of Rape: Islamic Law on
Nonconsensual Sex
First, Islamic jurisprudence specifies duress as a negation of
intent for zina.2 29 As the act of zina requires an element of free
will, an individual who has been raped cannot be punished with
the hadd penalty for zina.23 ° Furthermore, early Islamic teach-
ings and rulings prohibited punishing a rape victim for zina.23'
Second, zina is a crime of public indecency where the private
aspects of the activity remain between the individual and God.23 2
229. Quraishi, supra note 2, at 314 (noting that Islamic scholars have affirmed that
one who engages in zina under duress escapes liability); PETERS, supra note 22, at 94
(discussing legal defense of duress and noting that one who is forced to commit crime
of hudood is free of liability).
230. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (describing free will as element of zina);
CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 75, 80, 81, 82 (noting that to constitute zina, sexual inter-
course must be voluntary, discussing that in cases of rape, only assailant, and not victim,
incurs punishment, and citing hadiths where women who were forced to commit zina
incurred no penalty while their assailants were prosecuted); Quraishi, supra note 2, at
314 (citing two cases: one where Caliph Umar prosecuted rapist of slave girl and did not
prosecute girl, and another where Caliph Umar released woman who declared rape);
Rizvi, supra note 23, at 225-26 (noting that consent is element of zina and discussing
cases where Prophet Muhammad and Caliph Umar punished only rapist and not vic-
tim); SANAD, supra note 11, at 51, 92-93 (noting that consent is element of zina and
discussing nullification of hadd penalty in cases of coercion or duress); PETERS, supra
note 22, at 94 (discussing legal defense of duress, noting that one who is forced to
commit a hadd crime is not guilty); SANAD, supra note 11, at 88 (noting that lack of
intent negates criminal responsibility in crimes of hudood); PETERS, supra note 22, at 92-
94 (discussing legal defense of mistake where excusable ignorance, such as mistake
based on putative marriage, constitutes unassailable defense). See generally SANAD, supra
note 11, at 89-95 (discussing legal defenses for criminal conduct). See Quraishi, supra
note 2, at 302-05, 313-20 (citing Pakistani cases where alleged rape victims were charged
with zina, but rejecting application of zina (consensual sex) to rape (nonconsensual sex
or sex under duress), and discussing Islamic law of rape). Quraishi also cites to a
source that resolves cases where only one party claims the sexual encounter was consen-
sual. Id. at 314. But see Doi, supra note 14, at 236 (noting that in cases of zina, consent
of parties is immaterial); Kara, Mustafa Abdulmegid, The Philosophy of Punishment in
Islamic Law 137 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Claremont Graduate School) (not-
ing that consent is not required for zina). Note, however, that Doi and Kara do not cite
any Islamic texts supporting their claims that consent is irrelevant in zina cases. Id.; Doi,
supra note 14, at 236.
231. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 314 n.105 (citing case where Caliph Umar prose-
cuted rapist but not victim); Rizvi, supra note 23, at 225-26 (discussing rape cases in
early Islam); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 75, 80, 81, 82 (noting that in cases of rape,
only assailant incurs punishment, and citing hadiths where women who were forced to
commit zina incurred no penalty while their assailants wereprosecuted).
232. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 313 (distinguishing rape from zina); Sanusi,
Between the Shari[']ah and "Barbarism, "supra note 2 (drawing distinction between State's
power to regulate private and public morals); Bassiouni, supra note 152, at 5-6 (noting
that purpose of hadd penalty for zina is to deter public aspects of such conduct).
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Rape, however, is a crime of violence where public indecency is
not the essential criminal element of the act.2 33
Scholars have classified rape under the separate hadd cate-
gory of hiraba, a crime of forcible assault, under which four eye-
witnesses to the act of penetration is not required to establish
proof.234 In this way, committed in private or public, rape is con-
sidered a violent assault, and not a consensual public act of
sex.235 Under all Sunni schools of thought, a woman who claims
rape is free and not held liable for zina; however, the Maliki
school requires physical evidence of nonconsensual sex, a rule
that scholars have characterized as demonstrating insensitivity to
the fact that many rape survivors decline to struggle in order to
save their lives, while still not consenting to the act, and a rule
that is consequently inconsistent with the Islamic duty to defend
one's life. 236
3. Applicability of Ta'azir to Private Consensual Sexual Activity
While the majority view among Muslim schools of thought
limits criminal evidence to witness testimony and confession, this
restriction applies only to crimes of hudood, a defined class of
crimes whose punishments are prescribed by the Qur'an and
233. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 313 (revealing that public display is key to crime
of zina but not rape); SANAD, supra note 11, at 51, 92-93 (discussing nullification of hadd
penalty in cases of coercion or duress).
234. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 314, 315-17 (discussing Islamic law of rape);
Salama, supra note 52, at 118 (noting that scholars have argued that crime of zina is one
of public indecency).
235. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 313-19 (noting that in addition to criminal pros-
ecution, Islamic law creates path for civil redress for rape survivors); SANAD, supra note
11, at 51, 92-93 (describing consent as element of zina and noting that hadd penalty is
nullified in cases of coercion or duress); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296 (noting that
crime of zina is one of public sex).
236. Sanusi, Amina Lawal: Sex, Pregnancy and Muslim Law, supra note 222 (noting
that pregnant unmarried woman who claims rape is free in all Sunni schools except
Maliki which requires corroborating evidence of rape, and providing examples of such
evidence); NOvEMBER E-MAIL FROM QURAISHI, supra note 226 (noting that in case of
pregnant unmarried woman who claims rape, under Maliki law burden of proof is on
woman because prima facie case has already been made against her from fact of preg-
nancy); Sanusi, A Muslim Criticism, supra note 141 (discussing implications of claiming
rape in Maliki law where pregnant woman has never been married). But see NOVEMBER
E-MAIL FROM QURAISHI, supra note 226 (noting that requiring physical evidence to prove
that intercourse was nonconsensual indicates insensitivity to fact that many rape survi-
vors may have protected their lives by not physically resisting attack, yet still not con-
senting to it). See also SANAD, supra note 11, at 95 (discussing duty to defend one's life
in Islam).
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Sunnah.237 Classified as a hadd crime, zina represents a specific
and limited type of intimate conduct, namely consensual non-
marital intercourse. 23  The category of hudood crimes therefore
does not apply to all consensual intimate activity performed
outside of marriage. 2-9 This non-zina intimate behavior, how-
ever, may be liable to prosecution under a less restrictive cate-
gory of criminal conduct, known as ta'azir, or discretionary pun-
ishment. 2
40
Ta'azir includes all crimes whose penalties are not fixed by
the Qur'an or Sunnah. 241 A few characteristics distinguish taazir
237. See Salama, supra note 52, at 115, 119, 121 (noting that majority of scholars
limit criminal evidence in hudood cases to witness testimony and confession); SANAD,
supra note 11, at 99 n.1, 104-05 (discussing majority and minority views on criminal
evidence in Islam); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 2 (describing hudood as punishments pre-
scribed by Qur'an or Sunnah); SANAD, supra note 11, at 40-41 (describing hudood penal-
ties as those prescribed by Qur'an and Sunnah); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 81-82
(noting immutability of hadd punishment and demonstrating that once guilt of zina is
established beyond reasonable doubt, punishment can neither be pardoned nor negoti-
ated); al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 128 (noting that hudood penalties cannot be mitigated,
augmented, or suspended); PETERS, supra note 22, at 106 (noting hadith where Prophet
Muhammad disallowed substituting ransom in place of hadd).
238. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (defining zina); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at I
(noting that zina is hadd crime); CHAUDHRY, supra note 14, at 82 (describing elements
of zina); Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (discussing juristic variations regarding classifica-
tion of homosexual sodomy as zina); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 295-95 (discussing zina's
requirement of penetration); Interview with Sanusi, supra note 163 (asserting that sod-
omy between women does not constitute zina because of penetration requirement);
PETERS, supra note 22, at 127, 135 (noting that zina involves vaginal intercourse). But see
4 al-Dardir, supra note 1, at 448 (noting that majority of Sunni jurists regard heterosex-
ual anal intercourse between non-marital couple as zina). See also 3 al-Mawwaq, supra
note 1, at 405-06 (noting that majority of Sunni jurists regard anal intercourse within
marriage as sinful).
239. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (observing that sexual acts not amounting to
intercourse are not liable to hadd penalty); SIDAHMAD, supra note 152, at 163 (demon-
strating that acts of kissing, touching, or other acts of foreplay do not constitute zina);
Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (noting that Hanafi school does not classify homosexual
sodomy as hadd crime).
240. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (asserting that ta'azir provides basis for pun-
ishment of persons who have committed acts resembling but not satisfying definition of
hudood); Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (stating that Hanafi jurisprudence classifies homo-
sexual sodomy as crime of ta'azir); PETERS, supra at 22 (describing illicit sexual activity
that does not amount to intercourse as example of crime punishable under ta'azir).
241. See al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (defining ta'azir); Ghaouti Benmelha, Ta'azir
Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 212 (providing over-
view of criminal categories in Islamic law); EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 97 (arguing that
while term ta'azir is not used in Qur'an or Sunnah in same sense as in Islamic legal
texts, it is alluded to in these former sources); SANAD, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that
validity of ta'azir category derived from ijma); al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (explaining
that ruler or judge has discretion to determine, in accordance with public interest and
2003] PRIVACY IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
from hadd in the context of private consensual sexual con-
duct.2 42 First, as mentioned above, while Islamic jurisprudence
mandates punishment for a specific and confined category of
sexual conduct, the ta'azir penalty permits prosecution for pri-
vate consensual sexual activity that does not rise to the level of
241zina.
Second, the category of ta'azir implicates private consensual
intimacies by permitting conviction of persons who have com-
mitted hadd crimes but escaped penalty due to lack of evi-
dence.2 44 Some Muslim countries and scholars have applied this
residual catch-all category of ta'azir to the crime of zina in cases
where the strict evidentiary requirements of zina were not satis-
fied.24" There is a wrinkle, however, in applying the ta'azir pen-
changing mores, whether certain acts are punishable under ta'azir); Benmelha, supra,
at 219 (noting that judge's power is not unlimited and stating that ifjudge abuses his
discretion, e.g., by imposing judgment outside of or inconsistent with his delegated
authority or exceeding maximum limit of punishment, he may incur liability); al-'Awwa,
supra note 22, at 128 (noting that contemporary studies reject prevalent view that ta'azir
system is one of incrimination completely governed by unrestrained discretion of
ruler); SANAD, supra note 11, at 41 (noting that judge must comply with general rules
prescribed in Qur'an and Sunnah). See also PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (noting that
individuals who have committed hadd crimes but cannot be sentenced because of lack
of evidence may be punished under ta'azir); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 311 (noting that
in Pakistan, zina cases that do not meet strict evidentiary requirements of hadd are
increasingly being prosecuted as ta'azir crimes). In zina cases, if the accuser fails to
produce quadruple testimony or any witness breaches Islamic evidentiary requirements,
some argue that zina offenders may still be liable to criminal penalty under the less
restrictive category of ta'azir. Id.; PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (describing imposition of
penalty for persons who committed hadd crimes but could not be sentenced for lack of
evidence as important function of ta'azir). But see Quraishi, supra note 2, at 310-13
(arguing against applicability of ta'azir to zina offenders and asserting that prosecution
of zina as ta'azir crime where there is insufficient evidence to convict under hadd denies
zina its Qur'anic status as exclusively hadd crime).
242. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (distinguishing between hudood and ta'azir
crimes); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 311 (differentiating between weight of evidentiary
burden in ta'azir and hudood crimes); SANAD, supra note 11, at 65-66 (comparing hudood
and ta'azir crimes generally).
243. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (noting that illicit sexual activity not amount-
ing to sexual intercourse may be liable to taazir); SANAD, supra note 11, at 64 (listing
examples of intimate acts liable to ta'azir penalty and including rape as crime of to 'azir).
Contra Quraishi, supra note 2, at 314, 315-17 (classifying rape as hadd crime). See also
EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 128 (noting that withdrawal of confession rule does not apply
to taazir crimes).
244. PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (discussing applicability of ta'azir to persons who
committed hadd crimes but could not be sentenced for lack of evidence); Quraishi,
supra note 2, at 311 (discussing use of ta'azir where evidentiary requirements are not
satisfied).
245. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 311 (revealing that Pakistan has extended appli-
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alty to zina because of the specific penalty for slander that at-
taches to individuals who initiate zina prosecutions in the ab-
sence of four witnesses.2 4 6 Although an individual may logically
be convicted for zina as ta'azir, the prosecutor and testifying wit-
nesses should be punished for slander because of the special
considerations attached only to accusations of zina.24 7
While the hadd penalty prohibits prosecution in the absence
of eyewitness testimony or a willing confession, the burden of
proof is relaxed in crimes of ta'azir.24 8 The judge has discretion,
therefore, to permit a lenient, but suitable, standard of proof.249
As all jurists admit circumstantial evidence in crimes of ta'azir,
there is a lower evidentiary standard for convicting individuals
who engage in non-hadd crimes.2- ' For example, consider the
applicability of ta'azir to an individual who enters a brothel.251
In this circumstance, the quadruple testimony requirement, risk
of slander prosecution, and proprietary and personal security re-
strictions specified in Part II.A.1 protect the individual from in-
cability of ta'azir to crime of zina where strict evidentiary requirements of that crime
were not satisfied). See also PETERS, supra note 22, at 135 (noting that individuals who
have committed hadd crimes but cannot be sentenced for evidentiary shortcomings may
be liable under ta'azir doctrine).
246. Quraishi, supra note 2, at 312 (discussing crime of slander in context of sub-
jecting zina to ta'azir penalty); OCTOBER E-MAIL FROM QURAISHI, supra note 217 (discuss-
ing disputed applicability of ta'azir to crime of zina).
247. Quraishi, supra note 2, at 312 (arguing that classifying zina as ta'azir crime
contravenes Qur'anic verses); OCTOBER E-MAIL FROM QURAISHI, supra note 217 (discuss-
ing special privacy considerations attached exclusively to crime of zina and asserting
that this fact indicates that crime is really about protection against gossip about zina).
248. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 87, 90 (noting that circumstantial evidence is
admissible in crimes of ta'azir); Sanusi, Annotating Safiya's Diary, supra note 225 (assert-
ing that circumstantial evidence is permissible under ta'azir); Salama, supra note 52, at
109 (noting that in Islamic criminal jurisprudence, plaintiff has burden of proof).
249. See Benmelha, supra note 241, at 219 (noting that judge cannot abuse his
discretion); al-Alfi, supra note 1, at 227 (noting that in criminalizing acts under strength
of ta'azir, ruler or judge is bound by Islamic values and public interest).
250. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 87, 90 (noting that circumstantial evidence is
admissible in crimes of ta'azir); Sanusi, Annotating Safiya's Diary, supra note 225 (assert-
ing that circumstantial evidence is permissible under ta'azir); PETERS, supra note 22, at
135 (noting that evidentiary requirements are more relaxed for crimes of ta'azir, and
discussing application of ta'azir to those who have committed hudood crimes but cannot
be punished for specific reasons); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 311 (discussing distinction
between standards of proof employed in ta'azir and hudood crimes).
251. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 90 (noting that man who enters home with wo-
man of bad reputation and remains inside may be liable to ta'azir penalty); CHAUDHRY,
supra note 14, at 83 (noting that, during time of Prophet Muhammad, punishment was
not applied to woman who openly practiced prostitution because there was no proof of
zina).
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curring the hadd penalty for zina.252 Whether the individual can
escape criminal conviction for another sexual offence, however,
is blurred by the doctrine of ta'azir.253 Another example of the
use of ta'azir emerges in Hanafi law, where homosexual sodomy
is not considered a crime of zina.254 In both the brothel hypo-
thetical and the case of homosexual sodomy under Hanafi law,
theological prescriptions and regulations protecting proprietary
and reputational security continue to protect such intimate con-
duct from State restraint.2
55
B. Defining the Scope of Privacy: An Alternative
Reading of Lawrence
While Islamic hudood laws serve to protect public moral-
ity,2 5 6 academic scholars in the United States and U.S. Supreme
Court Justices have argued that the State's interest in morality
does not justify the criminalization of private sexual conduct be-
tween consenting adults. 257 Despite its ostensible privacy ratio-
252. See Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296-99, 313 (discussing implications of quadru-
ple evidentiary standard and crime of slander); al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68-70
(describing personal security in Islam).
253. See PETERS, supra note 22, at 90 (noting that man who enters home with wo-
man of bad reputation and remains inside cannot be punished with hadd but may be
punished on strength of ta'azir); SANAD, supra note 11, at 64 (listing certain sexual acts
as possible crimes of ta'azir).
254. See Peters, supra note 1, at 509 (discussing positions of Muslim schools of
thought on homosexual intercourse). See generally 5 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM,
supra note 1, at 776-79 (discussing sodomy, or liwat).
255. See al-Saleh, supra note 164, at 68-70 (describing protections afforded to prop-
erty and personal security in Islam); Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296-99, 313 (demonstrat-
ing that zina evidentiary requirements and crime of slander afford individuals protec-
tion from State intrusion).
256. See al-'Awwa, supra note 22, at 132-33 (discussing interplay between law and
morality in Islam). SANAD, supra note 11, at 45-46 (discussing inherent link between
religion and morality in Islam); Sanusi, Between.the Shari[']ah and "Barbarism, "supra note
2 (asserting that Muslim State can control public but not private morality, noting that
Shari'ah does not afford State unlimited power to infringe personal liberty but does
provide State with right to restrict personal liberty to private sphere, and arguing that
Shari'ah does not enforce "religion" but rather creates atmosphere conducive to its
development). But see EL-AwA, supra note 1, at 118 (asserting that Islamic law does not
draw distinction between private and public morality but acknowledging that strict stan-
dard of proof renders crime of zina as offense of public indecency). The private act of
zina, however, is still considered a sin in Islam). Id.
257. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530-531 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that it is not function of Court to decide cases based on community stan-
dards or enforce justices' personal views); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)
(emphasizing that articulating rights not easily identifiable from constitutional provi-
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nale, evidence suggests the U.S. Supreme Court finally adopted
this argument in its recent holding in Lawrence.2 8
1. Regulating Private Morality: Early Hints of Unrest
The dissenting Justices in Bowers, arguing that morality lacks
rational basis in the law, drafted opinions foreshadowing the
Court's recent decision in Lawrence. Invoking distinct themes of
privacy precedent, 259 Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens criticized the use of morals-based legislation to infringe
an individual's right of privacy in matters of intimate associa-
tion.2 " Arguing that the moral sentiments held by a majority
cannot justify deprivation of individual liberty, Justice Blackmun
challenged the Bowers Court's treatment of morality as a legiti-
mate State interest.26  Rejecting the majority's conclusion that
sions involves much more than enforcement of Justices' own value choices); Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that State is claiming
right to enforce its moral judgment by intruding into intimacies of marital relationship
by use of criminal legislation); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210, 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's holding that morality is legitimate State interest); Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that Court's prior cases have established that
morality lacks rational basis in law). See also Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353 (Ark.
2002) (arguing that interest in protecting public morality does not justify imposing
majoritarian moral views in case where private intimate acts between consenting same-
sex partners did not harm others).
258. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that morality is
not legitimate State interest); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (observ-
ing that majority held that advancing majoritarian morality does not constitute legiti-
mate State interest). See also Grossman, supra note 118 (noting that Lawrence "es-
chewed" morality as adequate basis for law).
259. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (employing Fourth
Amendment precedent protecting privacy within home); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (invoking privacy precedent of Griswold line of cases for discussion
of Court's stance on non-procreative sexual activity); Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1077
(noting that Justices Blackmun and Stevens adopted distinct approaches in their dis-
sents in Bowers).
260. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bowers, 478 U.S. at
214-220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wolf, supra note 98, at 112-13 n.64 (demonstrating
that while majority and concurring Justices in Bowers grounded their substantive due
process analyses in tradition, dissent explicitly rejected using tradition as analytical tool
for assessing claimed fundamental rights); REDLICH, supra note 59, at 234 (noting that,
in his concurrence in Bowers, Chief Justice Burger emphasized lack of tradition protect-
ing sodomy and stated that such conduct had been prohibited throughout history of
Western Civilization, e.g., Roman law and Judeo-Christian morality).
261. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that relig-
ious values cannot provide adequate basis for secular legislation). See also Goldstein,
supra note 49, at 1077 (asserting that Justice Blackmun rejected claim that long-held
beliefs regarding morality of sodomy shield sodomy statutes from judicial review). See
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long-held uniform condemnation of homosexuality adequately
justifies State regulation of same-sex sodomy, Justice Blackmun
argued that religious- or moral-based rationales are not suffi-
ciently legitimate to support secular State legislation.262
Justice Blackmun concluded by drawing a distinction be-
tween laws that prohibit public indecency and statutes that regu-
late private morality.26 Asserting that the right of privacy that
protects private consensual sexual conduct from State regulation
also justifies protecting the individual right against having sexual
activity "imposed" upon him/her in public, Justice Blackmun
averred that the mere knowledge that certain individuals are en-
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (StevensJ., dissenting) (arguing that Court's prior cases demon-
strate that traditional majoritarian beliefs regarding morality of particular conduct are
insufficient to support statutory prohibition of conduct). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191,
196 (holding that majority sentiments regarding morality of homosexual sodomy con-
stitute adequate basis for law). See also Brown, supra note 105, at 20 (asserting that
Bowers Court explicitly approved legitimacy of using morals-based legislation); Mootz,
supra note 96, at 1034 (arguing that premise of Bowers was that morality formed rational
basis for state legislation).
262. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210, 211 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's
holding that morality is legitimate State interest). See also Goldstein, supra note 49, at
1077 (averring thatJustice Blackmun rejected claim that long-espoused beliefs that sod-
omy is immoral protects sodomy laws from judicial review). See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's precedent demonstrates that traditional
majoritarian beliefs regarding morality of certain conduct are insufficient to support
statutory ban of that conduct). But see Bowers 478 U.S. at 191, 196 (holding that major-
ity attitudes that homosexual sodomy is immoral constitute adequate basis for law);
Brown, supra note 105, at 20 (stating that Bowers Court explicitly endorsed legitimacy of
using morals-based legislation); Mootz, supra note 96, at 1034 (asserting that Bower's
premise was that morality constituted rational basis for State laws); Grossman, supra
note 118 (observing that in Bowers, majority held that State's belief that homosexual
sodomy was immoral constituted rational basis for legislation banning sodomy).
263. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing H.L.A. Hart, Im-
morality and Treason, reprinted in THE LAw AS LITERATURE 220, 225 (L. Blom-Cooper ed.,
1961) for proposition that individuals will not abandon morality merely because certain
private consensual sexual conduct which they hate is shielded from prosecution). Jus-
tice Blackmun asserted that public indecency statutes are completely consistent with
protecting the individual right in decisions concerning sexual intimacy). Id. at 212-13.
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (upholding public indecency
statute whose purpose was to protect morals and public order). See also Scott C. Idle-
man, The Limits of Religious Values In Judicial Decisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 537, 557
n.73 (1998) (noting that in Barnes, Court upheld constitutionality of public indecency
statute, and cited Bowers as support for legitimacy of morals-based legislation). Several
federal court decisions have upheld the constitutionality of public indecency statutes.
See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; In re Tennessee Pub. Indecency Statute v. Metro Gov't,
Nos. 96-6512, 96-6573, 97-5924, 97-5938, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 535 (6th Cir. 1999). Cf
Quraishi, supra note 2, at 296 (arguing that zina is crime of public indecency and not
private sexual conduct).
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gaging in subjectively immoral private sexual activity is not an
invasion of the right against viewing sexual conduct on the
street, a park, or any public place.26 4
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that
the Court's prior cases have established that morality lacks ra-
tional basis in the law.26 5 Justice Stevens made a twofold argu-
ment for invalidating Georgia's sodomy statute.26 6 First, assert-
ing that the liberty protected by the Griswold line of cases em-
braces the right for married and unmarried heterosexual adults
to engage in non-procreative intimate activity that others may
deem offensive or immoral, Justice Stevens concluded that Geor-
gia may not entirely prohibit sodomy without exception.2 6 7 In
making this determination, Justice Stevens cited the Court's
264. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that Bowers
involved no real intrusion on rights of others); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chas-
tity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643, 729 (2001) (citing H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND
MORALITY (1996)) (noting that Hart distinguishes between public indecency and sexual
immorality offences and argues that while conventional morality regards private con-
sensual homosexual sodomy, but not private sex between married couple, as immoral,
both activities violate public decency if publicly conducted).
265. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing majoritarian
morality). See also Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 Ky. L.J.
885, 897-98 (2000-2001) (noting thatJustice Stevens concluded that morality is not ade-
quate justification for selective application of generally applicable law); Katheryn D.
Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REv. 405, 428 (1988) (discuss-
ingJustice Stevens' treatment of morality).
266. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asking whether State may
entirely prohibit private homosexual sodomy between consenting adults by enacting
neutral legislation without exception to all constituents or, if not, whether State may
selectively enforce law against homosexuals); Katz, supra note 265, at 428 (discussing
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers).
267. See Bowers at 216, 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that liberty protected by
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses individual decisions by un-
married and married persons to engage in non-reproductive sexual activity). See also
Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1077 (noting that Justice Stevens concluded that Georgia
could neither enact neutral statute outlawing sodomy by all persons nor selectively en-
force sodomy statute against homosexuals); Buchanan, supra note 104, at 1270 (assert-
ing that Bowers Court limited its holding to determining constitutionality of statute as
applied to homosexual sodomy). See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey for proposition that intimate choices of married
and unmarried persons concerning decision to engage in non-procreative sexual activ-
ity are form of liberty protected by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). See
also Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1077 (noting thatJustice Stevens concluded that liberty
protected by Court's privacy jurisprudence encompassed right of married and single
heterosexual persons to engage in non-procreative sexual activity, and every citizen has
same interest in such liberty).
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prior decision in Loving v. Virginia, 26 a case which invalidated
legislation outlawing certain interracial marriages, to criticize
the majority's attachment to the American history and tradition
of banning sodomy.26 Analogizing the prohibition of sodomy
to the statutory prohibition in Loving, Justice Stevens argued that
the history and tradition of criminalizing miscegenation could
not save such legislation from constitutional challenge.27
Next, asserting that the selective application of Georgia's
generally applicable statute to homosexuals must be supported
by a neutral and legitimate purpose, Justice Stevens concluded
that the State must identify an interest more significant than
aversion for or ignorance about homosexuals.271 Justice Stevens
concluded that the Court cannot rely on Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute, which does not single out homosexuals for disfavored treat-
ment, to support its holding unless it is prepared to conclude
that an entire ban on sodomy is constitutional.27 2 Justice Ste-
vens' analysis, namely his rejection of morality as a legitimate
State interest, forms the central point of the Court's holding sev-
enteen years later in Lawrence.273
268. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
269. See id. at 11-12 (invalidating statute on grounds of equal protection); Katz,
supra note 265, at 428 (mentioning Justice Stevens' reliance on Loving); Samuel A.
Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 81 GEo. L.J. 1, 5 n.26 (1992) (arguing that dissents in Bowers understated
importance of Loving to anti-gay discrimination).
270. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 n.9 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (stating that miscegena-
tion was once treated as criminal conduct similar to sodomy); Katz, supra note 265, at
428 (noting thatJustice Stevens relied on lesson taught by Loving); Wolf, supra note 98,
at 117 (observing that Bowers majority, unlike Loving or Zablocki Courts, was motivated
by prior discrimination).
271. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216, 218, 219, 220 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (arguing that
because all free citizens have same interest in liberty as members of majority, State must
articulate reason for applying generally applicable law to limited class of persons);
Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1077 (observing that Justice Stevens found that Georgia's
interest constituted nothing more than consistent dislike for or ignorance about homo-
sexuals); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that neither stat-
ute nor prosecution has met burden of justifying selective application of generally ap-
plicable legislation).
272. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that Georgia
voters have presumably expressed belief that all sodomy, and not just homosexual sod-
omy, is immoral, and criticizing statutory justification posited by Bowers majority as inac-
curate); Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that although statute in Bowers did not distin-
guish between same-sex and heterosexual sodomy, Court narrowly framed issue as en-
compassing homosexual sodomy).
273. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483-84 (2003) (adopting Justice Ste-
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2. The Court's New Rule: Extending the Right of Privacy
or Ending All Morals-Based Legislation?
On its face, the Lawrence Court seems to extend the right of
privacy to protect private consensual sodomy between homosex-
ual adults. 274 From the outset, the Lawrence Court specifically
chooses to analyze the case under the substantive dimension of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the con-
stitutional provision consistently employed by the Court to assess
whether the right of privacy protects an asserted liberty.
275
Under the substantive component of this constitutional provi-
sion, States cannot infringe fundamental liberty interests unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest.276 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia
vens' analysis in Bowers); Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (discussing Lawrence's reliance on
Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers).
274. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (holding that homosexual persons have funda-
mental right to engage in consensual sodomy without governmental restraint). See also
Goldberg, supra note 131, at 631 n.7 (describing Lawrence as recognizing liberty interest
of homosexual persons in making decisions regarding private consensual sexual activ-
ity); Ward, supra note 130 (noting that Lawrence invalidates State sodomy law as uncon-
stitutional violation of right of privacy). But see Leonard, supra note 51 (arguing that in
recent years, majority of Court has "backed away" from theory of constitutional pri-
vacy). Leonard argues that the current trend in the Court is to seek a more direct
"textual" basis for claimed constitutional rights, e.g., by employing the term "liberty."
Id. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (protecting petitioners' conduct as exercise of liberty
protected by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, rather than pursuant to
constitutional right of privacy); Leonard, supra note 51 (observing developing fashion
among justices in seeking more direct textual basis for claimed constitutional rights).
See generally Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (employing term "liberty" twenty times and "pri-
vacy" three times throughout entire majority opinion, not including direct quotations
from prior cases).
275. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (declining to address constitutional challenge
on equal protection grounds). See also Goldberg, supra note 131, at 631 n.7 (describing
Lawrence as recognizing liberty interest of homosexual persons in making decisions re-
garding private consensual sexual activity); Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (including Law-
rence as part of Court's substantive due process jurisprudence).
276. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (describing elements of sub-
stantive due process analysis); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965)
(Goldberg, J. concurring) (noting that States cannot infringe fundamental personal
liberties without showing compelling interest); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 686 (1977) (holding that where decision as fundamental as deciding whether to
bear or beget child is concerned, regulations burdening that right must be narrowly
tailored to advancing compelling State interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)
(finding that where certain fundamental liberties are involved, Court has held that laws
restricting those rights may only be justified by compelling State interests and must be
narrowly tailored to serving those interests). See also Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (discuss-
ing elements of Court's substantive due process jurisprudence); Robert Chesney, Old
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criticizes the Lawrence majority for its incomplete substantive due
process analysis. 277
Justice Scalia first criticizes the majority's substantive due
process analysis for its failure to characterize homosexual sod-
omy as a fundamental right.278 As an initial matter, the substan-
tive due process inquiry requires the Court to determine
whether the pertinent legislation infringes a fundamental
right.279  In order to make this determination, the Court must
ascertain whether the right at issue is deeply rooted in the his-
tory of this Nation.280 While the Lawrence majority focuses on
evidence that early sodomy laws were not directed at homosex-
ual conduct "as a distinct matter, "281 Justice Scalia argues that
the fact that homosexual sodomy was criminalized as part of a
Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and
Executive Action, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 981, 983 (2000) (noting that Court has employed
inconsistent frameworks in its substantive due process jurisprudence).
277. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
application of substantive due process). See also Leonard, supra note 51 (asserting that
Justice Kennedy's methodology was "calculated" to enrage Justice Scalia); Grossman,
supra note 118 (describing Justice Scalia's dissent as "angry").
278. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488, 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that ma-
jority never once describes homosexual sodomy as fundamental right). See also Gross-
man, supra note 118 (noting that "oddly," Lawrence Court does not explicitly character-
ize homosexual sodomy as fundamental right); Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that
Justice Kennedy does not employ term "fundamental right"). But see Loveless, supra
note 131, at 396 n. 77 (arguing that Lawrence elevates private consensual sodomy to
fundamental rights status).
279. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301-02 (defining elements of substantive due process);
Constitutional Law, 32 STETSON L. Rv. 561, 566 (2003) (noting that substantive due
process applies only to fundamental liberties); Jason J. Bach, Students Have Rights, Too:
The Drafting of Student Conduct Codes, 2003 B.Y.U. EDuc. & L.J. 1, 30 (2003) (asserting
that substantive due process protects certain fundamental liberties).
280. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (noting that fun-
damental rights analysis protects those liberties that are deeply rooted in history and
tradition of this Nation). See also Russell, supra note 97, at 1512 n.245 (revealing that in
order to ascertain whether legislation infringes fundamental right, Court must deter-
mine whether claimed liberty satisfies Palko, Moore or similar test of fundamental
rights).
281. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79 (discussing history of sodomy laws and not-
ing that in colonial times and nineteenth century, prohibitions against sodomy did not
distinguish between heterosexuals and homosexuals); Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1087-
88 (noting that while homosexual intimacy existed in earlier eras, assumption that ho-
mosexual persons were fundamentally different from heterosexuals only developed in
late nineteenth century); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479 (asserting that U.S. laws targeting
homosexual couples are not deeply rooted in history, but developed in last third of
twentieth century); Ryan, supra note 50, at 9 (arguing that Justice Kennedy provides
lengthy but not very convincing discussion that laws specifically directed at same-sex
sodomy are of relatively recent origin).
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general prohibition of non-reproductive sexual conduct and not
singled out as a specific offense does not render such conduct
deeply rooted in the history of this Nation.2 8 2 Justice Scalia then
criticizes the majority for its "emerging awareness" rhetoric (the
contention that legal scholarship has recognized that liberty af-
fords protection to private sexual activity between consenting
adults), and asserts that such a claim does not establish a funda-
mental right and furthermore, is factually inaccurate.283
Second, Justice Scalia argues that the majority fails to sub-
ject Texas' sodomy statute to the appropriate standard of review
for fundamental rights. 28 4  In order to survive constitutional
challenge, legislation implicating a fundamental liberty interest
must withstand strict scrutiny, a heightened form of analysis
which requires applicable legislation to further a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieving that inter-
est.28 5 Justice Scalia finds, however, that the Lawrence majority
applies rational basis review to the State legislation, invalidating
the Texas statute for lacking a legitimate State interest that
would justify its interference with an individual's consensual inti-
mate decisions.286 Arguing that the majority neither declares ho-
282. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice
Kennedy's argument that sodomy laws were not distinctly directed at homosexuals does
not erode historical premise upon which Bowers relied); Grossman, supra note 118 (as-
serting that Lawrence Court never explicitly identifies homosexual sodomy as fundamen-
tal liberty interest). But see Loveless, supra note 131, at 396 n. 77 (arguing that Lawrence
affords fundamental rights status to private consensual sodomy).
283. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that
majority circumvents requisite fundamental liberties test); Ryan, supra note 50, at 7
(declaring that Lawrence Court chooses not to find fundamental right to engage in sod-
omy); Leonard, supra note 51 (asserting thatJustice Kennedy never employs term "fun-
damental right" to describe right claimed by petitioners).
284. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488, 2495 (criticizing majority for asserting that
morality lacks rational basis in law); Grossman, supra note 118 (asserting that Lawrence
Court's language resembles rational basis review and not strict scrutiny). But see Leo-
nard, supra note 51 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy was declaring that Texas' statute
failed even most lenient standard of review).
285. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491-92 (noting that only fundamental rights qual-
ify for strict scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J.
concurring) (noting that States cannot infringe fundamental personal liberties without
showing compelling interest). See also Haywood, supra note 61, at 183 (noting that post-
Griswold and Eisenstadt, Court applied strict scrutiny standard in cases implicating right
of privacy).
286. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing majority's
scrutiny standard as "unheard-of form of rational-basis review"); Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at
2484 (invalidating State statute for furthering no legitimate State interest). The Law-
rence majority states that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate [S]tate interest
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mosexual sodomy a fundamental right nor subjects Texas' sod-
omy statute to the appropriate standard of review for fundamen-
tal rights, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority for overruling
Bowers while leaving its central holding "untouched. 2 87 Lastly,
finding that Texas' interest in morality constitutes a legitimate
State interest, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority's holding as
announcing an end to all morals-based legislation.288
III. THE WESTERN SCHOLAR'S PARADOX: FINDING
THE REAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
For more than ten centuries, Islamic jurisprudence has
maintained a thick wall through which the State cannot pene-
trate when prosecuting individuals for engaging in consensual
sex. Forbidding the State from unlawfully entering one's private
dwelling, Islamic law has rendered prosecutions for private con-
sensual sex virtually impossible. Until 2003, however, American
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Id.
Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (describing rational basis review as reduced level of scrutiny
applicable to non-fundamental liberty interests, noting that most legislation withstands
this easily satisfied form of review, and asserting that Lawrence Court resolves case pursu-
ant to rational basis review); Grossman, supra note 118 (noting that Lawrence Court
seemingly employs rational basis review, and not strict scrutiny, to invalidate State stat-
ute); Ryan, supra note 50, at 7 (arguing that by refusing to find fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, Justice Kennedy is "forced" to examine Texas' sodomy
legislation pursuant to rational basis review); Grossman, supra note 118 (asserting that
language employed by Lawrence Court resembles that used to describe fundamental
rights, and thus foreshadows use of strict scrutiny). But see Leonard, supra note 51 (sug-
gesting that Justice Kennedy was asserting that Texas' statute failed even most lenient
standard of review). Under this interpretation, if the Texas statute failed even the most
relaxed standard of review, it would not conceivably withstand strict scrutiny. Id.
287. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting that majority
overrules Bowers but does not establish homosexual sodomy as fundamental right). In
his dissent, Justice Scalia asserts that the Lawrence majority does not overrule the hold-
ing in Bowers because the majority neither describes homosexual sodomy as a funda-
mental right nor subjects Texas' statute to strict scrutiny. Id. at 2492. Rather, the major-
ity holds that the State statute fails rational-basis review. Id. Ryan, supra note 50, at 7
(discussing relaxed nature of rational basis test); Grossman, supra note 118 (asserting
that Lawrence majority never explicitly describes homosexual sodomy as fundamental
liberty interest).
288. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495, 2498 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that mo-
rality is legitimate State interest). See also Leonard, supra note 51 (noting that Justice
Scalia predicts that majority's holding could cast shadow on legislation prohibiting sex
crimes); Grossman, supra note 118 (noting that Justice Scalia predicts that range of sex
crimes would be invalidated as result of majority's holding).
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States could, and in fact did, initiate such prosecutions. 289 Law-
rence reveals that the American impetus for prohibiting these
prosecutions is significantly distinct from that of the Islamic
State.
By arguing that morality is an inadequate justification for
State regulation of private consensual sex between adults, the
U.S. Supreme Court has subtly shifted away from recognizing
privacy-related rights towards taking a stance against morals-
based legislation. Notwithstanding the fact that the greater part
of the opinion discusses the right of privacy, the Lawrence Court's
anti-morals legislation rhetoric determines the -holding of the
case.
Islamic evidence law and the consequences of evidentiary
transgression, on the other hand, act as a de jure restriction to
initiating zina prosecutions. Combined with theological and pri-
vacy-related regulations, which act as deterrents to such prosecu-
tions, these evidentiary requirements create a zone of privacy
that protects private consensual sex from State regulation. Ex-
ploring the ramifications of the Court's anti-morals legislation
posture reveals that there is a significant difference between
characterizing conduct as a privacy-right and identifying legisla-
tion as lacking rational basis. This distinction also reveals that
despite the caricature embraced by many Western thinkers, the
real right of privacy resides in Islamic jurisprudence.
A. Islamic Law: Finding Consistency in Privacy and
Morals-Based Legislation
1. Regulating Zina: Restricting State Control and Encouraging
Private Repentance over Public Confession
While Islam classifies acts of non-marital sex as crimes
agaihst God, it does not subject private consensual sexual activity
to unwarranted intrusion by the State.29 Islamic jurisprudence
has interpreted the Qur'an's quadruple testimony standard for
289. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
290. See supra notes 1-2, 255-56 and accompanying text (drawing distinction be-
tween Islamic State's power to prosecute individual for private acts of sex and duty of
individual to God).
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zina as requiring actual observance of sexual penetration. 211
Given these strict evidentiary requirements, the crime of zina is
one of public indecency rather than private sexual activity. 29 2
Criminalization of the public display of two nude individuals en-
gaging in sexual conduct does not implicate any aspect of the
privacy right as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.29 3 Rather,
such criminalization is necessary for preserving public health, or-
der, and morality, and protecting against non-ancillary moral ef-
fects, rationales that the U.S. Supreme Court itself has affirmed
in upholding the validity of public indecency statutes.294 Con-
sider the application of zina to the Supreme Court sodomy cases.
With Islamic regulations protecting reasonable expectations of
privacy in the home and the strict quadruple testimony standard
for proving intercourse, prosecutions against the defendants in
Bowers and Lawrence, at least under the majority of Sunni schools
which consider homosexual intercourse as zina, would have
likely failed at the trial level for lack of evidentiary support, while
the prosecutor and any testifying witnesses would have been
guilty of slander.29 5
Furthermore, Islamic jurisprudence strongly discourages
and resists accepting confessions even if prosecutorial evidence
is weak. 9 6 Rather, Islam emphasizes the importance of hiding
the faults of Muslims and encourages private repentance over
public confession and public discussion of sins.2 9 7
2. Legal and Therlogical Deterrents to Initiating
Zina Prosecutions
The classification of zina as a public indecency crime creates
291. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary require-
ments for zina and implications of these requirements).
292. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (noting that zina is actually
crime of public indecency).
293. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing public indecency stat-
utes in United States).
294. See supra notes 157, 264 and accompanying text (discussing public indecency
laws in United States).
295. See supra notes 152-53, 158-68 and accompanying text (discussing personal
security in Islam, crime of defamation, and strict standard of proof attached to zina
prosecutions).
296. See supra notes 172-89 and accompanying text (discussing confession in Is-
lamic jurisprudence).
297. See supra notes 169, 189 and accompanying text (discussing preference for
private repentance and concealing sins in Islam).
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a two-pronged right of privacy. First, the strict evidentiary re-
quirements implicated in zina prosecutions reflect a desire not
to authorize the State to punish private sexual conduct, but to
preserve public morality by preventing public acts of inde-
cency.298 As such, these requirements create a zone of privacy
that protects private consensual sex as against government au-
thority. Second, legislation prescribing mandatory punishment
for accusations of zina in the absence of four competent wit-
nesses, and prohibitions against the dissemination of scandal,
both reflecting the Shari'ah's interest in minding one's own bus-
iness and concealing the consensual sexual indiscretions of
others, combine to create a zone of privacy that protects private
consensual sex as against the community.299 By discouraging ac-
cusations of zina and restricting zina prosecutions, Islamic regu-
lations criminalizing slander and the Islamic ban against circulat-
ing hearsay regarding another's alleged indiscretions further
emphasize the public nature of the crime of zina. 00
This zone of privacy, however, is not a mere inevitability of
Islamic regulations. Rather, granting the freedom from govern-
mental intrusion, the Shari'ah expresses an affirmative right of
privacy that protects private consensual sex from State interfer-
ence.3 0 ' By espousing a self-conscious perception of privacy, the
Shari'ah affords individuals reasonable expectations of privacy
from unwarranted government intrusion. As State agents can-
not unlawfully enter or search one's home, let alone peek into
another's residence, where consensual sex would typically occur,
Islamic jurisprudence prevents the prosecution of individuals
298. See supra notes 2, 232, 255-57 and accompanying text (drawing distinction
between State's regulation of public and private morality).
299. See supra notes 158-63, 169 and accompanying text (discussing crime of slan-
der and prohibition of spreading gossip and propagating scandal).
300. See supra notes 156, 158-63, 169 and accompanying text (demonstrating diffi-
culty of initiating zina prosecution unless offenders are engaging in public act of sex,
and revealing preference for abstaining from gossiping about sexual indiscretions of
others).
301. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing proprietary and
personal security rights in Islam).
302. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (revealing that Qur'anic re-
quirement of knocking before entering and injunction against spying further support
concept that Islamic law provides individuals with reasonable expectations of privacy
within home).
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who engage in consensual sex in the privacy of their homes. 03
Furthermore, if State agents disregard privacy-related injunc-
tions and unlawfully search, enter, or spy into one's home, most
scholars agree that the evidence obtained through this violation
of privacy is inadmissible as proof of criminal misconduct.3"4 Ac-
cordingly, Islamic jurisprudential rules on privacy, affording in-
dividuals "the right to be let alone," act as a dejure restriction to
zina prosecutions.3" 5
3. Ta'azir: Circumscribing Right of Privacy?
One of three classes of punishment in Islamic jurispru-
dence, the hadd comprises only one criminal category associated
with the regulation of sexuality and morality.30 6 The distinctions
between the ta'azir and hadd penalties enumerated in Part II ar-
guably reject an absolute right of privacy from State restraint
with respect to private consensual sexual activity not amounting
to zina.30 7 That is, if the State can shut down a brothel without
the strict evidentiary requirements implicated in the crime of
zina, the right of privacy may be less than absolute. 08 The same
logic could apply to zina cases that are liable to ta'azir for lack of
evidence. "
However, privacy rights are still protected in both circum-
stances. As for the brothel hypothetical, rather than circum-
scribing the right of privacy, the doctrine of ta'azir can be justifi-
ably applied in this context as a form of secular welfare legisla-
tion.310 As for the application of ta'azir to cases of zina, the fact
that no other hadd crime has such specific evidentiary require-
303. See supra notes 166-67, 255-56 and accompanying text (discussing protections
against unlawful State intrusion in Islam).
304. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (discussing consequences of
State intrusion into privacy).
305. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text (discussing privacy rights with
respect to property, personal security, and correspondence in Islam).
306. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
ta'azir to private intimate and consensual acts).
307. See supra notes 242-45, 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing lower stan-
dard of proof and residual character of ta'azir).
308. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
ta'azir to private intimate conduct).
309. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of ta'azir
to persons who escaped hadd penalty for lack of evidence).
310. See supra notes 157, 251-53 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
ta'azir to entering brothel and noting comparable issue in American jurisprudence).
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ments (four witnesses) and the fact that no other hadd punish-
ment carries slander punishments for failure to bring those evi-
dence requirements, reveal that zina has special privacy consid-
erations that other crimes do not.3"'
B. U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence: Sweeping Privacy Aside and
Signaling the Demise of Morals-Based Legislation
While the U.S. Supreme Court had been expanding the
right of privacy since the early days of Griswold, the scope of this
right was restricted by Bowers v. Hardwick. In 2003, however, the
Court resurrected its expansive reading of privacy when it de-
cided Lawrence v. Texas. Although the Court claims that the is-
sue in Lawrence implicates the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause, the opinion fails to follow any semblance of the
fundamental rights analysis that the Court has consistently re-
quired in sustaining a claim of substantive due process.3" 2
While the Lawrence Court provides evidence to support the
notion that consensual homosexual sodomy is a fundamental
right, it fails to prove this essential element of substantive due
process.313 Rather, the majority circumvents this essential analy-
sis by focusing on evidence that early sodomy laws were not di-
rected at homosexual conduct "as a distinct matter" and subse-
quently cloaks the requisite tradition analysis underneath its
"emerging awareness" rhetoric.3" 4 As the fundamental rights
query focuses on whether the right at issue is deeply rooted in
history and tradition, the majority's argument is inapposite.3 15
Even if the Court's rhetoric impliedly establishes that Texas'
statute infringed a fundamental liberty interest, the Court still
fails to subject the statute to the more rigorous standard of strict
scrutiny, the second requirement of substantive due process
311. See supra notes 151, 158-59, 169, 246-47 and accompanying text (discussing
ban on publicly discussing sexual indiscretions of others).
312. See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's criti-
cism of majority's application of substantive due process in Lawrence).
313. See supra notes 123-25, 281-83 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence
Court's fundamental rights analysis and application of tradition).
314. See id. (describing Lawrence Court's application of history-and-tradition test).
315. See supra notes 97-98, 280 and accompanying text (discussing requirements
for evaluating fundamental nature of claimed right in substantive due process jurispru-
dence).
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analysis.3 16 Where pertinent legislation infringes a fundamental
right, such as the right of privacy, the Court has repeatedly af-
firmed that such legislation must survive strict scrutiny.3 17 The
Lawrence Court cannot conceivably apply the more relaxed ra-
tional-basis review to legislation involving infringement of a fun-
damental liberty interest.3"'
Paradoxically, Justice Scalia was correct when he exposes
the deficiencies of the majority's opinion and accuses the major-
ity for conducting an incomplete analysis in assessing the funda-
mental rights status of homosexual sodomy." 9
The Court's failure to adhere to this standard raises a larger
flaw in its constitutional privacy analysis: had the desire to articu-
late a right of privacy for private homosexual sodomy between
consenting adults steered the Court's opinion, as it should have,
the opinion would have closely, or at least somewhat, followed
the above chain of analysis. 20
The Court's incomplete analysis in Lawrence raises a compel-
ling query: if the right of privacy does not guide Lawrence's hold-
ing, then how does the Court strike down Texas' sodomy statute
as well as seventeen years of precedent circumscribing the scope
of privacy? The operative section of the opinion begins and ends
in the third to last paragraph, where the Court declares that the
statute fails to advance any legitimate State interest.12 ' Immedi-
ately before it strikes down Texas' sodomy statute, the majority
invokes Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers rejecting the legitimacy
of morals-based legislation. 322 In fact, the majority's assertion
that morality is not a legitimate State interest and its ensuing
application of rational-basis review reveal that the Court's cur-
rent privacy jurisprudence is more influenced by the desire to
316. See supra notes 130, 284-87 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate
standard of review in substantive due process analysis)
317. See supra notes 276, 285 and accompanying text (discussing conditions, in-
cluding heightened form of analysis, for substantive due process jurisprudence).
318. See supra notes 276, 286 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that
fundamental rights withstand strict scrutiny or be invalidated as unconstitutional).
319. See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in Lawrence).
320. See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for
substantive due process analysis).
321. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (describing Lawrence Court's hold-
ing that State statute does not further legitimate State interest).
322. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting that Lawrence Court
adopted Justice Stevens' analysis in Bowers).
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eradicate morals-based legislation than the interest in champion-
ing the constitutionally-derived right of privacy:
In this way, it is the Court's anti-morals legislation rhetoric,
and not its privacy rights language, that determines the holding
in Lawrence. Although consuming more than ninety percent of
the Court's opinion, Lawrence's rhetoric on privacy paradoxically
represents mere dicta. 324 In fact, the majority's language - voic-
ing the term "privacy" only three times and the term "liberty"
twenty times - reveals that the Court is "backing away" from pro-
tecting conduct pursuant to the right of privacy.3 2 5
The Court's persistence in eradicating morals legislation ef-
fectively protects consensual homosexual sodomy between adults
acting in private.3 26 The Lawrence Court's conclusion that moral-
ity lacks rational basis implicates the viability of statutes proscrib-
ing public indecency.327 If morals-based legislation fails the
more relaxed standard of rational basis review, on what basis
then is public indecency prohibited? The Lawrence Court fails to
specify whether its holding implicates all morals or simply morals
in the private sphere.328 At least three potential resolutions
emerge from the Court's ambiguity. First, if the Court intended
to define "morals" as morals in the private sphere, the Court's
resolution follows the jurisprudential trajectory of Islam. 29 Lan-
guage in the Lawrence opinion supports this interpretation. The
Court mentions that historically, a large number of prosecutions
for adult consensual homosexual sodomy involved conduct in a
323. See supra notes 130, 288 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence Court's
use of rational basis review in striking down morals-based law).
324. See supra note 286 (suggesting that because Lawrence was resolved pursuant to
rational basis review, its holding rested on concept that statute lacked any legitimate
State interest).
325. See supra note 274 (suggesting that Lawrence Court is not protecting conduct
at issue pursuant to constitutional right of privacy).
326. See supra notes 259-62, 265, 288 and accompanying text (revealing that Su-
preme Court's anti-morals legislation rhetoric protects private sexual activity between
consenting adults).
327. See supra notes 157, 263-64 (discussing public indecency statutes in United
States).
328. See supra notes 130, 286 and accompanying text (revealing that Lawrence
Court merely discusses morality in general sense of term).
329. See supra notes 93, 156-67, 232, 256 and accompanying text (discussing public
indecency laws in United States and drawing distinction between State's power to regu-
late private and public morality in Islam).
PRIVACY IN ISLAMIC JURISPR UDENCE
public space.3"t Tolerating criminalization of consensual sex
committed in public, the Court's reference to this Nation's pub-
lic indecency prosecutions demonstrates that such prosecutions
are valid.3"' This fact would suggest that the better rule would
be a zina evidentiary rule where the crime would only be pun-
ished if conducted in public.
Second, the Court may sustain the validity of public inde-
cency statutes through the approach espoused by Justice Black-
mun in his dissent in Bowers whereby the right of privacy protects
an individual against having sexual activity "imposed" on her in
public. 2 However, a fair reading of the Court's dicta illustrates
that public morals do not necessarily constitute a legitimate State
interest worthy of regulation, and thus the Court may have in-
cluded its discussion of public displays of sexual behavior as an
example of sexual conduct prosecutable for non-moral rea-
sons. 3 1 Construed as such, the Court's rejection of morals as an
inadequate state interest arguably applies to morals in both the
private and public spheres, and if the Court anticipated an all-
encompassing rejection of morals-based legislation, the prohibi-
tion of public indecency is then justified not by morals, but by
ancillary non-moral effects. 34 As a result, the Court's under-
standing of public indecency laws might be grounded in the the-
ory of public interest and protection, rather than public moral-
ity.
CONCLUSION
While the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence
v. Texas was actually decided on anti-morals legislation and not
privacy grounds, Islam places privacy interests at the heart of
every prosecution for consensual sex crimes. These privacy
rights, although inherent to Islamic jurisprudence, are too often
buried underneath patriarchal biases and traditions which are
330. See supra notes 34, 52 (discussing selective enforcement of laws regulating
consensual sexual activity).
331. See supra note 52 (discussing history of selectively prosecuting only public acts
of sodomy).
332. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's
argument for drawing distinction between laws banning public indecency and those
restricting private sexual conduct).
333. See supra note 157 (discussing non-moral justifications for public indecency
statutes).
334. See id. (discussing secondary non-moral effects of public indecency).
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responsible for the corrupt implementation of a criminal system
that engenders criticism and condemnation from the interna-
tional community. Islamic jurists, local human rights groups,
scholars, and especially women, must work together to bring the
Islamic ideal to their legal systems, for only when the Muslim
world amends its misconstruals of the Islamic legal system can
the international world be better suited to amend theirs.
